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Summary 
 
Migration is a global phenomenon and a sociological problem. As national boundaries 
are traversed at a greater density and more cross-cultural contact takes place, new 
modes of adjustment between migrants and non-migrants are inevitably produced, and 
problematised. Migration is therefore a journey, one that is replete with constant 
interaction and conflict. This thesis focuses on the increasingly sizeable Singaporean 
migrant "community" in Perth – a community of voluntary "quitters" who, from the state's 
point of view, leave for the greener pastures of Australia to escape the pressurising 
demands of modern Singapore society. It aims to investigate the ways in which migrants 
reinvent their identities amidst increasingly transnational conditions; how different modes 
of adjustment are employed by different "types" of migrants; and ultimately, whether this 
group of migrants form a cohesive migrant community characterised by strong social 
and symbolic ties.  
 Over the course of my fieldwork, I discovered that what I had been searching for 
– a community of interconnected migrants – was essentially an elusive and imaginary 
construct. What I found were scattered groups of informal networks that were formed 
around specific interests, rather than a cohesive "community" of voluntary migrants 
characterised by mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust. In fact, the opposite 
was uncovered – general fragmentation along post-national lines due largely to endemic 
negative self-essentialisation, resulting in mutual avoidance by many migrants. This 
resulted in weak social ties, a condition whereby mutual exchange (through social ties) 
and the convertibility of social capital for bounded community solidarity were 
unachievable. Nevertheless, symbolic ties in the form of ethnicity, food and the notion of 
"home" continue to operate as cultural resources that reinvent migrant identities amidst 
perceived oppositional contact in the host society. A symbolic community of 
  viii 
Singaporean migrants is therefore discursively constructed, despite the absence of 
social ties at the aggregate level.  
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INTRODUCING THE SINGAPOREAN MIGRANT: 
Issues and Trends in Contemporary Migration 
Research 
 
Migration and transnationalism are two prominent concepts in the social science 
literature today. Singapore is not known as an emigrant or sending society; yet currently, 
we are witnessing an outflow of educated middle to upper middle class Singaporeans, 
not as economic transmigrants, but voluntary migrants who view the "greener pastures" 
of Australia and Canada as attractive locations for permanent settlement. This trend may 
seem rather odd at first, given that Singapore – a First World society – has no internal 
conflict or natural disasters to induce these exits. However in 2005, more Singaporeans 
emigrated to Perth in Western Australia than at any other point in Singapore's short 
history, constituting the largest number and making Perth the most popular destination 
for voluntary migrants. The “popularity” of these exits was not lost on Singaporean 
politicians, prompting former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to remark sardonically that 
increased government housing subsidies ultimately enable more Singaporeans to 
purchase cheaper homes in Australia. Significantly, this was not the first time that 
Singaporean politicians have publicly condemned emigration (see Sullivan and 
Gunasekaran 1994), which culminated in Goh’s infamous “quitters-stayers” speech in 
2002 (Today, August 19 20021). Consequently, an increasingly insidious paradox is 
gripping Singaporean politicians: how to globalise, yet keep Singaporeans rooted to the 
country?  
 
1.1 Migration, Forms-of-Capital, and the Formation of Migrant Communities  
 
This thesis examines contemporary trends pertaining to Singaporean emigration to Perth 
in Western Australia. It seeks to answer the puzzle regarding why so many 
                                            
1 See appendices 1A, B, C and D for examples of the flurry of debates that emerged following the 
speech.  
1 
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Singaporeans are emigrating and why so many are concentrated in Perth, which has 
often been characterised as a boring retirement home, instead of other Australian cities. 
More significantly, since there are now approximately 13,000 ex-Singaporeans living in 
Perth – without accounting for students and some economic transmigrants – do they 
organise into a cohesive migrant community characterised by mutual solidarity, 
reciprocal obligations and trust? Thus, the thesis not only explains the diffusion patterns 
of migrants, but also their modes of incorporation and ways of belonging in Australian 
society. I use a forms-of-capital approach in my analysis, which has become increasingly 
popular in migration studies and immigrant adaptation after it was originally introduced 
by Douglas Massey et al (1987; 1998), and later extended and refined by Thomas Faist 
(2000). In some parts, I assess the heuristic value of transnationalism, as opposed to 
transnational approaches, as a useful analytical framework in contemporary 
understandings of the Singapore-Perth migration system.  
 This qualitative approach is based solely on in-depth interviews with members of 
the migrant community, and partially on my own status as an “insider”2. My central 
argument is that the Singapore-Perth migration system is characterised by fragmentation 
along post-national3 lines. I will show that rather than organising themselves into a 
cohesive community – characterised by mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust 
– their multifarious conditions of exit, coupled with their high “stocks” of capital in various 
forms (resulting in the non-functionality of social capital), generalised mistrust and 
endemic self-essentialisation among ex-Singaporeans themselves (resulting in the 
dysfunctionality of social capital), and the social-political contexts of both home and host 
                                            
2 That is, as a permanent resident (PR) in Perth.  
3 I employ this term without any theoretical connotations, suggesting that fragmentation does not 
occur on class, ethnic, religious, or generational levels. "Transnational" does not suffice, because 
I will show later that many Singaporean migrants are not transnationals. "National" also does not 
connote the right images, since many intend to sever political ties. Post-national seems to be the 
best term, since it connotes a sense of the national; that is, Singaporean in some ways, but at the 
same time not-Singaporean in other ways.  
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societies, all contribute towards a fragmented migrant community at the aggregate level. 
Despite community fragmentation, I will show how Singaporean migrants reinvent their 
identities along post-national culturally-symbolic lines at the individual level, and 
continue to imagine their “homes” in multiple ways. A central assumption of the thesis is 
this: rather than assume that most migrants necessarily coalesce into a tightly-knit 
migrant community by successfully converting various resources into social capital for 
adaptation purposes, migrants' capital may in fact have dysfunctional effects on 
community formation.  
 
1.2 Motivations for Emigration to Perth and the Concept of the Transnational 
Migrant – Uprooted, or Re-routed? 
 
Why do Singaporeans emigrate, and why are so many congregating in Perth? This 
seemingly simplistic question is problematised by the very diverse motivations of exit, 
which are historically informed by state-society conditions, producing different "types" of 
migrants with different adaptation strategies. Yet, I suggest that one consistent feature 
remains: general disenchantment with the Singaporean system or way of life, or feelings 
of marginalisation. Thus, unlike most of the world's 170 million international migrants (my 
own calculations, based on Faist's [2000:3] estimate), most Singaporean migrants in 
Perth are not labour migrants, nor refugees, nor economic transmigrants. They are 
essentially voluntary migrants who have intentionally uprooted to start a new life in 
Perth. Emigration may very well become a family affair, but it is not induced for profit 
maximisation. In contrast, the Vietnamese boat people who emigrated to Australia in the 
mid 1970s were predominantly refugees (Thomas 1997; Viviani 1984), just like the 
Croatians in Sweden (Frykman 2002), or the Eritreans in Europe during their struggle for 
independence from Ethiopia (Koser 2002). Insofar as motivations for migration are 
concerned, the Singaporean group arguably constitutes a unique North-North 
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(developed to developed society movements) empirical study in the international 
migration literature4, and no one single theory on migration can adequately explain the 
Singapore-Perth migration system due to its heterogeneity.  
 
Of migration and transnational migration (and, of migrants and transmigrants) 
Theoretically, the different approaches between international migration and transnational 
frameworks can be captured by a simple general observation. The former have largely 
focused on the macro-structural forces that induce and sustain migratory movements 
over time, including micro-rational theories which focus on top-down, structurally 
determinate economic processes that largely ignore migrants' "voices" at the individual 
level. The latter, however, mostly engage in micro-level discursive analyses and 
migrants' "voices" in their adaptation patterns and modes of immigrant incorporation, 
rather than the causes of emigration per se. Two general premises stand out: firstly, the 
fluid but interlocking linkages between home and host societies, culminating in a single 
social field of relations due to time-space compression. Thus, not only do people 
migrate, but so do goods, ideas, and symbols. Secondly, as a significant corollary to the 
first, is the conceptual decoupling (or detachment) of the individual from macro-structural 
societal forces, such as the state, because migrants are now increasingly mobile and 
"displaced" subjects. Concomitantly, dual nationality statuses and other signs of multi-
state/national connections are taken as increasing signs of transnationality and declining 
state hegemony (Sassen 1996; Tambini 2001).  
 However, as my research in Perth shows, the majority are not transnational 
migrants, despite holding dual nationality statuses. Rather than focusing on transnational 
migrants per se, we should focus on the practices that reflect transnationality, other than 
                                            
4 The dominant literature so far suggests that South-North (developing to developed societies) 
migratory patterns are characteristic features of historical and contemporary international 
migration systems. 
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property ownership or occasional return visits. Subsequently, where my analysis 
converges with transnational approaches lies in my emphasis on adaptation patterns 
and migrant discourses rather than the macro-structural forces that promote migration. 
Diverse conditions of exit are but one subset of a larger picture that hampers the 
formation of a cohesive migrant community. I will therefore offer detailed accounts of the 
factors that induce emigration from a state-society perspective. 
 
1.3 Forms-of-Capital and the Fragmentation of Community Life 
 
The theory of social capital5 advanced by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988) stresses 
one significant point: its fungibility or convertibility, whereby the utility of its resources is 
premised upon shared, interactive ties among members based on 'social obligations' 
(Bourdieu 1986:243) among connected agents. Within migration systems, social capital 
inheres in the social and symbolic ties that connect migrants and non-migrants alike 
within the transnational space of social relations (Faist 2000). In this thesis, I am only 
concerned with the adaptive functions of social capital.  
 A similar conceptual tack is maintained in studies on immigrant adaptation and 
modes of incorporation, whereby social capital is theoretically enforceable through trust 
and bounded by solidarity (Portes and Sensenbrenner 2004), emphasising not only its 
shared quality and fungibility, but also its potential fragility or dysfunctionality – a 
possibility that Coleman (1988) did not theoretically envisage. Social capital should 
therefore not only be viewed from the celebratory position of instrumentally positive 
(economic) gains alone, because as Portes and Sensenbrenner (2004:290) argue, 'the 
same social mechanisms that give rise to appropriable resources for individual use can 
also constrain action or even derail it from its original goals'. Might the prevalence of high 
                                            
5 Although I am aware that Pierre Bourdieu's name is synonymous with this theory, it has also 
made its way into other areas, such as migration and immigrant adaptation.  
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"stocks" of capital in its various forms therefore negate the need for actual social ties and 
exchanges? More significantly, I will show that generalised mistrust, endemic negative 
self-essentialisation and stereotyping of fellow Singaporeans (not only towards migrants) 
create negative forms of social capital, resulting in general avoidance by many. 
Disembedded from the community, migrants then refocus their social relations onto their 
own families or the religious domain instead. This, I suggest, fragments the community 
along post-national lines, because reciprocal relations, mutual obligations and trust 
based on strong social ties are largely absent. 
 
1.4 The Symbolically Constructed "Community": In Place of Sociality – 
 Migrant Identities and Cultural Capital 
 
My initial intentions at the early stages of fieldwork was to analyse everyday social 
behaviour and interaction among Singaporeans. This required several preconditions, 
such as a consistent "site" – a clearly demarcated zone in which Singaporean migrants 
congregate, which clearly did not exist. Minimal interaction amongst Singaporean 
migrants made it difficult for me to establish any general patterns of social interaction. 
While some may have been acquainted with other Singaporeans, their daily social 
relationships do not revolve exclusively around their Singaporean counterparts alone6, 
and whatever informal networks I found usually only encompassed a few people. The 
only non-physical "site" in which many Singaporeans engaged in meaningful social 
interaction was in the realm of eating and food-related discourses.  
 Focusing exclusively on Singaporean-Chinese migrants, I will show how migrant 
identities are symbolically reinvented along post-national ethnic and cultural lines, 
whereby cultural capital – as dispositions of the mind and body – are embodied in 
cultural values that preclude their identity formation processes. Without suggesting that 
                                            
6 While it would have been an interesting angle to explore, migrants' interaction with other non-
Singaporeans was not a focus of this thesis.  
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the migrant community is fragmented along ethnic lines, it certainly highlights the utility 
of ethnicity as an important form of cultural capital, in which perceived commonalities 
and differences create protective, exclusionary boundaries for identity maintenance, 
despite weak social ties among migrants. Significantly, a sense of a migrant community 
is symbolically constructed around food-related discourses and activities. Food as 
cultural capital is therefore a highly valued collective good (or resource) that is shared by 
all Singaporean migrants, but one which does not convert into social capital for the 
strengthening of social ties, because the social exchanges necessary for these 
conversions are absent.  
 
1.5 Discursive Analogies of Home and Ways of Belonging 
The utility of transnational approaches lie in the notion of multiplicity, especially in 
relation to discourses on home. Home is a dynamic space – a multi-dimensional, 
deterritorialised mental construct that operates on a paradox involving placelessness on 
the one hand, and familiarity on the other. Home in this sense is a generalised condition 
of comfort, and all migrants – especially voluntary ones – ultimately yearn for stability 
and to be able to call a place "home". However, conceptions of home clearly vary 
according to one's specific circumstances and his subjective reality about its meaning. It 
is possible that one may feel at home in a particular place, but is socially excluded from 
it by others. In some cases, "home" constitutes the immediately physical surroundings of 
Perth, while in others, the emotional home is constructed through diaspora 
consciousness and a nostalgic past. In utilising current theoretical understandings of 
assimilation and forms-of-capital, I will also show how some migrants are included into 
the national space based on racially inscribed notions of acceptance, while others are 
excluded from it because they do not possess adequate or the "right" sorts of "capital" 
for conversion.  
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1.6 In Lieu of a Conclusion, Between Migrant Diasporas – Comparing the 
 Singaporean Case and Other Migrant “Communities” 
 
Diasporas may be viewed as 'imagined communities'7 of migrants, sojourners, or 
refugees, which are essentially displaced extensions of the homeland (see Dorai 2002). 
Although this is not a comparative study, I will briefly juxtapose the Singaporean case 
against other established diaspora communities in Australia, such as the Italians and 
Vietnamese. Specifically, I suggest that while the Vietnamese and Italian migrant 
communities do not possess the same "stock" of capital as their Singaporean 
counterparts, their strong interpersonal ties and informal kinship networks function as 
positive resources that facilitate the perpetuation of social capital within the migrant 
community. As such, one finds a more resilient "community" based on mutual solidarity 
and reciprocal obligations, whereby the proliferation of ethnic businesses or residential 
ghettos are a possible reflection of the strength of those ties rather than an unwillingness 
to integrate into mainstream society. This final chapter will compare and contrast some 
general features between two of the larger non-White migrant groups in Perth against 
the Singaporean case, and further validate the fragmented community thesis. Unlike 
other chapters, information about the Vietnamese and Italian migrant communities are 
based entirely on secondary sources.  
 
1.7 Relevant Concepts – Forms-of-Capital, Community, and 
 Transnationalism8 
 
So far, I have referred to "community" without covering its intended meaning or scope. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will define “community”9 as a ‘unit of belonging whose 
members perceive that they share moral, aesthetic/expressive or cognitive meanings, 
                                            
7 This term is taken from Benedict Anderson (1983), although his conceptualisation of imagined 
communities referred specifically to the nation-state.  
8 For transnationalism, see section 1.8.1 (General views on transnational migration). 
9 The concept is extremely difficult to pin down, due to its multiplicity of meanings and uses (Amit 
2002). 
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thereby gaining a sense of personal as well as group identity’ (Kennedy and Roudometof 
2002:6). This definition sets the boundaries within which the concept will be employed.  
 While many social theorists, spanning from the Chicago School urban 
sociologists (see Park 1925; Wirth 1938; Redfield 1960) have invoked the term 
“community” in some capacity, it has mostly been employed as a heuristic device to 
explain solidarity or its lack thereof in relation to broader structures such as the nation-
state (Anderson 1983; Herzfeld 2005), the extended family (Young and Willmott 
(1962/1957), ethnicity (Epstein 1958), globalisation (Appadurai 1996), and 
transnationalism (Castles 2003; Portes 2000; Faist 2000) for example. However, such 
diverse conceptualisations have necessarily resulted in ambiguity, since these multiple 
connotations usually tend to be either too inclusive or too exclusive, and are 
conceptualised on disparate levels (e.g. micro, macro) of analysis. Nevertheless within 
the social sciences, one cannot deny the influence and popularity of Anderson's (1983) 
'imagined communities', and the arguably less well-known 'symbolic construction of 
community' (Cohen 1985). In this thesis, I employ Cohen's schema that a  
 [c]ommunity exists in the minds of its members…By extension, the 
 distinctiveness of communities and, thus, the reality of their boundaries, 
 similarly lies in the mind, in the meanings which people attach to them, not 
 in their structural forms (p. 98). 
 
This understanding of community does not privilege geographical fixity, nor does it 
presuppose any essential characteristics that members must fulfil to qualify as part of 
the community.  
Cohen's formulation, I argue, rests on three fundamental aspects: the symbolic 
meanings of a community, which members consciously and subjectively construct in 
their own minds; the privileging of the individual over the structural, as well as the 
symbolic over the social; and the Barthian concept of boundaries, which delineate 
insiders from outsiders. Since community exists in the minds of its members, the 
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structural gives way to the immediacy of the agent, who formulates his own mental 
schema regarding its content and form. If a person sufficiently feels part of that form and 
internalises its content in multifarious symbolic ways, then he feels part of that 
community, regardless whether others confer the same status upon him. Sociality in 
Cohen's "community" is therefore downplayed considerably, since its embodiment 
ultimately rests in the subjective minds of its members based on symbolically 
constructed images. Community, in this sense, is therefore a ‘symbolic framework for 
thinking about and conveying cultural difference’ (Amit 2002:5), reassuring insiders of 
their perceived commonalities. As Cohen argues, 
People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of 
meaning, and a referent of their identity (p. 118). 
 
However, what happens if the “symbols” associated with this “community” have 
been essentialised and distorted from within, so that the only meanings that members 
attach to their “community” are largely informed by negative connotations? 
Consequently, whenever I asked my informants for their views regarding the presence or 
absence of a community of Singaporean migrants, an immediate response was "It 
depends". What does it depend on? Obviously on what is meant by "community". Does it 
refer to Singaporean neighbourhoods, of which some exist? Does it refer to a community 
of believers in the church setting, of which many Singaporeans seem to be a part? Or 
does it refer to the migrant population itself, of which the sense of a community is weak? 
 Cohen's (1985) symbolic construction thesis, together with forms-of-capital, will 
be utilised concurrently to explain the fragmentation of community along post-national 
lines. I adopt Thomas Faist’s (2000) partial migration framework – which links network 
ties (structure) and social capital (contents) – to understand emigration on the one hand, 
and migrant adaptation (transnationality) on the other. According to Faist, social capital 
in migratory systems are embodied in the relationships between actors, constituting ‘the 
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set of resources [that are] inherent in social and symbolic [network] ties’ (Faist 2000:98; 
emphases added). Social capital is not a “thing” to be exploited by any individual; it 
requires social exchanges if members are to mutually benefit from it. If social ties among 
migrants are weak (which I will show later), then in theory, social capital becomes non-
existent or, in some cases, dysfunctional, thus fragmenting the community along post-
national lines. In simple terms, ex-Singaporeans are part of a "community" of migrants, 
but many do not want to belong to it socially. Consequently, the realisation of a 
community in its structural forms has not been achieved, because social ties are weak. 
Nevertheless, symbolic ties are utilised to reinvent migrant identities at the individual and 
familial levels, even though the social manifestation of community is absent. This is done 
by reasserting cultural values within the family as cultural capital; symbolic imaginations 
of the homeland in multifarious ways; and the identification of food as a valuable cultural-
symbolic resource that "objectifies" the sense of a Singaporean community through its 
shared practices (consumption).  
 
1.8 Review of Dominant Migration Literature, Singaporean Transnational 
 Migration, and Transnationalism  
 
1.8.1 General views on transnational migration10 
Since Basch et al's (1994; see also Glick Schiller et al 199211) inception of 
"transnationalism" into the social science literature in the 1990s, a flurry of empirical and 
                                            
10 Due to the expansive proliferation of the transnational literature in academic discourse, 
especially in its diverse meanings and approaches, it is virtually impossible to rehash all of it in 
this thesis. I will therefore confine my review to the more common ways in which it has been 
utilised, and explain some possible conceptual flaws. 
11 The 1992 article was the original foundation upon which the concept transnationalism was 
established, culminating in the authors' co-published book in 1994. I will only refer to the 1994 
book, since the central ideas and conceptual analysis revolves around the 1992 article.  
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conceptual works have emerged from various social scientific disciplines to make sense 
of this "new" migrant phenomenon12. The now "classic" definition of transnationalism is 
…the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social 
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these 
processes transnationalism to emphasise that many immigrants today build 
social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders…An essential 
element…is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both 
home and host societies (p. 8).  
 
The general thrust assumes that modern day technological advancements enable 
contemporary immigrants13 to sustain a multiplicity of involvements between two or more 
societies at once, without necessarily severing homeland ties nor assimilating into the 
host society, thus constituting a "new" migrant phenomenon. Transnationality emerges 
precisely out of these multifaceted and, in some ways, ambiguous conditions, enabling 
migrants to develop and sustain multiple identities, practices, and ways of belonging that 
are 'unbounded' from the nation-state (see Basch et al 1994). In metaphorical terms, 
they are no longer either "here" or "there", but at once both "here" and there", thus 
destabilising migrants' conceptions of place and home, yet also reinforcing it by 
encompassing not only places, but unbounded spaces. Typical research questions tend 
to focus on the aftermath and consequences of migration rather than its causes, 
sometimes incorporating theories such as assimilation and cultural pluralism to 
understand these "new" modes of immigrant adjustment. In general, the multiplicity of 
involvements – the sense of being neither here nor there, but at once both here and 
there – remains the main conceptual premise that is associated with transnational 
                                            
12 See the Transnational Communities Research Programme of the Economic and Social 
Research Council, www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk, of which Steven Vertovec is the series editor. 
Based on the papers presented in this research panel, fifteen edited volumes on transnationalism 
will be, or have been, published. For other substantive collections on the topic, see for example 
Levitt and Waters (2002); Smith (2001); Levitt (2001); Vertovec and Cohen (1999); Ong and 
Nonini (1997). 
13 What the authors mean by "immigrants" is unclear. 
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frameworks. Nevertheless, it is unclear what characterises these involvements (other 
than multiplicity), nor under what (propitious) conditions they may arise.  
 Consequently, due to its highly "flexible" conceptual guidelines, the concept 
became increasingly viewed as sociologically problematic14. Portes et al (1999; see also 
Portes 1999a; 1999b; 2003) have been highly critical of the ways in which the concept 
has been "misappropriated", reminding would-be social scientists of their academic duty 
to establish the contextual reality of the phenomenon before advancing various causal 
explanations. Subsequently, Portes et al (1999:219) proposed that the field should be 
delimited to only encompass regular and sustained 'occupations and activities…across 
national borders'. Similarly, Guarnizo and Smith (1998:3-4) worry that the concept risks 
becoming an 'empty conceptual vessel'. For Levitt (2001:196), transnationalism 'is used 
to describe everything under the sun, which seriously diminishes its explanatory power'. 
Reflecting on the extensive existing literature, I concur with Portes that the concept has 
often been used spuriously to describe phenomena that operate on different levels of 
analysis at varying degrees of abstraction. Even more daunting is the fact that 
researchers have attributed different meanings to the same term, for example, 
"transnational communities" (see Castles 2003; Portes 2000; Rouse 1992; Guarnizo and 
Diaz 1999; Faist 2000 for varying conceptualisations). Thus for Portes and his 
collaborators, the emphasis lies on certain transnational practices, rather than the 
ideologically-laden rhetoric and all-encompassing guidelines associated with 
transnationalism proposed by Basch et al, to the extent of disempowering the analytical 
distinctions between the "heres" and the "theres". Vertovec's (1999:447-462) summary 
of the dominant themes within transnational studies further highlights the disparity, 
ranging from types of consciousness, to modes of cultural reproduction, and to avenues 
                                            
14 Other criticisms exist, most notably in relation to Basch et al's (1994) view that transnationalism 
represents an entirely new phenomenon. See Foner (1997), and Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) 
for several useful criticisms.  
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of capital, for example. Alejandro Portes'15 work is particularly useful for this thesis 
because it combines sophisticated sociological theoretical analysis with the transnational 
concept at two levels: the role of economics and social capital in determining social 
action within transnational communities (Portes and Mooney 2003; Portes 1996a; Portes 
1995b; Portes 2000); and how transnationalism is one possible conceptual tool that 
explains different modes of incorporation among immigrants in America (Portes 1995a; 
1998b; Portes and Rumbaut 1990; 2005; Portes et al 2005; Portes and Zhou 1999).  
 Based on this initial conceptual framework by Basch et al (1994), other scholars 
have capitalised on this theoretical “breakthrough” in migration studies, and formulated 
other conceptual extensions to the field of transnational studies. Consequently, 
transnationalism from above16 emphasises the transnational nature of macro-level 
structures such as multinational corporations and the political powers of elites in 
determining economic and political events across nation-states. Transnationalism from 
below emphasises the influence of 'everyday practices of ordinary people, their feelings 
and understandings of their conditions of existence' (Smith 1992:493) on eliciting change 
from below by exercising power through transnational grassroots politics (Smith 1994). 
This more grounded version questions the utility of Basch et al's (1994) unbounded 
social science, because in reality, transnational migrants are bounded within a nation-
state and make decisions based on actually existing state regulations. Singaporean 
migrants in Perth are no different in this regard. Consequently, transnational urbanism, 
an offshoot of the transnationalism from below paradigm, claims to advance a middling 
                                            
15 Since Portes is a prominent scholar within the field of transnational studies, I refer extensively 
to his work, but do not always follow his methodology or theoretical framework.  
16 See the edited volume by Yeoh and Willis (2004), State/Nation/Transnation for examples of this 
approach. Although the term "transnationalism from above" was not explicitly used, the 
contributors highlighted the hegemonic powers of the nation-state amidst globalisation, with the 
continued power to determine transnational migrants' decision making processes at the daily 
level. Subsequently, Willis et al (2004:5-6) refer to the 'gate-keeping' role of the nation-state in 
transnational discourse. See also Robinson (2004), in which a transnational capitalist class 
utilises the hegemonic powers of various nation-states to achieve their universal economic goals.  
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capacity, or a meso-level analysis of sorts, to explain the relationality between social 
actors from below, and elites or organisations (e.g. the nation-state) from above (Smith 
2005; see also Smith 2003b, and Yeoh et al 2003). However, different levels of analysis 
are invoked, which enlivens the field empirically, but problematises it theoretically. 
Questions may arise as to whether this is a generally testable proposition that finds 
empirical validity among other migrant groups. Furthermore, if transnationalism entails 
the removal of the transnational actor from the hegemonic realms of the state, then by 
re-invoking the state as a potential transnational actor (e.g. in transnationalism from 
above paradigms), it only re-empowers the state in determining migrants' actions, and 
constrains the analytic usage of the term "transnational" (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 
2004). Perhaps the level that is most closely related to this thesis, at least in terms of the 
scope of transnationality, lies in the recent formulation of middling transnationalism (or 
transnationalism from the middle), which focuses on the grounded 'everyday practices 
inherent in transnational mobility', such as 'kinship, friendship and national identity'17 
(Conradson and Latham 2005:228). "Middling" here refers not to a meso-level analytical 
approach, but to the transnational space occupied by mostly middle class transnational 
migrants whose lives span geographically bounded places, precisely because of their 
middle class social status. For as I will show later in the thesis, most Singaporean 
migrants in Perth are either middle, or upper middle class migrants. For the latter, 
traversing back and forth on a regular basis and maintaining homes in two places is an 
attractive option. For the majority, however, "getting the best of both worlds" on a regular 
basis may not be such a practical nor achievable option despite their middle class 
status, thus limiting the scope and extent of their transnational activities.  
                                            
17 These are examples cited by the authors, which I do not necessarily employ in my analysis. 
Consequently, other possible conceptual tools are ethnicity, family (or kinship), and culture. 
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 Transnationality per se will not constitute a central framework in this thesis, but it 
is an important concept, since this study deals empirically with migrants within an 
increasingly "transnationalising" backdrop of Singapore-Australia relations. 
Nevertheless, I will show below that one other useful transnational framework stands out 
– Faist's (2000) transnational social spaces18. I contend that where the notion of 
multiplicity – and hence transnationality – can be practically grounded in empirical reality 
in this thesis lies in Singaporean migrants' multiple ways of belonging, especially in 
relation to their modes of adjustment and conceptions "homes", I will explicate in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Empirical studies on Singaporean transnational migrants 
Following from these theoretical frameworks, the social geographers Brenda Yeoh, Lily 
Kong19 and their collaborators have frequently utilised transnational frameworks to 
document the increasing flows of Singaporean transmigrants to China, as well as their 
adaptation patterns from other conceptual angles, particularly gender and the family 
(Yeoh and Willis 1999; Yeoh and Willis 2005; Yeoh et al 2002; Yeoh and Willis 2004). In 
general, these works not only highlight the multiple ways in which gendered discourses 
are reproduced in the transnational setting, but also the possibility that acts of migration 
and adaptation are steeped in gendered processes20. Their general argument is that 
transnationalism challenges normative, state-constructed ideological views regarding 
gender roles. For example, overseas entrepreneurship is often essentialised as a 
masculine task, which many Singaporean men are reluctant to perform because of the 
                                            
18 This is explained in section 1.8.2 (General views on migration), and I will situate Faist's 
framework within the context of this thesis.  
19 I will not focus on Kong's (1999) paper here, because I will be contrasting her findings with 
mine in a later section in Chapter Two. 
20 For other examples of transnationalism and gendered perspectives, see Moghadam (2005); 
Willis and Yeoh (2000). 
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"hazards" of overseas living compared to the comfort zones of Singapore society. 
Gendered discourses and power relations are evident in the ways in which men need to 
reconceptualise their masculine roles (fatherhood and domesticity) in relation to 
unfamiliar surroundings, thus simultaneously challenging existing norms (division of 
labour) and reinforcing them in other ways (patriarchy). In other works, 'contact zones' 
are utilised to show how cultural differences are negotiated within an unfamiliar social 
environment in China, despite being ethnically Chinese and hence culturally similar.  
 The transmigrants in these studies refer specifically to economic transmigrants or 
sojourners who will eventually return to Singapore. The voluntary migrants in my study 
represent a totally different proposition with vastly different aspirations and national 
consciousness, as well as different social experiences and adaptation patterns.  
 
1.8.2 General views on migration 
The sociological study of international migration has been riddled with a multitude of 
theories that attempt to explain global human movements, and it is pointless to rehearse 
all the theories here, since this thesis does not propose a new theoretical framework for 
analysing migration trends (see Massey et al 1998 for a complete summary). Generally, 
theories can be divided between micro and macro level analysis. The former 
emphasises the rationally-induced decision making capacities of the migrant in 
determining his intention to stay or move, covering a range between those who are 
compelled to move on the one hand, and those who want to move on the other. The 
degrees of autonomy informing these decisions at the individual level are further 
enmeshed within a web of social-political factors, including state policies towards 
immigrants and individual social networks between the home and host societies. Our 
focus should be limited to those who want to move, since they form the majority in this 
thesis. Macro theories, on the other hand, focus on the structural interplay between 
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governments in both the sending and receiving countries and migrant associations to 
account for the continuing flow of migrants. The world systems theory developed by 
Wallerstein in the 1970s viewed migration as the product of an increasingly 
interdependent global capitalist system, so that the encroachment of the global economy 
(core) onto less developed societies (periphery) increases inequalities and results in 
increased migratory movements (Massey 1999). Regardless, most theories are 
grounded on the assumption that migratory flows are best explained using economic 
theories such as wage differentials and supply and demand forces to account for the 
fundamentally economic basis of migration. However, as Massey et al (1998) argue, no 
one single theory to date can consistently account for the initiation and perpetuation of 
international migration over time.  
Thomas Faist’s (2000) meso level social capital approach is a recent notable 
exception that combines these two levels into a single coherent theoretical framework to 
explain the puzzle regarding why so many people migrate out of so few places, and why 
so few migrate out of so many places. In synthesising network and social capital 
theories, Faist identifies social capital – which inhere in social and symbolic ties – as the 
crucial explanatory device in accounting for why some people stay, while others move. 
This is due to the transnational mobility (and immobility) of resources, or social capital. 
While network analyses locate human movements in the self-sustainability of migrant 
networks by capitalising on social ties, it does not explain how these ties are developed 
in the first place and hence, fail to explain why some people move, while others stay. In 
answering his two puzzles, Faist argues convincingly for the prominent role of social 
capital in not only accounting for sustained international migratory movements, but also 
migrants’ adaptation patterns through the development of transnational social spaces. 
The entire migratory system thus becomes a unified space of flows (transnational social 
space) that encompasses regular social exchanges and the circulation of goods, people, 
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capital and symbols. These flows are concurrently regulated by the selective, diffusion, 
bridging, and adaptation functions of social capital which vary according to the strength, 
or weakness, of social and symbolic ties. Thus, depending on the intensity of exchanges 
and density of ties, transnational social spaces are the foundation upon which 
transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits, and eventually transnational 
communities are formed, reflecting a low-to-high continuum of social and symbolic 
exchanges. Faist's version of transnationality conforms with most others in the boundary 
breaking expansion of social space involving two or more geographically distinct places. 
But it departs from previous definitions of transnationalism in his conceptualisation of 
‘communities without propinquity’ (pp 207-208), where 
…dense and strong social and symbolic ties connect stayers over time and 
across space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries.  Such 
communities without propinquity do not necessarily require individual persons 
living in two worlds simultaneously…What is required, however, is that 
communities without propinquity link through exchange, reciprocity, and solidarity 
to achieve a high degree of social cohesion, and a common repertoire of 
symbolic and collective representations.  
 
 Transnational communities are therefore the ideal-typical situation arising out of 
transnational social spaces, where a high degree of social solidarity and mutual 
exchanges function to sustain the community across space and time. I will therefore 
utilise Faist's conceptualisation of transnational social space to show that weak social 
ties hamper the formation of a migrant community, although symbolic ties become useful 
resources in achieving Cohen's symbolic construction of community. Since most 
Singaporean migrants in Perth are voluntary rather than transnational migrants, apart 
from a few migrants who conform to Faist's transnational kinship groups and 
transnational circuits, I will show that the only dominant transnational aspect lies in 
migrants' multifaceted conceptualisations of home, which constitutes a transnational 
practice.  
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Empirical studies on Singaporean migrants in Australia 
The literature covering Singaporean voluntary migration to Australia – or anywhere, for 
that matter – is thin. To date, I have only located two published works that deal with 
Singaporean migration to Australia – Sullivan and Gunasekaran’s (1994) study, and 
Yap’s (1991) comparative report on Singaporean migrants in Australia and Canada.  
Being reports, both studies lacked theoretical and conceptual rigour. The 
strength lies in their quantitative analysis, which proves that emigration rates are indeed 
increasing, as I had proposed at the beginning of the thesis. Sullivan and Gunasekaran’s 
Fawcett-style questionnaire was quantitatively useful in describing the motivations for 
migration to Australia, but lacked analytical depth in explaining these motivations relative 
to other macro-level structures. For example, the authors noted that most informants 
intended to visit Singapore after they migrated (p. 8), but they fail to ask the relevant 
question “why?” and hence, what their observation shows about transnational ties or 
migrant adaptation. They make similar empirical observations in their report about other 
issues but do not, in my view, provide adequate analytical insights. Quantitative data are 
useful sources of numerical data, but when informants' views are hampered by selective 
choices, then accuracy becomes a problem. For example, when I asked my informants 
“Why did you migrate to Perth?”, some of them replied that “I did not migrate; I am on a 
long holiday”, which automatically invalidates my question and forces me to probe 
deeper into their subjective meanings. In contrast, face-to-face interviews allow the 
clarification of ambiguous answers.  
Yap attempted a more holistic approach by combining quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. While the final chapter on policy recommendations was particularly 
insightful, I felt that Yap’s analysis also lacked analytical vigour. Since it was conducted 
back in the early 1990s, the study is also rather outdated, and I believe that the numbers 
and demographic profile of migrants in Perth have changed greatly since then. The 
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report also grouped migrants from Perth and Sydney together, which I found problematic 
because I believe that the destination city is reflective of different motivations for 
migration, resulting in different socio-cultural adaptation patterns. Also, it is unclear 
whether the study was referring to overseas Singaporeans (economic transmigrants), or 
ex-Singaporeans (voluntary migrants). Grouping them together under the heading of 
"overseas Singaporeans" is misleading, which I will explicate in Chapter Two.  
However, several consistent points may be inferred. Firstly, a high percentage of 
migrants tend to choose Australia as their destination country, and Australia’s proximity 
to Singapore seems to be one of the more prominent factors. Secondly, emigration is 
viewed by the Singaporean government as a potentially serious “brain drain” problem 
that needs further research. Thirdly, there are multifarious reasons for Singaporean 
emigration to Australia, ranging from push factors such as a stifling education system, to 
pull factors such as a lower cost of living and a less meritocratic society. Some reasons 
may appear more frequently than others, but in general, there is no single dominant 
reason to explain Singaporeans’ motivations for migration to Australia.  
 
1.9 The Fieldwork 
1.9.1 Methodology 
Fieldwork began in Perth in April 2004, where I interviewed several informants who were 
personally known to me. Informants in this study were either (a) Singaporean citizens 
with permanent residency (PR) status in Australia (Perth), or (b) Australian citizens who 
had given up their Singaporean citizenship21. Obtaining informants was a painstakingly 
laborious process, not because of a shortage of supply, but because most people did not 
want to engage in these interviews for various reasons that I will highlight below. 
                                            
21 While the Australian government allows dual citizenship, the Singaporean government does 
not.  
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Nevertheless, the snowball technique was still the most effective method of obtaining 
informants. Although there are several "Singaporean associations" in Perth, the privacy 
laws in Australia do not allow organisations or individuals to simply disclose names and 
contact details without prior permission. It took a long time for my personal database of 
informants to grow.  
Methodologically, I employed an inductive research approach by identifying 
several relevant themes and allowing the data to “speak" to me. I employed a semi-
structured, open-ended questionnaire and posed several standard questions to my 
informants. I allowed them free rein to speak about their personal experiences, but 
occasionally interrupted them when I felt that they had digressed to other issues that I 
deemed to be irrelevant to the study. Time constraints were a crucial factor in almost all 
the interviews, as my informants were either working adults who had taken time off work 
to assist me, or who grew slightly weary at my detailed, thought-provoking questions. In 
general, interviews lasted between twenty minutes to four hours, which was entirely 
dependent upon informants' requests.  
Before I conducted interviews, I provided a self styled “consent form”22, in which I 
gave strict assurances of confidentiality. These forms were designed to give them a 
sense of security and to ease their suspicions about my motives (which I will explain 
below). Many informants signed without questioning, but some remarked that if the 
interview was indeed confidential, why then did they have to disclose their names? I 
replied that I was doing so to protect their own interests, because if I disclosed any 
information irresponsibly, I was therefore liable. I subsequently made the form optional 
for all future interviews.  
 
1.9.2 Fieldwork techniques and problems encountered 
                                            
22 Informants were requested to fill in their names, the date of the interview, and their signatures.  
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At first, some of my informants – even those who were recommended to me by friends – 
treated me with extreme scepticism. One of the most common light-hearted comments I 
received was “Are you a spy for the government?”. It did not help matters that I was from 
the National University of Singapore (NUS), because there seems to be a misinformed 
perception among Singaporeans that researchers or academics in Singapore are civil 
servants who directly or indirectly represent the Singaporean government, and this 
“survey” was therefore commissioned by the government to illuminate the causes of 
emigration. The difficulty of my research was undoubtedly exacerbated by the timing of 
then Prime Minister Goh's “quitters-stayers" speech, because people felt that it was a big 
coincidence that I was doing a “survey” on Singaporean migrants in Australia at a time 
when the government seemed to be treating its want-away citizens with disdain. The 
crux is that as a Singaporean who is doing research about and among other 
Singaporeans on this topic, it is extremely difficult to gather first hand, face-to-face 
information concerning an arguably “sensitive” topic such as emigration. While some 
informants were more co-operative in sharing information, others felt that whether they 
were physically residing in Singapore or not was irrelevant, because by accepting an 
interview with me, they would be jeopardising their relatives' "safety" if they spoke out 
against the Singaporean government.  
 This may seem ludicrous, but true. One person I called told me that his wife used 
to work in a government department in Singapore, and supposedly knew that they had 
government agents all over the world to "spy" on the activities of the overseas 
Singaporean community. Needless to say, he declined to be interviewed. I had to 
constantly remind many informants that I was a student from NUS who was conducting 
research – and research alone – in my own chosen field which was not dictated to me by 
the university (and hence the government, from their point of view). More importantly, I 
had to convince them that my research was about migration and adaptation patterns, not 
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politics and the Singaporean government. Some informants felt more comfortable when I 
accorded them the liberty to pass on any question. By the end of October 2004, I had 
contacted 94 people through emails or telephone in Perth, and managed to interview 55 
of them. For interviews with designated time limits, I asked the more important questions 
first. Many informants suggested that I continue the interview at a later date, which I only 
managed to do with some.  
 
Some final considerations 
A thesis is not a personal diary. It is made up of my informants' personal thoughts which 
I tried to document as accurately as possible. Since many informants were forthcoming 
and cooperative, it was my personal responsibility to ensure their complete anonymity 
and confidentiality. As such, any form of information that allowed them to be identified in 
any way was either edited or omitted, such as street names, meeting places, job titles, or 
specific events. A no-photograph-rule23 was also enforced.  
 As much as possible, I used a tape recorder for the interviews to save time and 
ensure accuracy. However, this was done with my informants' complete consent, and my 
assurance that the information would be kept confidential and strictly anonymous. 
However, there were several occasions when some informants simply refused to allow a 
tape-recorded interview, so I had to be content with taking copious notes as accurately 
and quickly as possible.  
  
1.10 Forthcoming chapters 
In this chapter, I have situated the research problem and surveyed the literature on the 
relevant themes, concepts and theoretical framework. Chapter Two presents 
                                            
23 Not all informants were against the idea of taking photographs or using them in the thesis. 
However, I decided to standardise and avoid using photographs in the thesis, since most of them 
were against the idea. 
Introducing the Singaporean Migrant 
 25 
demographic data regarding Singaporean emigration to Australia, and documents the 
diverse reasons for Singaporean emigration from a historical state-society perspective. 
Chapter Three shows how various forms of capital, as well as generalised mistrust 
amongst migrants themselves, have resulted in weak social ties and the fragmentation 
of community along post-national lines. Chapter Four shows how migrant identities are 
reinvented through symbolic ties. In Chapter Five, I show how the concept of "home" is 
conceptualised in relation to theories of assimilation, and how symbolic ties are utilised 
to create a sense of diaspora consciousness. Chapter Six concludes the thesis by 
juxtaposing the Singaporean migrant group in relation to the Vietnamese and Italian 
communities in Australia. 
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WHITHER THE SINGAPOREAN TRANSNATIONAL  
MIGRANT? 
State-society in the Context of 
Singapore-Perth migration 
 
Acts of migration are not only informed at the individual level, but are bounded within 
state-societal structures, making it both a public as well as a private issue. Ethnic 
politics, opportunities, network and family ties are important variables that significantly 
inform individually-calculated acts of emigration. I will attempt a historical overview of 
these emigration trends starting from Singapore's independence1 in the 1960s within the 
context of state-society relations. I argue that despite heterogeneous reasons for exit, 
Singaporean emigration to Perth is characterised simultaneously by certain push factors 
– in particular, disenchantment or feelings of marginalisation within the Singaporean 
system; and pull factors2 – the increasing attractiveness of Perth as a place that allows a 
distinctively alternative form of lifestyle compared to Singapore. In this chapter, I will 
show why an increasingly large number of Singaporeans are emigrating specifically to 
Perth. Crucially, as Massey (1999; see also Massey et al 1998) has suggested, 
contemporary migration theories tend to under-utilise a significant variable – the role of 
the state in influencing the density and form of outward migration. I will show that 
underlying these heterogeneous conditions of exit, a strong sense of marginalisation and 
disenchantment towards state ideology has contributed directly to their exits.  
 
2.1 Migration Issues in State-Society Context – Australia and Singapore 
By way of introduction, I will briefly situate the topic in its relevant context by highlighting 
several trends in the Singapore-Perth migration system through statistical data and 
                                            
1 While there may have been some Singaporeans who emigrated prior to this period, I am using 
independence in 1965 as a benchmark.   
2 I employ these concepts (push-pull) loosely, but do not limit myself to Thomas' (1973) linear 
push-pull framework.  
2 
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tabloid news, including the respective states' views concerning immigration (Australia), 
and emigration (Singapore).  
 
Immigration concerns in the "lucky country"3 
Perth is a spacious and modern city that is situated in the south-western corner of 
Australia's largest state – Western Australia4, which is only five hours' flight from 
Singapore. With a population of about two million in a land area that covers 2,529,875 
square kilometres, Western Australia is approximately ten times the size of the United 
Kingdom, making it vastly underpopulated by Singapore's5 standards. Today, there are 
approximately 13,200 Singaporean voluntary migrants of various ethnic groups residing 
in Perth, prompting a Straits Times journalist to run an article in October 2003 about 
"Singaperth"6, reflecting the huge popularity of this so-called boring7 city among 
Singaporean migrants.  
 The Australian government places significant 'economically rational' criteria in 
selecting its immigrants, by employing the 'human capital approach' or points system 
(Jupp 2002:141-147). This selective immigration policy is designed to ensure that only 
people who can contribute positively towards Australia are granted access. Indeed, 
immigration has been an issue of central concern for the Australian government since 
the Immigration Restriction Act was passed in 1901, an act which has often been 
                                            
3 This phrase was first coined by Professor Donald Horne, author of the book The Lucky Country 
(1968). Since then, it has been used by Australians to describe everything in general that they 
seem to be blessed with – from the weather, to their lifestyle, and their abundant natural 
resources.  
4 See appendix 2A for a map of the region.  
5 Singapore's population was recorded at just over 4.2 million in 2004 within a land area of 699 
square kilometres, making it one of the most densely populated countries in the world (Singapore 
Yearbook of Statistics 2005). 
6 See appendices 2B and C for the full article. The Sunday Times, September 28th 2003 
"Singaperth".  
7 See Straits Times, 'Philip-isms over the years', May 15th 2005. Former Economic Development 
Board (EDB) chairman Philip Yeo once remarked that 'If Singaporeans can't make the grade, 
they go to Perth. You know what Perth is like? A very boring place'.  
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identified synonymously with the explicitly racist White Australia Policy8 since the 
formation of the Australian Commonwealth (Markus 2003; see also Mackie 1997). Over 
the course of the 20th century, several controversial debates have ensued in local 
Australian politics over the issue of increasing immigration by people of "non-White"9 
backgrounds (Castles and Vasta 1996). Viviani (1996) has argued that many Australians 
fear that their cultural values will be threatened by the implosion of the "Yellow Peril"10 
onto Australia's shores. Moran (2005) has argued that despite official multiculturalist 
policies, a strong assimilationist trend still underpins Australian political culture, which is 
largely informed by the (misplaced) fear that increasing immigration will eventually 
produce ethnic ghettoes. In recent years, the Blainey controversy11 (1984) and the rise 
of Hansonite politics (mid-1990s) sparked fears of increasing anti-Asian sentiment 
amongst Australians, showing the salience of racial12 issues amidst multicultural 
underpinnings in Australian socio-political discourse, culminating in what Ang (2003:51) 
refers to as 'fortress Australia'. Not surprisingly, the Howard government has consistently 
tried to tighten the noose around Australia's immigration policies13, ensuring that only 
certain select people qualify as PRs or citizens (Jupp 2002). In fact, Howard recently 
declared that 'we want people when they come to Australia to adopt Australian ways' 
(Today, February 21st 2006). I will show in Chapter Five that these "ways" are not 
                                            
8 According to Jayasuriya (1999:17), the White Australia Policy confirmed Australia's 'racist 
ideology based on White supremacy,…and became the symbol of Australian nationalism'.  
9 Another term that is often used is NESB (non-English speaking background).  
10 See Appendix 2D for Janice Seah's article. Seah, herself a Singaporean who emigrated to 
Perth, was writing in response to a sudden wave of racially motivated attacks in several Asian 
restaurants in Perth.  
11 Geoffrey Blainey, a respected Australian historian, argued that while the White Australia 
(immigration) Policy was arrogant and insensitive, the policy of accepting Asian immigrants 
(especially refugees) en masse in the 1980s was insensitive to Australian public opinion. The late 
1980s and early 1990s saw 210,000 Asian immigrants admitted into Australia, compared with 
140,000 immigrants from Europe. See Mackie (1997) for a thorough account of the "Blainey 
Controversy".  
12 This is a significant point that I will return to later in Chapter Five.  
13 See Brawley (2003) for an overview of Australian foreign relations since 1973, which situates 
immigration in its current political climate against the period of the White Australia Policy.  
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necessarily achievable for some migrants. Based on these stringent immigration criteria 
adopted by DIMIA, most Singaporeans generally have few problems qualifying because 
they possess the necessary "capital"14.  
 
Emigration anxieties of a first world society 
Conversely, the Singaporean government has been increasingly anxious about the 
outflow of its citizens15, and persistently links emigration to national identity issues. The 
recurring paradox is this: how to encourage its citizens to globalise, yet construct an 
'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) of Singaporeans who will develop a strong sense 
of national consciousness that is characterised by loyalty and attachment to the nation? 
In other words, how to curb the trend of increasing emigration, since emigration – from 
the state's point of view – signifies a lack of national belonging and loyalty? Kong 
(1999:563) implicitly suggests that such a project is 'potentially contradictory'. In fact, 
minister George Yeo acknowledged in 1991 that the central concern facing incoming 
Prime Minister Goh's new management team was the management of 'multiple loyalties' 
(Straits Times 1991, cited in Jones and Brown 1994), or the increasing 
transnationalisation of ties, within a more participatory framework of governance. 
Consequently, the Singaporean government often equates emigrants and emigration in 
relation to the national identity problem, as if to suggest that a strong national 
consciousness will, in theory, be directly proportional to a decrease in emigration rates 
(see Kluver and Weber 2003; Koh 2003). However, as Chua (1995:116) has argued, any 
form of loyalty to Singapore is couched in pragmatically laden goals that revolve around 
material excess and economic well-being, which he claims is one of the 'truths of being a 
                                            
14 The application process is often complex and tedious, and it is not uncommon for potential 
migrants to engage in the services of migration agents, who usually charge between SGD$3000 
to $6000 for one application.  
15 In 1989, outgoing Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew called for more research to be done in the 
area of emigration. See Sullivan and Gunasekaran (1994).  
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Singaporean'. Velayutham (2004) also discovered that national identity – and by 
extension the sense of belonging to Singapore – is largely framed very pragmatically in 
relation to the state-endowed material gifts of social life at the everyday level. Thus, if a 
pragmatic middle class Singaporean feels that he can receive a better "deal" elsewhere 
and reproduce his middle class lifestyle at a lower cost, why then would he not 
emigrate? Is it also any wonder then, that the attachment to these gifts plausibly explains 
the lack of 'communal solidarity and a sense of broader national sociality' (p. 22) not only 
among Singaporeans in Singapore, but also amongst Singaporean migrants in Perth?  
 Goh's "quitters-stayers" speech may be seen as yet another attempt to forestall 
the exits of some increasingly affluent, yet disenchanted, Singaporeans by reminding 
them of their "duty" to stay put as loyal citizens16. Indeed, forty years after 
independence, one finds that emigration rates have increased, whereby 1,076 
Singaporeans emigrated to Perth between the years 2004-2005 – the highest number 
for two decades – accounting for the largest percentage increase of migrants from any 
group in Western Australia17. Citizenship may signify a consociationally formal 
relationship between state and subject, but it certainly does not preclude national 
belonging and societal integration, especially if some Singaporeans are unable to 
associate citizenship with 'governmental belonging'18 (Hage 1998:45-46). Does 
increasing emigration therefore signify a lack of loyalty to one’s birthplace, which seems 
                                            
16 Goh referred to these "stayers" as those who 'pah see buay zao' (literally in Hokkien, unable to 
kill off someone; metaphorically, despite bad times, people will still remain loyal to the country by 
not emigrating). See Today, August 19th 2002.  
17 The total number of Singaporean migrants to Australia in the period 2004-2005 was 3,036 
(Immigration Update 2004-05). Singaporean migrants settling in Western Australia therefore 
made up a staggering 35% of the total number of migrants, a huge figure considering that there 
are seven other Australian states to choose from.  
18 Hage identifies two types of national belonging in the Australian context: one produces passive 
belonging, and the other governmental belonging. The former signifies an attachment to the 
nation and a right to its resources, while the latter signifies a right to contribute towards its 
management. This is similar to Turner’s (1991:216) understanding of citizenship, which not only 
stresses formal rights, but also includes an appreciation of its cultural content or, membership in a 
community.  
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to be Goh’s suggestion, or does it simply mean that we are now living in an age of 
transnational moments, in which migration – be it temporary or permanent – should be 
viewed more as the norm rather than the exception, especially for such 'gifted' members 
from a First World society? Lest it be mistaken, I am not suggesting that a weak national 
identity explains increasing emigration. I have simply included this discussion to show 
the discursive realms within which emigration is often situated in both the Singaporean 
and Australian contexts.  
 
2.2 Singaporean Migrants in Australia 
Data on Singaporean migrants in Australia 
Statistical19 data concerning Singaporean emigration is extremely difficult to obtain. 
Fortunately, Australia readily provides this information to members of the public. 
According to the 2001 Australia-wide census20, there were 10,270 Singaporean-born 
residents21 living in Western Australia, with a vast majority located in the city of Perth22. 
This makes up 30.6% of the overall Singaporean-born population living in Australia, a 
considerably large number given that Australia is made up of eight different states.  
                                            
19 The Department of Statistics in Singapore refused my request for data regarding Singapore's 
emigration rates. Perhaps as Rodan (2004:51) has suggested, the 'opaqueness' of state activities 
mean that information is strategically controlled and only disclosed on a need-to-know basis. All 
data were therefore obtained from DIMIA's and the ABS's websites. DIMIA's information was 
based on the 2001 Australian census. No other censuses have been conducted since then. 
Secondary data from newspaper articles were also utilised if they were quantitatively useful. See 
also Tan (2005), who conducted quantitative analysis on emigration trends in relation to 
Singaporean national identity.  
20 In 2001, there were a total of 33,590 Singaporean migrants in Australia.  
21 "Residents" is the preferred term adopted by DIMIA. 
22 When I refer to Western Australia (WA), I am referring to Perth city itself, since I was unable to 
locate Singaporean migrants who may have been living in other towns or cities outside of Perth.  
Whither the Singaporean Transnational Migrant? 
 32 
  
Figure 2.1: Number of Singaporean migrants in Australia in 2001 and 2005 (WA only) 
[Source: Adapted from Department of Communications, Information Technology and the 




Demographically, 56.9% of them are ethnic Chinese, which is reflective of the dominant 
ethnic Chinese setting in Singapore. Based on my interpretation of the 2004-2005 data 
compiled by DIMIA, the total number of Singaporean migrants in Western Australia has 
risen to approximately 13,20023 in mid-2005. Especially significant is the fact that the 
number of Singaporean migrants to Western Australia during this period (2004-2005) 
showed the highest percentage increase for all migrant groups into the state – a 64.7% 
jump – from 697 migrants during the 2003-2004 period to 1,076 in the following year.  
                                            
23 This does not take into account deaths and repatriation. I simply added up the numbers 
obtained from the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts' 
publication on settler arrivals from 1994 to 2004 and arrived at this figure.  
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Figure 2.2: Annual emigration trends from Singapore to Western Australia between 1994 
and 2005 
[Source: Adapted from Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 




To put the issue in its context so that one may appreciate its overall significance, 
Singaporean migrants out-did the total number of migrants from the whole of the 
Americas24, and also the total number of migrants from southern and central Asia25 
during this period.  
 
2.3 Reasons for Singaporean Emigration to Perth 
Despite heterogeneous conditions for exit, several dominant patterns were discernible 
from my interviews, and I will explicate them in relation to the push-pull theory of 
migration, starting with the historical groundwork set by the “first wave” – the Eurasians. 
The importance of a historical perspective is obvious when we consider that there are, 
as I mentioned earlier, different "types" of emigrants, all of whom have acted upon 
historically contingent circumstances. 
                                            
24 The Americas refer to North America, South America, and the Caribbean islands.  
25 Southern Asia comprises people from countries such as India, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, 
for example. Central Asia comprises people from countries such as Afghanistan and the other 
republics of the former Soviet Union.  
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2.3.1 Independence and the period of uncertainty 
 
The 1960s was a turbulent period in Singapore’s political history, when it was thrust with 
statehood after it left the Malaysian Federation due to the respective governments’ 
divergent principles on multi-ethnic management. As leader of Singapore’s ruling PAP, 
Lee Kuan Yew had espoused the political rhetoric of a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in lieu of the 
dominant ethnic Chinese Singaporean population, whereby the principle of multiracial 
rights inherent in Lee’s proposal would have directly threatened the bumiputera26 
advantages that the Malay leaders had inherited from the British colonialists (Hill and 
Lian 1995:91-93; see also Mauzy and Milne 2002). Following Singapore’s exit, a siege 
or garrison mentality was developed (Brown 1994; see also Chan 1971), leading to a 
pragmatic ideological governing framework – encompassing the ‘myths’ of multiracialism 
and meritocracy (Hill and Lian 1995:31) – that stressed industrialisation and rapid 
economic growth as immediate solutions for the small city-state (Chua 1995). It is within 
this historical context of the ‘ethnic origins of Singapore’ (Hill and Lian 1995:39-66) and 
the double minority27 setting that we must locate the discourse of insecurity felt by some 
emigrants.  
 
The politics of CMIO and the double minority setting as push factors 
 
Although statistics are unavailable, there is sociological evidence to suggest that a 
sizeable proportion of Eurasians emigrated because they were uncertain about their 
political status as ethnic minorities in post-independence Singapore (see Benjamin 1976; 
Pereira 1995), especially in relation to the paradox of multiracialism (Hill and Lian 
                                            
26 Literally means "sons of the soil", which acknowledges Malay special rights and relegates the 
other ethnic groups to a minority political status. See Eugene Tan (2001) for a thorough analysis 
of the bumi concept in relation to Malaysian and Indonesian politics. 
27 This means that the ethnic Chinese are a majority in Singapore, but a minority in the Malay-
Muslim dominated Southeast Asian region.  
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1995:104) within a plural society28. The politics of “CMIO”, and the paradox that results 
from it, refer to the essentialised categorisation of Singaporeans according to their state-
ascribed ethnic backgrounds based on putative commonalities – Chinese, Malays, 
Indians, and Eurasians (or Others), despite cultural heterogeneity within each "model" 
(PuruShotnam 1998). The state’s reference to the Eurasians as “Others” not only 
highlights their demographically small numbers, but also their implicitly marginal status, 
since they are ethnically grouped with other non-dominant ethnic communities and 
essentialised as such, despite contributing significantly to Singapore society in many 
ways (see Hill and Lian 1995).  
An irony is manifested on two levels. As Benjamin (1976:127) notes, the 
Eurasians are in fact the only ethnic group that comes closest to any semblance of 
Singaporean national culture, since theirs is the only genuine culture that has evolved 
within Singapore itself. But in line with the state’s insistence that each “race”, as the 
state calls it, should have a ‘respectably ancient and distinctive exogenous culture [and] 
mother tongue29’, the Eurasians are therefore politically and culturally disadvantaged 
because they possess none of these; they are cultural hybrids. A further paradox is that 
while multiracialism in theory seeks to accord equal rights and privileges to all 
Singaporeans regardless of race, identifications along ethnic lines – officially 
implemented through the CMIO model at the everyday level – would logically lead to 
ethnic chauvinism and the strengthening of ethnic group boundaries, rather than social 
cohesion at the national level. The size of an ethnic group obviously affects the level of 
ethnic "security" on the one hand, and feelings of marginalisation on the other based on 
numerical strength. Eriksen’s (1993) claim that ascription is part of a larger process of 
                                            
28 This term was conceptualised by Furnivall (1948) to depict culturally distinctive ethnic groups 
that ‘live side by side, but separately’ within a political community (quoted in Vasil 1995:2-3).  
29 The mother tongue is a significant issue that relates to the state’s bilingual education policy, 
which has, over the years, ironically “disadvantaged” another group – the young ethnic Chinese –
further contributing towards the emigration rates. I will return to this in a later section. 
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the social organisation of culturally distinctive groups is applicable here. Yet in this case, 
the Eurasians were not only socially organised, but marginalised as numerical and 
cultural “Others”. Consequently, according to Benjamin (1976:127), many Eurasians 
emigrated because there was ‘no proper place for them’ in Singapore society, precisely 
because they lacked the cultural resources, such as a distinctive culture and a second 
language (mother tongue), to fit into the rigid multiracial model30. As some of my 
informants said, in relation to my enquiry about their reasons for emigration: 
It wasn’t a level playing field. (Male: 64, Eurasian, university education, retired) 
 
My view is this: the Singapore government made certain decisions,…given the 
conditions at that time…But in making those decisions, they would have disadvantaged 
some and advantaged others...Therefore if the government chooses to disadvantage 
some, then…they should have no qualms if those few choose to leave…Loyalty 
becomes a non-issue then, so you can't call them quitters or whatever, because loyalty 
is a two-way thing. (Male: 45, Eurasian, PhD, community volunteer) 
 
Racial rhetoric was avoided in these statements, which is understandable given 
the “sanitised” nature of ethnic relations in Singapore, whereby ethnicity (or race) has 
frequently been 'demonised' by the state as a dangerous, primordial form of identity that 
should be avoided in public discourse (Lawson 2001:81). Consequently, other 
comments were situated within discourses on political insecurity: 
My parents decided to migrate here in 1968,…when I was still, I think only about 12 or 
13…Anyway, years later, when I went back to Singapore for a holiday, I asked them why 
they migrated to such a boring place – well at that time Perth was boring, especially for a 
young person like me. So they said I don’t know the country’s history…Singapore is 
situated in a very precarious position over there. A lot of people didn’t think it could 
survive, not after being kicked out of Malaysia and all that…So there was this, this 
feeling of insecurity about the country’s future at that time. (Male: 49, Eurasian, 
university education, real estate agent) 
 
The “precarious position” that this informant speaks of refers to the double minority 
setting inherent in the geographical location of Singapore, which is situated in a Malay-
Muslim dominated region. As Chua (1995) has argued, the rhetoric of survivalism has 
                                            
30 Significantly, none of my Eurasian informants ever told me that they emigrated because of 
racial issues.  
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been constantly imbued into the Singaporean population by its national leaders, given 
their small size and "unfavourable" geographical location. Although Eurasians are 
ethnically “distinct” from the Chinese, the demographically dominant Chinese population 
arguably contributes towards perceived feelings of insecurity about the country’s long-
term political future31. Yet the strongest expression regarding the reasons for Eurasian 
emigration comes from my non-Eurasian informants.  
In the late '60s, ’70s and early ‘80s, there were a lot of Eurasians who emigrated 
here…The government said don’t worry, they are second class, they are not our best, 
not our cream of the crop…I thought the Eurasians got very angry with this, and I have 
Eurasian friends here today to verify this. OK? They were not happy at all, not to 
mention the fact that they were already being called “Others”. And I felt that the number 
of emigrants rose at that time, not only from the Eurasian side, but others as well…But 
they didn’t care. They didn’t care until the 1990s and now, when the Chinese started to 
leave. Then now they come out saying quitters lah, stayers lah, whatever lah. Still try to 
insult people to make them stay. But is it working? (Male: 52, Chinese, HSC, 
businessman) 
 
If what some of these informants said were true, then it can be deduced that the 
workings of multiracialism and CMIO politics were plausible dominant push factors that 
elicited a wave of Eurasian emigration to Perth, due to feelings of insecurity about their 
own individual futures as Singaporeans32. Rex (1997) has argued that ethnic 
communities or diasporas are concerned about their detachment from a territory, in 
reference to feelings of loss experienced as a result of migration. But in this case, 
detachment has precipitated migration. Many Eurasian informants said that they chose 
Perth because of its proximity33 to Singapore, among other factors such as the mild 
weather and quiet surroundings. Probing deeper, it is deducible that the political 
                                            
31 da Cunha (2002:134-136) lists several structural and cyclical features that have given rise to 
Singapore’s sense of insecurity in the region, such as its small size, lack of natural resources, 
and the 78% ethnic Chinese composition. Ironically, former Prime Minister Goh once remarked 
that these constant reminders may have had the unintended effect of contributing towards ‘the 
sense of pessimism and the feeling of insecurity’ (Goh 1989, quoted in Sullivan and Gunasekaran 
1994), resulting in increased emigration rates. 
32 See Barr and Low (2005), who argued that Singapore's multiracial policy is a disguised attempt 
to assimilate the minority races into the dominant Chinese majority.  
33 While proximity was one of the most oft-cited reasons by most informants for choosing Perth, it 
cannot constitute a motivating factor for emigration, since Malaysia and Indonesia are more 
geographically proximate.  
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conditions in Australia during the 1960s and early 1970s favoured Eurasian voluntary 
immigration more than other Asians. The White Australia policy meant that Eurasians 
were “privileged” bearers of culturally specific “requirements” that facilitated entry into a 
society which was still practicing a strict policy of assimilationism (Jupp 2002). As this 
informant said, 
My parents had British passports, so it was easier I guess. But at that time you still had 
to prove that you had 51% White blood or something like that if you wanted to stand any 
chance of getting in, and I think we all went through about three or four interviews, 
including police interviews and also with the Australian High Com. But looking at me you 
really couldn’t tell the difference between me and an Aussie, so I think that helped a lot. 
But it was quite a tedious process which took about twelve months. (Male: 62, Eurasian, 
university education, real estate agent) 
 
The context-specific politics of immigration are thus secondary but nonetheless arguably 
significant issues that some migrants consider when choosing their destination states. 
As this informant had suggested, White Australia meant that "looking like one of them34" 
was a significantly valuable source of embodied cultural capital (along with human 
capital) in the receiving state. Institutionalised as such, a person's race becomes a 
determining factor not only in his choice of destination, but in the extent to which he 
qualifies as a migrant and is included within the larger Australian polity. Nevertheless, 
while successive "waves" of Eurasians have uprooted to Perth, they did not emigrate in 
toto as is commonly assumed. However, a sense of "collectivity" is ingrained within the 
nuclear family unit, resulting in family reunification for some emigrants.  
 
2.3.2 Family reunification and kinship ties as pull factors – network ties 
 
The facilitating functions of families as network ties in the migration process have been 
dealt with extensively by scholars on migration (Boyd 1989; Winchie and Carment 1989; 
Harbison 1981), and more recently by those working within the transnational framework 
                                            
34 The politics of race and modes of incorporation in the context of immigration is a significant 
issue that I will return to in Chapter Five when I discuss home and adaptation. 
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(Parrenas 2005; Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Yeoh et al 2003; Chan and Seet 2003; 
Chan 1997; Huang and Yeoh 2005). Migrant networks are 'sets of interpersonal ties that 
connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants' through kinship and other ties, 
constituting 'a form of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to various 
kinds of financial capital' in the host society (Massey et al 1998:42-43). These ties lower 
the risks associated with migration and raises its odds considerably (Massey et al 1994). 
Eventually, according to Massey (1999:45), migration develops cumulatively and 
becomes self-sustaining, because 'each act of migration creates the social structure 
needed to sustain it'. Theoretically then, if people emigrate, others within that social tie 
(especially family members) will tap on pioneers' social capital and eventually follow suit. 
In my study, the role of the nuclear family as both a pull factor and a social tie is 
manifested on two levels, albeit for different migrants: first, in terms of reuniting distant 
family members who had created network ties as pioneer migrants; and second, the 
choice of Perth due to its proximity to the homeland.  
 The first reason highlights the importance of kin in the destination city for 
potential migrants, and explains why some Singaporeans selected Perth over other 
Australian cities. It was not uncommon for some parents35 to emigrate, leaving their 
children in Singapore to complete their National Service or varsity education. Several of 
these secondary migrants later decided to join their parents in Perth. These are two 
examples: 
My parents were getting on in their years, and being the eldest son, I thought I'd move 
over and be with them, since my brothers didn’t want to come. But I wouldn’t have come 
without securing a job first of course…So no, if I didn’t have a job here, I wouldn’t have 
moved over. (Male: 43, Eurasian, university education) 
 
I felt it was time to move somewhere else, because Singapore was getting a bit too 
competitive and too stifling for my liking. And since my parents were in Perth, it was a 
                                            
35 Unfortunately, while I managed to interview quite a number of Eurasian migrants, I was unable 
to gain access to their parents.  
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no-brainer…If my family wasn’t here, then I probably would have considered other 
places first. (Male: 33, Eurasian, university education, self-employed) 
 
Family ties here simply constitute a pull, not a push factor; one that facilitates the 
destination choice rather than acting as a catalyst for emigration. Thus, while the social 
capital that is inherent in familial network ties may be useful resources for adaptation 
purposes because they function as credit-entitling 'credentials' (Bourdieu 1986), it does 
not constitute a precipitating factor in determining acts of emigration as Massey et al 
(1998) suggested. This is especially so for voluntary migrants, because the theory fails 
to explain why some emigrate, while others who are part of the same circumstances do 
not. Other considerations, such as lifestyle choices, were evident in the decision making 
process, and not everyone emigrated simply because they had family ties in Perth. In 
Massey et al's (1998) formulation, potential migrants want to be connected to other 
labour migrants abroad because they need those connections to facilitate future 
movements and adaptation. Massey et al's (1998) formulation works better in explaining 
labour, not voluntary, migration. Furthermore, the key element of social capital – its 
transferability across borders through social and symbolic ties – was not particularly 
evident in this framework. Social capital is simply assumed to increase with every act of 
migration, because others within a network tie can, and will, necessarily utilise it for 
future migration.  
 While some situated the presence of kin as their main reason for choosing Perth 
over other places, others chose Perth because it was geographically proximate to 
Singapore and hence, close to their left-behind kindred. The importance of nuclear 
family ties in this case operates functionally to determine some migrants' choice of city.  
The kids were struggling with their Chinese, and the younger one I think can't pass 
PSLE (Primary School Leaving Examinations). But I chose Perth because its also close 
to home. Mum and dad are still there, so it makes it more convenient to go back if I have 
to, and also for them to visit. Also same time-zone, so easier to communicate. So a 
combination of factors. (Male: 48, Chinese, university education, banker) 
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In these cases, the pull of the family acts as a strong cultural force in opting for a 
proximate destination. Proximity therefore constitutes a variable component within the 
more important aspect – family ties36. For why would emigrants consider proximity to 
Singapore as an important factor if most of them intend to sever political ties, other than 
to facilitate the maintenance of kinship relations?  
 On the other hand, social obligations that are culturally embedded within familial 
ties may create unintended negative reinforcements in the pre-migration process. This 
point was not lost on Chan (2005:66), who argued that the family can contribute in 
positive as well as negative ways, the latter acting as some sort of 'psychological 
imprisonment' that restricts family members' destination choices. At times, the presence 
of kin in Perth creates obligatory expectations by other family members, so that the 
patriarchal, nuclear family becomes a site of social control and altruistic behaviour that 
are informed by cultural norms. For example, this migrant wanted to move to Sydney 
due to the "lure of the dollar". However, as he says, 
My wife and I preferred Sydney because of the nature of our job37, but when my mother 
heard about it, she was not happy at all. She wondered why, if we wanted to move to 
Australia, we didn’t want to come to Perth, since she was already here. Especially since 
I have kids, the assumption was that she could take care of the kids, because we work 
really long hours…So that’s why we're here now; not exactly our first choice. (Male: 35, 
Chinese, university education, investment banker) 
 
In this case, the presence of kin acts as a cultural force in regulating patterns of 
behaviour (choice of migration site) in line with the functions of the traditional nuclear 
family unit, one of which is to care for the elderly. Nevertheless for most people, 
decisions to emigrate are constructed within a web of familial ties; ties that can both 
positively or negatively reinforce obligations and norms, and affect their destination 
                                            
36 See Kau et al (2004:28), who argue in their longitudinal survey on Singaporean values that 
'Singaporeans are pro-family'. 
37 There is a general assumption, rightly or wrongly, that the eastern Australian cities of Sydney 
and Melbourne provide more viable economic and business opportunities than Perth.   
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choice. As Rumbaut (1977, cited in Portes 1998a:17) argued, 'family ties [may] bind, but 
sometimes these bonds constrain rather than facilitate particular outcomes'.  
 
2.3.3 Expanding the realms of marginalisation – opportunities (or lack thereof) within 
 an increasingly meritocratic and elitist framework 
 
Due in large part to the PAP's export-oriented industrialisation programme and state-led 
intervention in the local economy, Singapore's political-economic position had stabilised 
considerably by the late 1970s (Rodan 1997). The problems that confronted the PAP 
leadership upon independence, such as overpopulation and unemployment, had largely 
been solved through a delicate balance between pragmatic governance based on an 
effective communitarian ideology on the one hand, and authoritarian rule on the other. 
These structural transformations, however, seem to have come at a deeper social price.  
 The "Second Industrial Revolution", which was effected in the early 1980s, aimed 
pragmatically at accelerating economic growth by structurally redirecting the economy 
towards the manufacturing and high-tech sectors (Rodan 1997). However, it also meant 
that unskilled and lowly-educated workers were becoming increasingly alienated within a 
capitalistic system. They would gradually have to be phased out and replaced by more 
"qualified" workers, or undergo retraining if it was possible38. The meritocratic-elitist 
principle of governance therefore became the raison d'être in the 1970s (Hill and Lian 
1995), which directly rewarded particular kinds of talent (particularly academic 
achievements) and downplayed others (for example, creativity or sporting talent). The 
early 1980s and beyond also saw the increased consolidation of state power in various 
ways, such as the splintering of the two largest trade unions39 into nine "subsidiaries" 
                                            
38 Rodan (1997) argued that the retraining of approximately 320,000 workers in 1996 with less 
than secondary education was a difficult, if not impractical, task.  
39 See Deyo (1981), who explains how the state effectively suppressed organised labour in its 
corporate paternalist model of governance.  
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(Rodan 1997), as well as the restriction of civil society40 through political co-optation on 
the one hand, and ambiguously defining the limits of political space on the other (Rodan 
1996). In light of these historical state-society circumstances, Rodan (1997; 2004) has 
consistently argued that the conditions that greatly privilege a select class of 
Singaporeans, such as the domestic bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic elite, also 
marginalises those who do not fall within this socially differentiated class of educated 
professionals. The reproduction of a Marxist class structure – in accordance with a 
deliberate state strategy to transform the fortunes of the resource scarce city-state by 
firstly industrialising, and subsequently exploiting labour in all its forms – had 
marginalised some Singaporeans who lacked the necessary educational credentials for 
promotion. This became the main exit-inducing factor for most emigrants during this 
period.  
One day I woke up and read in the papers that if you don’t have a university degree, you 
can't be promoted to Division One. And so, I left. (Male: 52, Chinese, 'O' Levels, real 
estate agent) 
 
I felt at that time, the Singapore government was only looking at graduates, and if you 
were not a graduate, then there was really no future for you. I am not a graduate, and 
neither is my wife. So you go and put two and two together and tell me whether I was 
wrong to leave…Not that I wanted to leave, but in my view, the government kicked me 
out…But for you its different – you are young, you have done national service, you are 
educated, so you should stay there, because you are useful. Then when you've had 
enough, and built up your savings, you transfer it over here. That’s the way to go. (Male: 
49, Chinese, HSC, director) 
 
 Meritocracy covered all aspects of social life, including jobs and university 
entrance requirements. The general perception is that the lack of these state-defined 
"merits" severely hampers one's social mobility. As this informant testifies, 
Many of them I spoke to here are very bitter…They left with a chip on their shoulder…It 
wasn’t that here (Perth) is greener, and over there (Singapore) less green, no. They 
                                            
40 Some informants mentioned lack of freedom in Singapore as their main reason for emigrating. 
However, I treated this as an excuse rather than a real exit-inducing reason, because none of 
them were involved in any political activities prior to emigration, nor did they attempt to effect any 
changes in homeland politics after emigrating. See Chong (2005) and Lee (2002) for recent 
critiques of Singapore's civil society projects.  
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came here because they wanted to get out of a system that had become untenable for 
them and their children. (Male: 55, Indian, university education, musician) 
 
In recent years, the class structure has become increasingly entrenched due to the 
state's revised economic strategy, which was redirected towards offshore investment 
and regional economic integration (Rodan 1997:161-166). These initiatives entailed the 
co-option of a 'virtual "class" of public entrepreneurs' (Rodan 1997:160) and politically 
trusted civil servants (Rodan 2004) into the state's executive committee – an "inner 
circle"41 of sorts – ensuring that middle class dissent is kept at a minimum. Typically, 
government scholars are seen as the “cream of the crop” in Singapore. Nevertheless, 
this informant believes that 
In Singapore, no matter how hard you try, eventually you will hanta kaki42. Even if you 
are a scholar, it is not a guarantee of a stable career. You still have to perform to certain 
expectations, because there are just so many of them (scholars) now…In fact, I’m willing 
to bet that a lot of those so-called scholars, other than your President's scholars, are in 
pretty mundane jobs at the moment. They are working because they have to serve out 
their bonds. Whether they are happy in their working environment is another matter 
altogether…Bond breaking has become one of the hot topics recently hasn't it?...In my 
view, a scholarship in Singapore is no longer a great indicator of success outside 
government circles, especially as society progresses even further into the knowledge 
based economy. (Male: 46, Indian, university education, lawyer) 
 
As Rodan (1997) has suggested, social divisions based on material inequalities are not 
only fractured between classes, but within the rapidly expanding middle class as well, 
since different people have vastly different life expectations and interests. If the state 
had felt that gifting Singaporeans with material goods necessarily instils loyalty, then 
these increasing emigration trends among a broad section of the Singaporean middle 
                                            
41 See Barr (2006), who argues that Singapore's culture of governance is based on technocratic 
ideals that revolve around the interplay between pragmatism and elitism. 
42 This is a typical Malay phrase that is used in the Army, which means to "march on the spot". In 
local parlance, it is invoked to describe a person whose career prospects within an organisation 
have stagnated.  
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class shows that material luxuries – such as the 5Cs43 – are not the only fetishized 
commodities that modern Singaporeans crave for.  
 
Pragmatic considerations, rising middle class expectations, and cost of living within the 
relative deprivation model of migration 
 
Or does it? Many informants expressed very pragmatic concerns in their emigration 
decisions; pragmatism which undoubtedly stems from the socially engineered demands 
of living in modern day consumeristic Singapore society. Dollars and cents are still the 
most sensible tools for upward social mobility.  
Quite simple lah. I don’t think Australia wants people like me in their fifties. But we are 
here to live off our existing wealth, away from the crowded environment and the crazy 
cost of living that goes up every year. I am tired of paying six figures for my car all the 
time…This is a country that is adopted for convenience, because its cheap relative to 
Singapore, and I have no qualms about saying that I won't even learn the Australian 
anthem; what? Australian Fair, even though I will take up citizenship soon. Neither will I 
die for this country. But it gives me what I want at this stage of my life, which Singapore 
will never be able to provide. (Male: 55, Chinese, university education, retired lawyer) 
 
In simple economical terms, $500,000 in Singapore nowadays you will struggle to live a 
middle class lifestyle. But here, the same amount can get you a decent head start in life. 
You just calculate – for $450,000 you sell your 5-room HDB flat and maybe your middle 
range car. You withdraw your CPF. You take that amount here, say $550 to $600,000 in 
cash, and you can easily buy a landed property with your own garden for say $250 to 
$300,000 or even cheaper than that, not in Dalkeith of course, but somewhere else. A 
Toyota Camry will only cost you about $30,000; in Singapore its close to $100,000. Then 
you have your CPF money as your savings for emergency. And you still have change of 
about $150,000. And you have your own house, your own car to keep for life with no 
COE. It is simple economics. Then you work in a job you earn say $40,000 a year. You 
won't be super rich, but its enough for you to get by comfortably in life. In Singapore if 
you earn $40,000, you cannot live the same type of lifestyle as here. You will be 
struggling to pay off your debts all your life. So when the average Singaporean fella 
comes here, he gets an automatic upgrade. (Male: 49, Indian, university education, 
dentist) 
 
 A middle class lifestyle is clearly an important pragmatic goal for disenchanted 
Singaporean migrants, which is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in Singapore. 
                                            
43 See Straits Times, March 26th, 2005 "Status isn't everything anymore for S'poreans". The five 
Cs refer to the perennial pursuit of the essentialised symbols of success among Singaporeans – 
car, condominium, credit cards, cash, and country club. The authors, several academics from the 
NUS Business School, argue that Singaporeans are becoming more altruistic and less status-
conscious. See also Kau et al (2004).  
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Furthermore, when retirement sets in, retirees44 often find themselves at the wrong end 
of the social spectrum because they are no longer useful, exploitable human resources. 
Rodan (1997) has argued that in line with pragmatic governance and meritocratic ideals, 
the subsequent lack of social welfare and medical benefits45 in Singapore – which are 
characteristic features of most other developed societies – marginalises older people 
and places the burden of aged care entirely on second generation family members. As 
this informant said, 
Here I can stretch my dollar, especially since I am retired. I just had a (heart) bypass last 
year for free. And the medication that I take – you know how much it costs? AUD$4.50. 
Otherwise without these government subsidies, it will cost more than $150…If I knew 
here was so good to old people, I would have come over much earlier. I thought they 
were all racist, including the government, that’s why I was uncomfortable at first. But now 
I know they really take care of their citizens. (Male: 67, Chinese, retired) 
 
If a middle class, educated Singaporean (retirees included) feels that he can 
reproduce his unattainable middle class lifestyle in Perth at a fraction of the cost, then 
pragmatically speaking, why would he not emigrate? Pragmatism is also evident in this 
case: 
I just got my PR, but I wanna earn more money in Singapore first before coming over for 
good. Australia's tax is so high. Better earn money in Singapore, save up, then move 
over when I have to. (Female: 29, Chinese, university education, lawyer) 
 
Building up one's financial capital in Singapore prior to emigration is not uncommon. 
Theoretically, the transferability of local assets (or resources) enhances mobility, and it 
constitutes an important source of social capital in the adaptation process because it 
lowers transaction costs in the host society46 (Faist 2000). In this case, the middle class 
                                            
44 Due to space limitations, I am unable to elaborate upon this group. Suffice to say that most 
retirees are also middle to upper middle class people, which supports my assertion that it is the 
middle class and above who are emigrating. However, I will return to their roles when I discuss 
the fragmentation of community in the next chapter.  
45 See Today, 20th February 2006, 'Keeping greener the grass of home'. The article cited an 
example of an elderly couple who emigrated to Perth because they found a home that catered to 
their medical needs.  
46 Transferability of resources does not contribute directly towards emigration for voluntary 
migrants. However, it facilitates emigration and the destination choice.  
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Singaporean migrant is more advantaged than other migrant groups who either lack 
these resources, or its potential transferability across borders. As these verbatims have 
shown, although Singapore's high standard of living is a bane for many, it nevertheless 
facilitates migrant adaptation because local assets are positively transferable, since 
living costs in Perth are lower than in Singapore. This also partly explains why many 
emigrants do not opt for the more costly eastern states of Sydney and Melbourne.  
 For some Singaporeans, feelings of marginalisation stem from the increasing 
difficulty in sustaining a middle class lifestyle in Singapore. Theoretically, the anxieties of 
these middle class Singaporean migrants can be located within the relative deprivation 
model of migration (see Stark and Taylor 1989; 1991). Rationally-calculated acts of 
migration occur because people want to increase their wealth in absolute terms and 
relative to others in the same society. By exchanging their labour overseas for foreign 
capital, labour migrants eventually reduce their deprivation when they return home47. 
However, for Singaporean voluntary migrants, their relative deprivation encourages them 
to uproot permanently and settle in Perth because cost of living is relatively lower. They 
can therefore reproduce their ideal middle class lifestyles and feel relatively less 
deprived or economically marginalised in their new environment. Interestingly, former 
PM Goh showed sociological awareness of the situation, when he said that 
Singaporeans 
…will look at the rich and find them getting richer while they remain poor. While 
their income goes up, it will not go up by as much as the incomes of managers, 
professionals and businessmen (Straits Times, 2nd May 1996, quoted in Rodan 
1997:167-68). 
 
                                            
47 This is exemplified by both the skilled and unskilled foreign workers in Singapore, such as 
Bangladeshi workers in the construction industry, Filipino domestic maids, and mainland Chinese 
"foreign talents".  
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However, Goh was referring to the income disparities between the working and middle 
classes48. In this study, the middle classes rather than the working classes are 
emigrating, since the latter lack the necessary “capital” to pass the stringent immigration 
requirements in Australia. As Rodan (1997:170) argued, the opportunity costs of 
Singapore's dramatic economic growth based on meritocratic principles are not only 
deepening social-economic fractions, but also increased material expectations by the 
growing middle class. Unable to achieve their material needs, the lower costs of living in 
Perth offers a pragmatic step towards upward social mobility. The urge to reproduce 
their middle class lifestyle may be seen as a meso level link between push factors based 
on feelings of marginalisation on the one hand, and pull factors based on family ties and 
cost of living on the other. However, relative deprivation is not a causal factor for all 
emigrants, especially for those who have been co-opted into the broader middle to upper 
middle class social structure in Singapore. Nevertheless, when the expansive reach of 
meritocracy filters down to their children's education and marginalises them, potential 
emigration turns into a family affair and becomes a reality.  
 
2.3.4 Layering the marginalisation process – meritocracy and the education system 
 
Adopting the principle of meritocracy to complement multiracialism may be seen as an 
attempt to remove racial barriers behind social mobility by ensuring equal opportunities 
for all, whereby individual merit is presumed to be an objective indicator of a person's 
abilities (Mauzy and Milne 2002). Yet, equal opportunities do not always generate equal 
outcomes, since opportunities are also dependent upon individual abilities and personal 
resources (Tan, E. S. 2004). Subsequently, meritocracy is only meritocratic if the merits 
are defined as meritorious by those in power. For while meritocracy can be invoked by 
                                            
48 Consequently, the 2006 pre-elections Progress Package was a short-term solution that 
attempted to correct this socio-economic imbalance. 
Whither the Singaporean Transnational Migrant? 
 49 
the state to explain away inequalities based on individual differences, many 
Singaporeans can see through this "false consciousness", and rationalise that the state's 
meritocratic ideology legitimises socio-economic inequalities based on elitist principles 
and communitarianism, which privileges a minority, and disadvantages others. Indeed, 
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew himself once declared that 'I started off believing all men 
[sic] were equal. Now I know that’s the most unlikely thing ever to have been…the Bell 
Curve is a fact of life' (Han et al 1998, quoted in Mauzy and Milne 2002:55).  
 Thus, the 'macho-meritocratic' (Vogel 1989:1053) Singaporean educational 
system places tremendous emphasis on examinations and streaming49, so as to 
"objectively" quantify individuals' scholastic abilities based on the Bell Curve. However, 
while it is in theory blind to race, class or parentage, meritocracy as defined by the state 
places sole emphasis on academic achievements50 as the single criteria by which 
Singaporeans' abilities should be determined. Rodan (1996b:24) has also observed that 
Singapore is arguably the only place in the world where formal educational credentials 
based on meritocratic ideals are so easily convertible into ‘economic or social capital’. 
Thus, in recent years, an increasing number of Singaporeans have emigrated to Perth 
because they feel that their children are unable to survive in Singapore's elitist51 and 
                                            
49 Singaporean students are "streamed" into various categories in secondary schools to facilitate 
teaching. However, Kang (2004) observed that streaming not only caused low self-esteem, but 
also created intra-ethnic segregation. Khong et al (2004) also concluded that streaming and 
school ranking exercises are socially divisive policies that create elitist notions of intelligence 
based solely on academic results, and fail to develop students' other innate potential. 
50 Arguably the most obvious, and also controversial, implementation of this meritocratic principle 
in the area of education is the Graduate Mothers’ Scheme, which was introduced in 1984 but 
eradicated in 1987. By providing concessions for graduate mothers if they produced more babies 
and penalising non-graduate mothers for the same outcome, the scheme aimed to correct the 
disproportionate imbalance between the "educated" and "less-educated" in society. The huge 
unpopularity of this policy cost the PAP several seats in an election year (Mauzy and Milne 2002). 
51 Then Prime Minister Lee argued in 1966 that the education system in Singapore should be 
geared towards a ‘"pyramidal structure"’ that consists of three levels: ‘"top leaders, good 
executives”, and a ”well-disciplined and highly civic-conscious broad mass"’ (Tan 2002:174). Lee 
therefore believes that the education system should be tuned to produce a stratified society to 
ensure its holistic functioning.  
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pressurising educational system. Many are middle to upper middle class, else they 
would not be able to afford the high costs of private schooling52 in Perth.   
I'm doing it for my kids' education. After they finish, I will go back. (Female: 44, Chinese, 
university education, property agent) 
 
She (informant's daughter) wasn’t making it at all. I don’t think she could even pass her 
PSLE53 (Primary School Leaving Examinations), so you can call her an academic 
refugee…I felt that for her to continue another ten years of decent education, she had to 
come here…You can say I’m over-reacting, but in Singapore, from day one you need to 
be getting scholarships and awards, otherwise you will find your chances in society 
severely limited. (Male: 55, Chinese, university education, retired) 
 
We came here because of my daughter. She was so stressed out in school because she 
was in JC (junior college), and every Saturday she was practising for a band concert 
from 7.30am until 10.30pm, and I am not exaggerating. Then her academic results 
suffered, and she has to be solely responsible for that. So I asked myself where are the 
priorities? You want to take away so much of her time doing this band thing, and you 
blame her for not doing well in her studies. She literally wanted to leave JC and go to a 
polytechnic. So I said that’s the last straw, and I decided we should come over. (Male: 
49, Chinese, university education, real estate agent)  
 
I belong to my kids. I had an excellent career ahead of me, but I dropped all that 
because my kids just could not cut it in school, especially their Chinese. We spent 
thousands of dollars on Chinese tuition, yet they were still struggling, and then they 
became so demoralised because the teachers were always badgering them because 
they were hopeless in Chinese54…Then their other subjects suffered. But the irony was 
that one of their teachers, who was an Australian grad, told me to take them out of 
Singapore and put them in the Australian system, because he said that my kids were not 
stupid, only that they were not getting the right support from their teachers. And now, I 
can see that they are so much happier going to school. (Female: 48, Chinese, university 
education, freelance lawyer) 
 
 Family migration is a direct result of the state's insistence that education is the 
sole determinant of a person's abilities and life chances. The perceived societal need to 
excel academically had marginalised those who may not have been as academically 
inclined as others. But in uprooting to Perth for educational reasons, are they not 
reproducing state-ideological norms regarding the importance of education? The answer 
                                            
52 While public schooling is generally free, private schools charge between AUD$10,000 to 
$25,000 per annum.  
53 Equivalent to Year Six in Australia. 
54 In accordance with the bilingual education policy, Chinese language constitutes one of the few 
"mother tongues" that all Singaporean students are required to learn throughout their pre-tertiary 
education. Inability to cope with the Chinese language as an examinable subject is not 
uncommon, even for ethnic Chinese Singaporean students (see Mauzy and Milne 2002). 
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depends on one's views about education. For if meritocracy leads to competitiveness 
and an increasingly anxious middle class, then the paper chase inevitably becomes a 
necessary step towards success (see Chua 1998). This informant sums the issue up 
nicely: 
Actually in Singapore, a lot of what you want your child to achieve are your own 
expectations, not your child's…So you talk about the so-called normal path – going from 
primary school all the way to university, and then get a well-paid job as a professional 
and then the parent can retire happily. Especially for Asian parents, its very difficult to 
step back and let the child do what he wants naturally, to harness his own individual 
talent in any area of life…I used to be like that when I first came, but I realised its unfair 
for me to judge him based on my own selfish standards…Ya people always say over 
here school is easier, because standards are lower. Well I do agree that expectations 
are lower, but simply because getting As is not the only measure of a child's talent. And 
going to school is not just to rote learn and get your As. Over here its a much more 
holistic education which develops the child in every aspect of life, be it sports, or public 
speaking, or creative talent, or music. Not just exams and results. And people here also 
don’t compare and ask questions like "What marks did your child get?". Because it really 
doesn’t matter at all…Ultimately, I believe that at the end of the day, a good education 
system is one where the child is constantly motivated to go to school every day on his 
own. And in that regard, I can see a big change in my two kids' attitudes towards school 
life. (Female: 46, Chinese, university education, former lawyer) 
 
Are these emigrants "quitters", or simply caring parents who would sacrifice their careers 
for the sake of their children's future? In a later chapter, I will show that education still 
represents a significant form of human-cultural capital among Singaporean migrants, to 
the extent that it augments the reproduction of elitist Singaporean identities in terms of 
educational importance.  
More significantly for my concluding section, the importance of a tertiary 
education has resulted in increased overseas contact for a section of the middle class. 
Some students were unable to make it pass the stringent university requirements in 
Singapore, while others simply wanted to broaden their horizons by attending overseas 
varsities. From a historical perspective, the key point is that with the rapid economic 
growth and subsequent emergence of the affluent ‘new rich’ (Robison and Goodman 
1996:5-7) in Singapore in the 1990s, an expensive overseas varsity education has 
become a much more attainable and attractive option. Eventually, the resultant effect is 
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that more overseas contact, especially with developed societies like Australia, Canada 
and the US, increases the likelihood of lower rates of return among these university 
students, transforming them into emigrants instead.  
 
2.3.5 The return of the students – contrastive quality of life as push-pull factors 
 
If an alternative lifestyle is cited as an important factor in motivations for emigration, then 
the experiences of student returnees – Singaporeans who studied in Perth and returned 
as PRs – arguably constitute the most accurate basis for comparison. Having lived in the 
host society, they were able to make more objective assessments about lifestyle 
choices, as opposed to the post hoc explanations offered by other informants55. Indeed, 
student returnees from all ages comprised a significant proportion of my sample. For this 
group of emigrants, the quest for an alternative lifestyle, one that rejected meritocratic 
ideals and excessive materialism – constituted both push and pull factors. Emigration 
was not always elicited to reproduce a middle class lifestyle in Perth relative to an 
elusive dream in Singapore per se, although it was a facilitating factor. Rather, an 
alternative, more relaxed lifestyle, which would ironically not have been realised without 
Singapore’s rapid economic growth, has resulted in emigration for this “group” of 
emigrants. In general, what these informants often termed “lifestyle choices” collectively 
referred to shorter working hours, a more pro-family environment, better weather, 
friendlier people, more open spaces, and a more egalitarian society. Distilling from these 
varied reasons, a central underlying factor – better quality of life56 – was discernible in 
their contrastive descriptions between the "rat race", meritocratic culture of modern 
                                            
55 Almost all informants cited “better lifestyle” as an extremely positive characteristic about Perth.  
56 As if to pre-empt further disenchantment amongst Singaporeans, one of the main priorities of 
the newly-installed Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, in 2004 was to implement a five day work 
week. This was also designed to lighten workers’ loads and to create a more pro-family 
environment, so as to hopefully curb the trend of decreasing birth rates.  
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Singapore society, compared to the more relaxed and informal social surroundings of 
Perth. As these informants pointed out, 
I came here because of the lifestyle, because I have much more time for my family and I 
enjoy my work so much more. Because I teach PE, and the weather here is excellent 
compared to Singapore. America? Too much crime. UK? Too far, and the cost of living is 
too high when you convert Sing dollars into pounds. Canada? Same as Australia, so 
might as well come to Perth which is nearer, same time zone, and also more 
Asians…Sydney and Melbourne? No. Too similar to Singapore in terms of the working 
culture, attitudes, and cost of living is much higher than Perth. (Male: 38, Chinese, 
university education, teacher) 
 
Having been here in my student days, I really fell in love with the open spaces. In 
Singapore its too crammed and too hectic. Not as if work is so tough in Singapore, but 
its just the weather, the people around you, that don’t give you the buzz when you go to 
work. You trudge along, you make superficial remarks to your peers, and they are just 
waiting for you to slip up. I just didn’t like the environment, especially after coming back 
from Perth. It was quite a culture shock. Over here, I really enjoy work so much 
more…There are many factors, but if I were to choose one general one, I’d say the 
lifestyle. That’s why I’d never go to Sydney or Melbourne, because I believe the culture 
there is no different to Singapore. (Male: 35, Chinese, PhD, private tutor) 
 
The yearning for a better quality of life is juxtaposed against the First World, 
cosmopolitan and mechanical society that the PAP has assiduously built up over the last 
forty years. Ironically, the modern and materially-grounded social conditions that the 
government has created now seems to have become a central motivating factor for 
some to leave for the so-called "greener pastures" of Perth, in which a laid back and 
comfortable lifestyle represents a more attractive alternative than material success. 
Having lived overseas during their student days, this group of emigrants seem to have 
redefined their parameters of "success" away from meritocracy towards a more 
egalitarian mentality, which is noticeably devoid of excessive materialism and status 
consciousness. 
Here is more egalitarian, underdog mentality, giving everybody a fair go, and not status 
conscious…It doesn’t mean if you're a plumber or electrician, means you're not 
intelligent or knowledgeable. So its not a matter whether someone does chor kang – 
rough work – versus brain work type of thing…So I also have redefined my measure of 
success; not necessarily only degree and money…Here it gives room for people who 
have less in life to gain more, because success is not only defined in relation to the 
dollar sign. (Female: 37, Chinese, university education, music teacher) 
 
Whither the Singaporean Transnational Migrant? 
 54 
The good thing about here is that you don’t need to be a scholar or graduate to be 
successful in life. Not graduate never mind. You don’t get thrown to the lower rungs of 
society…I’ve had enough of being in a place that judges people based on their academic 
achievements alone…Here, you can be a carpenter or a bricklayer and earn more than a 
professor. And I see nothing wrong with that, because both jobs require specific skills. 
While Singapore brings in all the Bangladeshi workers to do your dirty jobs, here it is a 
recognised skill which requires proper certification, and people are not ashamed to do it. 
So its this sense of egalitarianism, giving everyone a fair go, and treating everyone as a 
decent human being, that people like about this place. And the more I think about it, the 
more I look down on Singapore because of their way of dividing society into degree, no 
degree; clever, not clever. I won’t be surprised next time if you don’t have a degree, the 
government will revoke your citizenship. (Male: 53, Chinese, HSC, manager) 
 
My company believes in two things: Christianity, and meritocracy. But my version of 
meritocracy is not necessarily having a degree, because it is not the only measure of a 
person’s ability. (Male: 48, Chinese, university education, managing director) 
 
I am not suggesting that meritocracy and excessive materialism as such have "pushed" 
these student returnees away. However, having experienced an alternative lifestyle, 
especially one that satisfies their own individual priorities, the tendency to uproot to a 
less meritocratic and more egalitarian environment becomes extremely attractive.  
 Should not a First World society with one of the highest living standards in the 
world be able to provide a high quality of life – and not only a high standard of living – 
that appeases its people? But as Rodan (1996) has argued, middle class expectations 
will only increase with higher standards of living, especially if success is constantly 
defined in material terms. Similarly, Chua (1998) has argued that any imaginary 
reference to Singapore is solely encapsulated in the modern, state-sanctioned material 
conditions of social life. Clearly, these expectations have now been expanded to include 
not only material gifts, but a better quality of life as well. Perhaps more worryingly, Kau 
et al's (2004:67) longitudinal survey showed that Singaporeans 'might be satisfied with 
life in general, but might not be as satisfied with life in Singapore in particular' (emphasis 
added). This is the paradox of living in a modern city-state that has "over-provided" its 
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citizens with the material gifts of social life, but under-compensated in other areas57. As 
former PM Goh himself lamented,  
The more the government provides for Singaporeans, the higher their 
expectations [will be]…The more we educate Singaporeans…, the more 
internationally mobile they will become. The more they gain from subsidised HDB 
housing, the more money they have to buy cheaper houses in Australia (Today, 
19 August 2002). 
 
If Singaporeans are by-products of a pragmatic and success-oriented governing 
framework, then surely loyalty becomes a non-issue. For how can loyalty be 
promulgated if pragmatism and meritocracy are the instrumental raison d'être of 
governance? Rodan (1996b:39) argued that there is no need for the 'now sizeable 
middle class to seek drastic political change' due to their 'elevated social status'. Yet, it 
will not stop them from emigrating if they feel that this social status can be reproduced at 
a fraction of the cost elsewhere without worrying about political change.  
 Multifarious conditions of exit therefore characterise this extremely diverse 
migration system. Underlying these heterogeneous exit-inducing reasons, one finds that 
a strong sense of marginalisation prevailed. The “first wave” of Eurasians were ethnically 
marginalised under the CMIO model of multiracialism, which some non-Eurasian 
informants felt had disadvantaged these culturally hybrid “true-blue” Singaporeans. The 
meritocratic and pragmatic ideological governing framework in the 1970s further 
expanded the realms of marginalisation to include those who did not possess the “right” 
educational credentials. Emigration to a more egalitarian society that placed less 
emphasis on educational qualifications became a pragmatic option. With an expanding 
middle class in the 1980s and the rising expectations that resulted from this broad base, 
material needs became increasingly important in “measuring” one’s “success” in a status 
                                            
57 Ngiam Tee Liang, an economist at NUS, observed that while the government has been keeping 
‘a lot of tabs’ on the economic health of Singapore, they would also do well to ‘start keeping tabs 
on social health too’ (The New Paper, 26 August 2002). Singaporean novelist and government 
critic Catherine Lim also remarked that ‘[Singaporeans'] loyalty is to the good life provided by the 
PAP’ (Today, August 24th 2002). 
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conscious society. Unable to sustain a middle class lifestyle due to rising costs and 
feeling relatively deprived, this feeling of marginalisation was resolved by emigrating to 
Perth, where lower costs of living and state benefits for the elderly allowed many 
Singaporean migrants to reproduce their ideal middle class lifestyle. With the perpetual 
emphasis on educational qualifications within an increasingly elitist and meritocratic 
governing framework, some parents felt that their children were becoming increasingly 
marginalised in the paper-oriented society. Family migration, especially for the middle to 
upper middle classes, was elicited to provide their children with a reasonable education 
in a less competitive social environment.  
 While most emigrants are from middle class backgrounds, their interests and 
aspirations vary considerably. This diversity certainly signifies a lack of a unifying force 
that conditions the emigration process into a collective experience. Nevertheless, with 
such a vast number of Singaporean migrants in Perth – approximately 13,200 to date, 
without accounting for economic transmigrants – do they then form a cohesive migrant 
community based on mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust? As we will see, 
other intra-migrant factors contribute heavily towards the fragmentation of migrant 
community life in Perth.  
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To what extent does disenchantment among Singaporean migrants affect the form of the 
migrant community? This chapter focuses on the migrant "community" itself, combining 
both transnational as well as forms-of-capital approaches to make sense of community 
life in Perth or its lack thereof. In this chapter, I will explain why members of this 
increasingly large community in Perth do not coalesce into a cohesive community of 
diasporic actors based on mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust.  
 Several propositions and questions will guide my analysis in this chapter, firstly 
by revisiting the transnational concept here. It is my contention that the Singapore-Perth 
migration system is characterised by potentially high levels of transnationality for two 
main reasons: firstly, due to the emergence of the internet, cheaper forms of 
telecommunications (Vertovec 1999), budget airlines, and the increased marketing of 
Australia in Singapore; in other words, the increasing accessibility of alternative forms of 
overseas lifestyles for a particular class of migrants. Secondly, the average middle class 
Singaporean migrant's ability to traverse back and forth between home and host society 
on a comparatively more regular basis than some other migrant groups. If 
transnationality may be defined as 'the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain 
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement' 
(Basch et al 1994:8), then Singaporean migrants certainly fall under this broad category 
of social actors. However, while transnationality has been invoked in contemporary 
migration studies to illustrate the multi-level ties that migrants develop as a result of 
globalisation and 'time-space compression' (Harvey 1990), we would do well to 
remember that migration is ultimately an act of leaving, uprooting, "quitting" (according to 
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emigrate with the intention of cutting off all political ties to Singapore. For it is one thing 
to simply identify certain activities as being "transnational" because of the density and 
frequency of its "flows" across the increasingly porous borders of modern nation-states, 
and quite another to say that migrants have the capabilities or, more importantly, the 
willingness to identify with those transnational activities and internalise their practices in 
the first place. So perhaps some migrant groups are not models of community 
cohesiveness or, as Castles (2003) would have it, transnational communities, precisely 
because they want to avoid1 the very same people that they left the homeland for – 
Singaporeans. For if emigration is indeed a voluntary choice as opposed to a need, then 
might it be probable that migrants do not want to maintain actual links with the 
homeland? Still, this does not mean that the homeland is not symbolically imagined, 
which I will explicate in Chapter Four. However, we have to be cognizant of the fact that 
not all migrants want to establish transnational links, despite their ability to do so. So, 
what happens to social ties between migrants in the host society? I will show why some 
Singaporean migrants are transnational, while others are not. I will also briefly situate the 
concept of citizenship within the transnational framework, and show how and why it 
constrains transnationality for some, but promotes it for others.  
 This first set of questions lead to a second. If there are large numbers of 
Singaporean migrants in Perth, do they organise into a cohesive community of migrants 
characterised by high levels of social solidarity and trust, in which readily available 
capital is transformed into other social ties? My second proposition, therefore, is that 
because these migrants are mostly middle-class, cosmopolitan, and well-educated, 
some of whom seek to sever political ties to the homeland, the articulation of identities 
                                            
1 I am not suggesting that avoiding fellow Singaporeans constitutes a reason in itself for 
emigration. Rather, it is part of a subset of overlapping reasons in which the essentialised 
caricature of the "ugly Singaporean" comes to the fore in migrant discourses.  
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take on individual rather than collective forms at the aggregate level2. Rather than 
assume that a group of migrants necessarily find solace and mutual trust in their own 
"kind" (Singaporeans), especially since they are endowed with the relevant resources, 
one might find adequate ontological basis for the reverse; their self-sufficiency, in 
various senses of the word, negates the need for interdependence (apart from their 
family) when adapting to life in a new society. It is therefore extremely difficult for 
members of this group to organise themselves "from above" into an effective diasporic 
community based on mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust, partly because 
many members "from below" do not want to be known to one another beyond the level 
of informality3. And, partly as a significant corollary to this, potential immigrant grassroots 
organisers find that their efforts to construct post-national homeland ties and community 
networks in Perth are mostly in vain. We would do well to recall (Chapter Two) also that 
this group of migrants (regardless of the period in which they emigrated) represents a 
rather unique subset within the general international migration framework, because of 
their extremely diverse individual-level decisions for emigration. Many are neither 
refugees, labour migrants, nor economic entrepreneurs. Could the lack of a "uniting" 
push factor (Portes and Sensenbrenner 2004) be a significant contribution to the 
subsequent fragmentation of community life in Perth, despite their large numbers?  
 I will also show that endemic self-essentialisation reinforces migrants' sense of 
negativity towards one another, resulting in a fragmented community of migrants in 
Perth. However, I will also show that despite their fragmentation along post-national 
lines, many migrants turn to religion – specifically Christianity or its offshoots – in the 
absence or rejection of other organisational structures to aid in their adjustment. This is 
                                            
2 Migrant identities will be further explicated in Chapter Four.  
3 This is contrasted with the San Fiorese Italian migrants in Perth. The 'cluster migration', which is 
typical of this migration process, ensures that most people from the same town know one 
another, hence forming dense, interrelated social networks in the host society (Baldassar 2001).  
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not to argue that religion is a substitute for other forms of identities, nor has the migration 
experience had positive bearings on their religiosity. However, many recent migrants find 
higher levels of trust and camaraderie in churches than they do with their fellow 
members of the Singaporean migrant community, reflecting the salience of modern 
Christian religions in appealing to the masses, not as "opium" (Marx 1970), but in terms 
of uniting its members into a 'moral community' of believers (Durkheim 1965:62). 
Religion, in this sense, reconstitutes a community in the absence of other forms of 
organising vehicles.  
 Although this chapter is guided by several different arguments and research 
questions, the general thrust is to show how and why – through the various themes 
discussed above – Singaporean migrants do not form a cohesive community, despite 
their increasingly large presence in Perth.  
 
3.1 The Multifarious Aspects of Transnationality – Homeland Ties, 
 "Types" of Transnational Migrants, and State Discourses 
 
Revisiting a conceptual problem and rethinking transnationality 
Due to the extremely "flexible" conceptual guidelines with which social anthropologists 
Basch et al (1994) introduced the term "transnationalism" into social scientific lexicon in 
the 1990s (see Chapter One), there are now multiple meanings and uses in academic 
discourse (Portes 2001). While scholars from various disciplines have strategically 
reinvented the concept in line with their own empirical and conceptual frameworks, 
Portes (1999), however, has been highly critical of the ways in which the concept has 
been "misappropriated", reminding would-be social scientists of their academic duty to 
establish the contextual reality of the phenomenon before advancing various causal 
explanations. Guarnizo and Smith (1998: 3-4) worry that the concept risks becoming an 
'empty conceptual vessel'. Even Vertovec's (1999:447, emphasis added) definition of 
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transnationalism, which '…broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people 
and institutions across the borders of nation-states' leaves much conceptual ambiguity, 
because it can refer to anyone living in any of today's modern, industrial-capitalist 
societies. What makes the task of establishing transnationality even more daunting is the 
fact that researchers have attributed different meanings to the same term, for example, 
"transnational communities" (see Castles 2003; Portes 2000; Rex 1998; Rouse 1992; 
Faist 2000 for varying conceptualisations). So, what really is transnationality, and when 
and how is a transnational migrant? 
 
3.1.1 Typologies of transnational migrants – the "uprooted" vs the "re-routed" and the 
 complex realities of a transnational lifestyle 
 
These broad-stroked conceptual understandings of transnationality make it difficult to 
map out objectively the dominant social patterns pertaining to Singaporean migrants' 
activities in Perth and their transnational inclinations, because in reality, there is no one-
size-fits-all typology. If a transmigrant (or, transnational migrant) is defined as one who 
'develop[s] and maintain[s] multiple relations' that connect him to 'two or more societies 
simultaneously' (Glick Schiller et al 1992:1-2), then many, if not all, Singaporeans in 
Perth are transnational migrants. The only difference would be the variation in the extent 
to which these ties are maintained. As I will show in the next chapter, it is increasingly 
easy in today's multicultural Australian setting for migrant groups to reconstruct their own 
homeland cultural life-worlds, given the proliferation of vast arrays of ethnic products, 
and the political freedom with which migrant cultures are expressible. Cheaper forms of 
telecommunications and air travel have undoubtedly produced more frequent cross-
border contact between (transnational) migrants and their homeland acquaintances, 
strengthening the entire transnational social field of relations. However, does the 
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accessibility to these resources make them transnational migrants? A strong clue may 
be located within the Singapore state's own ideological framework regarding migration. 
 
Of stayers and quitters – who is a "migrant", and who is a "transmigrant"? 
 
The Singapore state creates different discursive images for different "types" of migrants. 
While an entrepreneurial class has been strongly encouraged to venture abroad for work 
and are viewed as economically useful state resources, most Singaporean migrants in 
Perth do not fall under this category. Conceptually, there is a stark difference between 
these “overseas Singaporeans” who live abroad for indefinite periods as re-routed 
economic transmigrants, and those who emigrate (uproot) with the specific intention of 
minimising political ties to Singapore. Kong's (1999) study on Singaporean 
transmigrants in China is an empirical example of the government's pragmatic ideology 
to embark upon regional and global capital expansionism, while ensuring that these 
labour migrants continue to maintain social and cultural links with the homeland through 
various organisations, such as the Singapore International Foundation4 (henceforth SIF) 
and Contact Singapore. These transmigrants are seen as potential overseas 
"ambassadors" – a sort of “transnational capitalist class” (see Sklair 2001) – reflecting 
not only the significance of homeland attachment, but more importantly, the state's 
continued insistence on equating economic rationality with the image of “the 
Singaporean”. As Kwok (2001:21) has pointed out, the 'cultural vibrancy of a city [from 
the Singapore state's point of view] has everything to do with economic development'. 
They are, in former PM Goh's words, 'stayers' (see Straits Times, Aug 19 2002) who 
have Singapore’s interests at heart, despite being physically detached from the home 
country.  
                                            
4 See Lee (2001), which is a collection of essays about overseas Singaporeans published by the 
SIF.  
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 On the other hand, Singaporean migrants in Australia are viewed more as "ex-
Singaporeans" than "overseas Singaporeans". They do not contribute to the economy, 
except when they return to Singapore as tourists. While there are some economic 
transmigrants in Perth, their numbers are few and far between, since most 
Singaporeans prefer to work in the bustling eastern states of Sydney and Melbourne due 
to the more attractive remuneration. The majority of Singaporeans in Perth (at least 
those whom I interviewed) are strictly voluntary migrants; some have already given up 
their Singaporean passports, while others are awaiting to do so once they receive their 
Australian citizenship. Some others have kept their Singaporean citizenships, but hold 
Australian permanent residency statuses and have no intentions of returning to 
Singapore to live in the long-term. They have uprooted and intend to start life afresh in 
the supposedly "greener pastures" of Australia. From the state's point of view, they are 
unsuccessful, undesirable5 "quitters" who cannot survive in the rat race, meritocratic 
culture of modern Singapore society due to their own inability to "dis-alienate" their 
selves from the perceived cut-throat social environment of Singapore society. 
Analytically, they are not transmigrants, because they have intentionally sought to 
disengage themselves politically from Singapore. In sum, the Singapore state glorifies 
                                            
5 In 2004, a Singapore Airlines (SIA) pilot, Captain Ryan Goh, who was also a union member in 
the Airline Pilots Association (Alpa-S), was pinpointed by Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng 
as 'an undesirable immigrant as defined by Section 8(3)(k) of the [Singapore] Immigration Act'. 
The comment was made with respect to a potential leadership ouster by a group of pilots in the 
union, in which Goh was identified by Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew as the 'instigator' (Straits 
Times, 27 Feb 2004). Being a Malaysian citizen who possessed Singaporean and Australian 
permanent residency statuses, Goh's loyalty to Singapore was publicly questioned. MM Lee was 
quoted as saying that 'If Singapore goes down, you go down, [but] he doesn't go down' (Straits 
Times, 29 Feb 2004). The implication was that Goh had multiple allegiances to several countries, 
and none in particular. It is also interesting how the Straits Times painted Goh in a negative light, 
describing how he had shipped his Mercedes Benz car to Perth, sold off his HDB flat in Toa 
Payoh, and enrolled his children in Perth schools, implying that he was preparing to sever his 
links with Singapore if need be. Goh promptly had his Singaporean PR status revoked due to his 
"undesirable" status. See also Straits Times, 29 February 2004 for a more detailed, blow-by-blow 
account of the confrontation between MM Lee and the pilots. The implicit conclusion, according to 
the newspaper, was that 'It is not up to PRs or other foreigners to get into union matters and play 
around with decisions that affect the rest of Singaporeans [sic]'.  
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economic transmigrants as "stayers", and denigrates voluntary migrants as "quitters". 
The importance of these essentialised typologies will become evident later, when I 
discuss the high levels of paranoia that haunt many emigrants, resulting in mutual 
avoidance rather than solidarity and trust. 
 
3.1.2 The complex realities of transnationality – transnational practices among some 
 migrants 
 
So if we were to delimit the scope of analysis and work within Portes' (1999:464, 
emphases added) more refined framework of transnationality and his understanding of 
transmigrants, then only certain Singaporean migrants exude transnational inclinations. 
For him, transnational activities are those that  
take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular 
and significant commitment of time by participants. Such activities may be 
conducted by relatively powerful actors,…or immigrants and their  home country 
kin and relations. [They] are not limited to economic enterprises, but include 
political, cultural and religious initiatives as well…, [requiring] a series of time- 
and space-compressing technological innovations and their commercial diffusion.  
  
For Portes (1999) and Faist (2000), regular activities are the main preconditions of 
transnationality. During my fieldwork, several isolated cases were evident.  
 
"Astronaut families" and "parachute children" 
"Astronaut families" was a term employed specifically to explain the transnational 
situation of middle class Hong Kong families, in which familial separation is a rationally 
calculated means to an end – education for the children, and income maximisation by 
the breadwinner (see Pe-Pua et al 1998; Chan 1997). Transnationality is both evident in 
the physical separation of the family into two distinct places, and the regular cross-
border commuting for its members. Unlike the Hong Kong 'satellite children' in Waters' 
(2003) Canadian setting, these cases did not entail parents sending their children into 
"orbit" (overseas) to accumulate much-needed cultural capital – an overseas education – 
The Fragmentation of Community 
 65 
for their parents to acquire permanent residency (PR) status. As I documented in 
Chapter Two, migration was a family affair that involved all members if children's' 
education was cited as an issue. However in some remote cases,  
I spend the colder months in Perth, because I like the mild weather here and I hate the 
Singaporean summer, so between March to November I stay here to take care of the 
kids, and then for the rest of the time I bring my kids back to Singapore. Then when the 
school term starts again, we come back. My wife is still working in Singapore, so of 
course we need to go back there during the holiday period. (Male: 56, Chinese, 
university education, retired lawyer) 
 
Sometimes, the reverse occurs, whereby the male is sent to Perth to scout for jobs and 
housing before the wife and children move over. Despite intense cross-border ties 
(length of time in each society), transnationality in this sense is nevertheless a rationally-
induced strategy that separates and displaces these multi-local families, rather than 
facilitating their social relations within a unified space.  
 
Transnational entrepreneurs 
Transnational entrepreneurship is arguably the most visible and common transnational 
practice, since it requires regular cross-border movements for the sustainability of 
business links based on reciprocal exchanges through 'transnational circuits' (Faist 
2000:206-207). For Portes et al (2002), transnational entrepreneurship among self-
employed migrants represents an alternative form of migrant adaptation that heavily 
utilises social capital within transnational networks. Who you know arguably becomes 
more important than what you know. In a similar fashion, due to the steadily expanding 
Singapore-Perth migration system, some enterprising migrants, who may previously 
have been semi-retired, have capitalised on the lucrative avenues associated with 
increasing Singapore-Perth contact by becoming migration or real estate agents. These 
agents utilise their existing social capital or "connections" to expand the field of 
transnational social relations by either promoting property ownership in established or 
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up-and-coming parts of Perth, or commodifying PRs by "selling" its advantages to 
Singaporeans. For this informant's spouse, 
My husband just started up his Singapore office, so he stays there for about eight 
months on average, then I stay here and look after the kids. He comes back here maybe 
only for about a total of three or four months in a year sporadically. For me, I can't go 
back so often because I have to take care of the kids, unless its school holidays then we 
all go back. (Female: 49, Chinese, university education, freelance lawyer) 
 
Depending on individual inclinations and business strategies, the transnational 
entrepreneur can either operate from his home base in Perth where his family is, or 
return to Singapore where an expanding market can be found. Maintaining transnational 
links serves a utilitarian function for many of these semi-retired transnational 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Upper middle class retirees versus middle class inflexible PRs 
Finally, this group of Singaporean migrants epitomise Ong's (1999:3) 'flexible citizens' – 
the wealthy, dual nationality holder who maintains property in both places. Their 
numbers, again, are obviously small. Nevertheless, these people are able to capitalise 
on global market conditions and state policies to intensify their transnational lifestyles 
through frequent jet-setting. For this informant, regular movement seems to be the norm. 
Depending lah. When I get bored of this place, then I'll go back to play mahjong, catch 
up with all my old friends and take a trip to Thailand or somewhere close by in 
Asia…each time maybe about, depending lah, about three weeks?...Then when I've had 
enough, I come back here. It’s the best deal, getting the best of both worlds. (Male: 58, 
Chinese, university education, retired) 
 
 Maintaining transnational links for this class of migrants presents a totally 
different proposition compared to other middle class Singaporeans, in which the costs 
associated with frequent travelling does not constitute a practical option. Indeed, for a 
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retiree who has withdrawn his CPF6 savings and sold off his property in Singapore, 
leading a jet-setting lifestyle within the Singapore-Perth transnational field (health 
notwithstanding) would be much easier and a more attractive option than for younger, 
working migrants who may be too financially burdened to sustain those regular 
movements that Portes speaks of, especially those with families.  
Of course I want to go back to Singapore! Over here, I am so bored and lonely. My 
husband's work requires him to travel regionally to Southeast Asia and China, and now I 
am pregnant we agreed that I should just stay home to take care of our two year-old. But 
how to go back? We've already sold our HDB flat (in Singapore), and taking a plane is 
not exactly the same as taking a bus to Johor7 from Singapore…I also don’t want to stay 
with friends or relatives, because it gets uncomfortable since most of them are young 
married couples with their own lives now. I don’t want to impose on them. So the only 
other option is to stay in a hotel. But what for? (Female: 31, Chinese, university 
education, unemployed) 
 
Property ownership in both places greatly facilitates transnationality for a select class of 
people, but not for the vast majority, since high maintenance costs will invariably be 
incurred. For others, the only way to maintain transnational links is through internet chat 
relays, email, and cheap international phone calls8 (Vertovec 2004). But are these 
activities reflective of transnationality in Portes' sense? Or are they simply post-migration 
adjustment strategies within a transnational social field? Perhaps an indication lies in the 
extent to which migrants maintain multiple political-legal ties, reflecting an intent to 
maintain transnationality.  
 
Citizenship and political-legal status as indefinite markers of transnationality 
 
                                            
6 Central Provident Fund, similar to the superannuation scheme in Australia. The CPF cannot be 
used for any purpose other than to purchase property in Singapore, and the full amount can be 
withdrawn upon retirement at 55 years old.  
7 The closest Malaysian state to Singapore, linked by a causeway bridge.  
8 Interestingly, Vertovec (2004:219) argues that these increasingly cheap international calling 
cards are the 'social glue of transnationalism'. Indeed, when I was conducting fieldwork in Perth, 
some calling card companies charged 2.5 cents per minute for a Perth-Singapore international 
call, making it cheaper than a local call within Australia.  
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To what extent is dual residency status a reflection of transnationality? Indeed, one of 
the most visible vestiges of transnationality is dual state membership, which comes in 
two forms: dual citizenship, and dual nationality. Since the Singapore state does not 
allow dual citizenship (although there have been public calls for its instatement), many 
Singaporean migrants in Perth hold Singaporean citizenship and Australian permanent 
residency (PR), making them dual nationals with partial (non-voting) rights in Australia. 
Since Australia practices both ius soli (citizenship based on territory) and ius domicili 
(citizenship based on length of residence) citizenship laws, the migrant may choose to 
apply for Australian citizenship after satisfying certain conditions, such as residing in 
Australia for two out of five years. Indeed, the commodification9 of Australian PRs in 
recent years has been explosive, resulting in the proliferation of migration agents in both 
Australia and Singapore.  
 Empirically, while dual nationality does facilitate cross-border movements of 
sorts, it certainly does not mean that regular transnational movements take place. 
Neither does it mean that social-cultural ties through remittances, elderly care, or 
attempts to effect changes in the home country exist. Indeed, a growing amount of 
literature have called for reappraisals of the notion of citizenship specifically due to 
increasing transnationality and the resulting flexibility of ties, wherein the general thrust 
is that the nation-state's hegemonic powers in controlling its denizens are presumed to 
have waned (see Smith 2003a; Smith 2003b; Lewis and Neal 2005). Where notions of 
citizenship are important here lie in the fact that people, including migrants, live within 
the actual confines of nation-states rather than in an imaginary transnational vacuum. 
                                            
9 It is not uncommon to hear people asking "how much did you pay for your PR?", making foreign 
residency an increasingly marketable commodity that arguably lacks the emotional attachment 
(loyalty) inherent in previous conceptions of citizenship. 
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The point is that these subjects need to make real choices as 'flexible citizens'10, insofar 
as they need to strategically reposition themselves physically according to their own 
instrumentally-pragmatic interests by exploiting nationality rules (Ong 2002:174). 
However, if the majority of Singaporean migrants in Perth are not labour migrants nor 
economic transmigrants, then their flexible citizenship becomes useless. Why then do 
some continue to hold onto their Singaporean passports?  
Well, by law I don’t need to give up my Singaporean passport what. I can be a PR here 
and a citizen in Singapore. So why should I give up? (Female: 31, Chinese, university 
education, postgraduate student) 
 
 While Ong's "flexible" schema privileges, and is arguably representative of, a 
particular class of hypermobile (transnational) migrants elsewhere, the reality is that 
most voluntary migrants remain rooted to a particular place over time, even though their 
initial pre-migration intentions may have been predicated upon an utopian ideal of hyper-
mobility and dual-state existence. For as I explicated in the previous section, it is rather 
idealistic to assume that most middle class working migrants are able to sustain 
transnationality consistently with one foot in each place, so to speak. Indeed, many pre-
migration discourses tend to revolve around the notion of getting the "best of both 
worlds" (Perth and Singapore). In reality though, the real costs in maintaining 
transnational linkages become a burden rather than a privilege. However, the practicality 
of transnationality lies in migrants' rationality in maintaining dual nationality, as 
exemplified by the various verbatims above, rather than its actual utility. The 
Singaporean passport serves as a safety net, just in case the migrant chooses to 
repatriate. He is legally able to live anywhere in Australia as a PR, and enjoy the same 
rights and privileges (except voting) as other Australian citizens. It allows the migrant 
                                            
10 Ong (1999; 2002) coined this term to refer to the increasingly mobile strategies of a 
transnational professional and entrepreneurial class who seek to take advantage of political and 
economic "loopholes" in various states to traverse back and forth regularly. I use the term rather 
loosely to refer to the dual nationality options that are available to Singaporean migrants, without 
necessarily engaging in back and forth movements.  
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and his family members to keep their short term options open, living the Australian way 
of life, while maintaining their political links with Singapore. For example, 
Last time when I first came, if Singapore had allowed dual citizenship, I would definitely 
have taken it. But now, the answer is no, because I don’t need it anymore. When you 
first move over, you are unsure, and its always nice to know that you have something to 
fall back on if you need to, rather than to sever all your ties, which is a very scary 
thought. (Male: 49, Chinese, HSC, businessman) 
 
 So, does dual nationality or flexible citizenship therefore reflect transnationality? 
Analytically, maintaining dual nationality is but a pragmatic adaptation strategy that 
usually only persists during the initial stages of migration. Once the migrant is more 
certain about his life options, the tendency is to renounce his Singaporean citizenship, 
sell his property and withdraw his CPF savings, or return to Singapore. In sum, 
transnationality through flexible citizenship is only achievable for a select class of 
migrants, and for those who willingly want to maintain political links with the home 
country. Furthermore, flexibility only entails disposable options; utility is another matter.  
 
3.2 Forms-of-Capital, Middle Class Migrants, and the Fragmentation of 
 Community Life 
 
3.2.1 The socio-economic status of Singaporean migrants and forms-of-capital 
 
Most of the ex-Singaporeans I interviewed in Perth were socially middle-class11 and 
above. They were generally well-educated, by virtue of their English-based tertiary 
education in Singaporean or Australian universities; cosmopolitan; had relevant 
occupational "skills"; and had more disposable income than the average Australian. If 
middle class is a reflection of a person’s social status, then it is clear that most 
Singaporean migrants do possess high stocks of "capital" in various forms. For class 
does not refer only to the economic aspects of a person's social orientation, but to other 
indicators such as occupation, educational qualifications, and ownership of property, for 
                                            
11 See the various verbatims for examples of my informants' profiles. 
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example. The stringent points system adopted by the immigration authorities in Australia 
also ensures that only select people are eligible for immigration under the skilled or 
business migration12 programmes. In sum, most Singaporean migrants in Perth arrived 
with large stocks of capital – human, cultural, and financial – giving them added 
transnational capabilities compared to other migrant groups, such as refugees or labour 
migrants from Third World societies. As Alba and Nee (2003) have argued, the most 
important capital for labour migrants (or economic transmigrants) are in fact social 
capital and their various business connections. However, Singaporean migrants in Perth 
are predominantly not labour migrants. 
 If we start from the premise that the socio-economic background of Singaporean 
migrants in Perth reflects large stocks of human-economic capital, then we need to 
explain why social ties based on reciprocity, trust, and mutual solidarity are largely 
absent. Ultimately, the main problem that confronts all migrants in a new society is 
access to adequate funds for adaptation purposes. If a migrant has satisfied this basic 
aspect, by virtue of the fact that he already possesses adequate amounts of financial 
capital for his daily subsistence, then the tendency to rely on other members of the 
migrant community, or their own "kind", lessens considerably. As Nee and Sanders 
(2001) have shown, while class-based resources and migrants' elite backgrounds are 
important "assets" in determining migrants' employment options in the host society, it 
also determines the extent to which migrants assimilate into the mainstream or the 
underclass. For if large stocks of capital are already present among individuals or within 
the family, then it arguably negates the need to transform their existing capital into social 
capital through other forms of reciprocal social relationships. 
                                            
12 It is clear that the Australian government selects and excludes migrants based on extremely 
stringent criteria (see DIMIA's website), thus ensuring that most migrants come from middle class 
backgrounds. This also means that Singaporeans who come from the lower middle class income 
bracket are unable to migrate to Australia. Most migrants, according to Faist (2000:125), 'cannot 
choose…They completely lack all forms of capital for exit and voice'.  
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Financial capital 
Financial (or economic) capital may be defined as the 'arrangement of material 
resources to improve flows of future income' (Faist 2000:117). A migrant's financial 
capital greatly reduces the "costs" of settling into a new country and increases his 
autonomy (Faist 2000). Costs need not only be economic, but include a range of 
interests that are usually, but not always, related to the availability of financial resources. 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, an ironic link may be drawn between financial 
capital and motivations for emigration, because the increasingly high cost of living in 
Singapore has had the unintended effect of "pushing" some middle class Singaporeans 
out. As former PM Goh once lamented,  
The more [Singaporeans] gain from subsidised HDB housing, the more money 
they have to buy cheaper houses in Australia (Today, August 19 2002) 
 
Indeed, after liquidating their assets in Singapore, most migrants are able to re-enact 
their middle class lifestyles in Perth, placing them adequately within the Australian 
middle class social structure in terms of property type, disposable income and medical 
benefits, without relying on fellow migrants or immigrant associations for loans or credit. 
According to my informants, borrowing money from 'co-ethnics', apart from one's own 
immediate family members, was a rare occurrence. As this informant estimated, 
Most of us come over here with x amount of money to make sure that we can be 
independent. (Male: 62, Chinese, university education, retired teacher)  
 
Me and my husband both agreed that no matter what, we won't go on the dole. So we 
made sure that we have enough money to have the basic necessities, such as a house 
and to put our kids in school, and of course some savings for emergency. Maybe it’s a 
very Chinese thing, where we are conscious of face value, so we don’t want to depend 
on others financially. (Female: 48, Chinese, university education, self-employed 
financier) 
 
 For a researcher, ascertaining informants' financial capital is an impractical task. 
By and large, an objective indicator is property ownership. This is a significant point, 
because not all migrants in other parts of the world have adequate capital to ensure 
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property ownership in the host society. Almost all my informants had purchased, or were 
intending to purchase homes. Their "automatic upgrade" – upward economic mobility – 
arguably reduces economic dependence on others. Sometimes during the initial post-
migration phase, the new migrant may "bunk in" with members of his extended family 
who emigrated before him, or with other acquaintances until he manages to find his own 
home. Although this constitutes a reliance on social capital (personal relationships with 
others) to reduce financial costs (such as renting one's own apartment), "bunking in" 
long term does not represent a practical option for most migrants. In sum, most 
Singaporean migrants arrive in Perth with readily available financial capital to ensure 
self-sufficiency for their immediate needs, including home ownership.  
 
Human capital 
For most recently-arrived migrants, their relevant work experience and educational 
qualifications are significant forms of human capital that minimise their entry into the 
menial or low wage labour market, ensuring that they maintain their middle class social 
status in the host society. If financial capital is an important resource for day-to-day living 
and set-up costs during the initial migration process, then human capital may be seen as 
an individual resource that minimises reliance on fellow migrants by ensuring long-term 
self-sustenance through wage labour. Faist (2000:117), in citing Ostrom (1995), says 
that 'human capital is the knowledge and skills that people bring to the solution of any 
problem'. More specifically, human capital are the 'skills that can generate returns in the 
labour market' (Nee and Sanders 2001:392, emphases added). Like financial capital, 
human capital reduces migration "costs", because the migrant's transferable skills and 
educational credentials are immediately convertible into employment opportunities. As 
Nee and Sanders' (2001:386) study clearly showed, migrants who arrive with high stocks 
of human capital which are 'fungible in the host society tend to gain employment in the 
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broader mainstream society'. Similarly, the fact that most recent Singaporean migrants 
are highly educated (tertiary education and above) means that their skills13 are valuable 
assets that facilitate employment opportunities which are compatible within the 
Australian economy, facilitating adaptation and reducing the burden of long-term job 
security. Subsequently, reliance on fellow migrants for help in job acquisition or opening 
doors through personal contacts are reduced.  
 However, not all migrants find the initial migration process smooth sailing, with 
some lamenting the fact that despite earning a degree from NUS or other Singaporean 
universities, they were unable to find jobs that matched their academic qualifications. 
Others may have graduated from Australian universities, but found it frustrating that 
Australian employers tended to question the relevance of their work experience in 
Singapore. Many of the recent migrants I interviewed qualified under the skilled 
migration programme, meaning that tertiary qualifications were a necessary prerequisite 
for immigration. Ironically, as this informant says, 
Luckily I came over here as a retiree. I would not like to be in a young migrant's shoes. 
Getting a job here is not as easy as it seems. Yes, we always say our universities are 
world class, but do you know that over here you cannot practice law or medicine if you 
come from NUS? We open our doors to the whole world and all the foreign talent are 
coming in, but the rest of the world shuts us out. (Male: 54, Chinese, university 
education, retired lawyer) 
 
According to other informants, job prospects are dependent upon the immediate 
transition period between tertiary education and working life. It is not uncommon to find 
migrants obtaining their basic degrees in Australia and immediately acquiring PR 
statuses, while continuing their job searches in Australia. The tendency for these people 
to obtain a job seemed to be much higher compared to those who returned to Singapore 
to work for a few years prior to emigration. As Sanders and Nee (1996) observed in the 
                                            
13 In the skilled migration programme, more than half of the total required points are attributed to 
the university degree and the most probable occupation that the migrant is able to perform in 
Australia given those qualifications.  
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American setting, employers tend to devalue foreign-earned human capital (e.g. 
overseas degrees and work experience), leading to low rates of employment for those 
migrants concerned.  
 English language abilities constitute another important source of human capital, 
despite the fact that English is not the official language of Australia (Jupp 2002). Since 
formal education in Singapore is English-based, the Singaporean migrant finds it much 
easier to get by in Australian society without relying on fellow migrants for social support, 
compared to migrants from non-English speaking countries14. Even for Singaporeans 
who do not possess tertiary qualifications, their command of the English language is 
arguably better than migrants from non-English speaking countries. The cosmopolitan, 
English-speaking Singaporean migrant can therefore easily integrate into mainstream 
society without relying on others for support.  
 
 
Connecting the various forms – social capital 
It is clear that Singaporean migrants are well placed to withstand the financial difficulties 
of emigration compared to other migrant groups who need to rely more extensively on 
kin or co-ethnics. Theoretically, it is important to understand the conceptual differences 
and relations between social capital and the other forms mentioned above. Here, I will 
analyse Coleman's (1988) more general framework on social capital, and introduce 
Faist's (2000) extension in relation to migration studies.  
 Social capital is embodied in the relationships between actors, constituting 'the 
set of resources [that are] inherent in social and symbolic ties' (Faist 2000:98). According 
to Coleman (1988:98), it 'inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among 
actors'; it is not a "thing" or an asset in itself, making it a more intangible resource than 
the other two types discussed above. Without social ties between people, social capital 
                                            
14 Also known as NESBs (Non-English Speaking Background) in Australian circles. 
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is non-existent. As Faist (2000) argued, social capital is shared between and among 
actors who are connected to it in some interactive way, in which the withdrawal of an 
actor necessarily dissolves the social capital in that tie. In the context of migration, social 
capital potentially reduces migration costs through reciprocity, mutual obligations and 
solidarity based on ties between movers and stayers. Since I am not explaining the 
reasons for migration in relation to social capital, I confine myself to the adaptive 
functions of social capital, whereby social and symbolic ties are crucial variables in 
accounting for the persistence of migrants' ties in the transnational social space15.  
 A problem with Coleman's analysis is that social capital is only viewed in 
structurally positive terms, overlooking the possibility that the social structures in which 
these resources are embedded may actually have counter-productive effects on group 
relations rather than positive ones (Portes and Sensenbrenner 2004). My argument then 
is straightforward: if migrants are sufficiently endowed with human and financial capital, 
why then would they need to rely on their fellow migrants for mutual support and 
reciprocal obligations, since they are able to adapt without the need for actual social 
relations with other migrants16? If this is the case, how can a cohesive community of 
migrants based on mutual interests and social solidarity be formed? Granted, it is 
common for people who uproot to a new country to seek out others from the same home 
country. However, since migrants are able to utilise their own personal resources during 
the bridging and adaptation stages of migration, they do not need to transform these 
resources into actual social ties for adaptation purposes. Without networks of social ties, 
how can migrants be connected to one another socially? The availability of large stocks 
                                            
15 While I refer extensively to Faist's work in this thesis, I do not utilise nor apply his entire 
extensive theoretical framework.  
16 This may seem like an overly simplistic, common-sensical argument to make. However, it was 
virtually impossible to ascertain migrants' degrees of self-centredness or altruism, other than 
relying on their own individual reasons. It was not uncommon for them to say that their ability to 
speak English and their financial self-sustainability meant that they did not need to rely on others 
for support.  
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of "capital" in various forms have clearly lessened their need to rely on others. 
Nevertheless, one other important aspect needs to be considered in relation to the 
fragmented community thesis – generalised mistrust among members of the community 
itself, addressing the puzzle "why would they want to rely on fellow migrants?".  
 
3.2.2 Generalised mistrust, stereotyping, and the fragmentation of community  
 
My argument that large stocks of personal capital negates the need for social reliance 
only paints half the picture, for it would be reductionist to simply assume that because 
people are self-sufficient, they would necessarily avoid others from the same country of 
origin. There must be other significant reasons as to why such a large group of migrants 
are unable, or unwilling, to form a cohesive community. Unless, of course, strong class 
differences exist, so that wealthier migrants discriminate against their middle class 
migrant counterparts17. Based on my fieldwork and interviews, I was led to believe that 
the fragmentation of community was not articulated along class lines. However, the other 
significant portion involves multi-dimensional forms of generalised mistrust amongst 
migrants. I emphasise the word "generalised" on two levels – firstly, not all Singaporean 
migrants distrust others; and secondly, based on my interviews, mistrust is personified in 
various ways, so that there are different meanings behind the very same term, ranging 
from stereotypical perceptions of others based on trivial experiences or rumours, to 
blatant examples of deceit.  
 Theoretically, Herzfeld's (2005:26-33) concept of social poetics and cultural 
intimacy becomes extremely useful in making sense of our puzzle within the broader 
framework of migrant community life. Social poetics is the 'analysis of essentialism in 
everyday life'. Herzfeld argued that 'social life consists of processes of reification and 
                                            
17 Guarnizo et al (1999) have documented the ways in which class differences among 
Colombians in New York and Los Angeles have contributed towards a fragmented community.  
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essentialism', and 'distrust of essentialism' should not detract the social theorist from the 
awareness that essentialism is a 'pervasive' feature of everyday life which informs 
people's behaviour and social patterns. This is not the same as saying that I will 
essentialise or that I believe in essentialising others; but rather, I must be aware of the 
ways in which Singaporean migrants essentialise themselves and others. For it was 
clear that many migrants spoke in highly essentialistic terms, which I will explicate in the 
next few sections. Stereotyping to create iconicity – or 'resemblances' – is a common 
method of essentialism; it is practiced in everyday life. It is practical and it provides a 
sense of immediacy, while also allowing the essentialist actor to locate perceived 
similarities along culturally constituted lines. These resemblances or icons are therefore 
culturally intimate – they may be sources of external (and sometimes national) 
embarrassment, but nevertheless provide its members with the sense of common 
sociality. However, what if these icons or essentialised behavioural traits are not only 
culturally intimate, but have been stigmatised by its own members? Stereotyping can 
also work against oneself and one's own group, particularly if the presumed traits, or 
icons, have perceived "harmful" effects on the Self.  
 So the crux of the matter is that if generalised mistrust prevails among migrants, 
then it foments social fragmentation rather than cohesiveness, since migrants become 
wary of one another based on essentialised beliefs, and are unable to come to terms 
with their future expectations for the community. Furthermore, the highly individualised 
conditions of exit reduce any common historical experiences for group formation. Hence, 
it follows that if traumatic homeland experiences such as wars or internal strife are 
absent, and if there are multiple, negative reasons for exit, and if most of them are not 
economic transmigrants but migrants who seek to start afresh elsewhere, then it 
problematises the creation and utility of social capital for the strengthening of network 
ties to form an imagined community of diasporic actors. The reproduction of alleged 
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unsavoury, essentialised, stereotypical "Singaporean traits" amongst migrants 
themselves further serve to enforce and strengthen these anti-Singaporean feelings 
amongst ex-Singaporeans themselves. Thus for some, avoidance rather than contact 
seems to be a more practical option than mixing with other Singaporeans in the host 
society.  
 
Generalised mistrust and paranoia 
As I illustrated in Chapter One, it was extremely difficult to obtain interviews with fellow 
Singaporean migrants. It undoubtedly takes someone in my position – a researcher 
going around asking questions about one's migration experiences – to fully appreciate 
the extent to which the sense of paranoia18 grips so many Singaporean migrants. I 
gradually felt like the "most-distrusted-Singaporean-in-town" because of the stigma 
associated with my "occupation", links with NUS, and my research topic. This was 
despite utilising my available social capital to acquire informants through personal 
contacts. Regardless of my true intentions, I was still seen by some as a potential "spy" 
for the Singaporean government, despite my "insider" status as a PR and hence being a 
"fellow migrant".  
I thought you were from the ISD, and I wanted to say no. But after thinking about it, I 
thought "what the heck". What are they going to do to me anyway? I already gave up my 
Singaporean citizenship. (Male: 47, Eurasian, PhD, community volunteer) 
 
 An important dimension informing these feelings of paranoia may be found in 
state discourses regarding the trend of increasing emigration, in which the "brain drain" 
problem was identified as a direct consequence of increasing emigration in the late 
1980s. Consequently, there seems to be an unavoidable sense of guilt among some 
migrants that the state views them in a negative light, precisely because they have been 
                                            
18 Many informants told me at the end of our interview sessions that they thought I was from the 
ISD (Internal Security Department).  
The Fragmentation of Community 
 80 
identified as the cause of Singapore's problems. This feeling even pervades those who 
may have severed all political ties by renouncing their Singaporean citizenship. For 
example, in response to my request for an interview, this informant said  
My wife used to work for [Ministry in Singapore], and we know they have people all over 
the world watching us lah. Maybe they even know what you are doing here you know. 
Not to say I don’t trust you, but no thank you I will pass. (Male: Chinese) 
 
This informant promptly recorded down all my details, including my supervisor's name, 
and details of my research project. Other potential informants talked about their own 
insecure feelings: 
I know we’ve already migrated, and we gave up our Singaporean passport (citizenship). 
I also know Singapore is opening up more now. There seems to be more freedom. But 
you can't run away from the fact that certain things are still the same. Like how if you say 
negative things about the government they will hound you to death. So it’s these things 
which make you wonder, who can you trust? Can I trust you? I don’t know. So of course, 
better play safe what. If I don’t talk to you, nothing happens to me. I know some people 
say aiyah why would the government bother about Singaporeans who are quitters and 
all that. But it’s the perception lah. The perception that this is the way Singapore is. At 
the most you just call me kiasu (afraid to lose) lor. (Male: Chinese, university education) 
 
Emigration is seen as some kind of "mortal sin", so that migrants are always suspicious 
that some untoward event might happen to them. The recent Captain Ryan Goh incident 
in 2004 and the quitters-stayers debate in 2002 only served to further ignite rather than 
alleviate these fears, and some of my informants actually showed concern over these 
issues. As this informant said, 
You see? Even up till now, the government is still clamping down on people who have 
dual nationality, even PR status. Ryan Goh doesn’t have dual citizenship you know? 
Only PR status. What did he do? Make a bit of noise about his welfare that’s all. Then 
his Singapore PR got revoke. (Male: 58, Chinese, retired) 
 
These fears may very well turn out to be exaggerated. But it is the perception and image 
of the omnipotent "strong" Singaporean state19 that creates them. If such a perception 
exists, then it provides a plausible explanation why many migrants prefer to keep a low 
                                            
19 Chua (1996) operationalised the concept of the "strong state" to explain the historical 
background behind the ruling People's Action Party's (PAP) unbroken governance of Singapore 
since 1959.   
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profile rather than mix with fellow Singaporeans, or talk to me. As this informant warned 
me, 
I'm sure when you do your interviews, you will come across some who say "Please don’t 
tape", or "don’t mention my name" and so on, because I think they are just paranoid 
about this whole thing. (Male: 42, Chinese, PhD, lecturer) 
 
Perhaps this interview excerpt sums this section up nicely: 
DS: What did you think when I called you up asking for an interview, bearing in mind 
 that I was from NUS? 
 
Jane: What? You are from NUS? I thought you said you are from UWA? So all these 
 things are going back to NUS ah?! 
 
Jane's  
husband: See? That hits the nail smack on the head doesn’t it? 
 
 Still, these are self-reflexive examples directed at myself, the researcher. What 
about their feelings towards one another? I will show below that stereotyped, essentialist 
perceptions are reproduced amongst migrants themselves, which also inform their 
negative attitudes towards one another. 
 
 
"Culturally intimate" reproductions of Singaporean-ness? Essentialised reconstructions 
of the "ugly Singaporean" and other unsavoury traits 
 
The caricature of the ugly Singaporean is a manifestation of societal ills, such as being 
excessively competitive (kiasu), being judgemental of others, and being loud and 
boisterous in public settings, for example. Its pervasiveness is reflected in the way that 
people, usually Singaporeans, often joke about its usage in public discourse. They are 
the 'self-stereotypes that insiders express ostensibly at their own collective expense' 
(Herzfeld 2005:3; emphasis added). Trivial though this may seem, the extent to which 
Singaporeans evade their fellow migrant counterparts are largely informed by these 
stereotypical, generalised cultural traits. As this informant, a manager in a hotel in Perth 
said, 
The Fragmentation of Community 
 82 
Singaporeans can stay away as far as I'm concerned. I've been in this business long 
enough to know that they are the worst customers. They complain, talk loudly, very 
demanding, even bordering on the ridiculous, and worst of all I don’t like how they like to 
compare things over here with Singapore. They think their money damn big, and they 
like to throw it around here. In Singapore, maybe money talks. But over here, no. 
Nobody here cares whether you are a multi-millionaire if you don’t treat others with 
respect. I'd rather have Japanese or other clientele come in to this joint anytime. (Male: 
56, Chinese, hotel manager) 
 
 There seems to be a strong perception among Singaporean migrants themselves 
that all Singaporeans possess these generalised "ugly" traits, located within Herzfeld's 
(2005:1-32) conceptual analysis of 'cultural intimacy' and 'practical essentialism' through 
the creation of 'iconicity'. According to Herzfeld, stereotypes are inherent in social 
interaction, consisting of processes of reification and essentialism. However, it is the 
stereotyping of these culturally intimate forms of behaviour that provide people with the 
perceived notions of similarities that they, as fellow ex-Singaporeans, all share intimately 
as culturally coded identities, despite their “negativity”. Similarly for this informant, these 
perceived, essentialised characteristics are the main reason why she prefers to 
dissociate herself from others: 
Because of the perception about Singaporeans being complaining sort of people, people 
like me just want to stay away from them. Judgemental, worried about how others think 
of you based on what job you have, what car you drive…When I meet other 
Singaporeans at parties or dinners, its only a matter of time before they pop the 
inevitable question "What do you do for a living, where do you stay?". They don’t 
understand that over here, you don’t ask this type of questions – questions designed to 
ascertain your standing in society…Among all the nationalities, Singaporeans are the 
worst in both respects. Insecure about their own status in society, and judgeful of others. 
(Female: 39, Chinese, university education, piano teacher) 
 
Whose perception is it, and what informs the perception? Another informant said matter-
of-factly: 
What for I want to come here and mix with Singaporeans? I told you already I left 
Singapore precisely because I don’t like the way that society works, and as a result of 
that, the way that Singaporeans behave – always thinking about the dollar sign, always 
comparing things. Then you want me to come here and find other Singaporeans ah?...I 
am honestly ambivalent to the fact that this place is becoming a mini Singapore. As far 
as possible I try to avoid them, unless I am introduced by someone else I know well…I 
won't go out of my way to accommodate him just because he is Singaporean, because 
there are all kinds of idiots who come from all walks of life. I know other groups like the 
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Italians, Lebanese, Vietnamese all have this kar kee nang kind of mentality – we help 
each other because we are the same kind and from the same place. But Singaporeans 
are inherently self-centred, and they would rather save themselves before they help 
others, because they have more to lose. (Male: 55, Chinese, university education, retired 
lawyer)  
 
When this informant spoke of "the dollar sign", he was referring to the essentialist 
(Singaporean) perception that typical, pragmatic Singaporeans tend to attach monetary 
value to most issues in life (see Chua 2003a). A person's type of car and his residential 
suburb are reflective of their social status not only in Perth, but in Singapore, based on 
“the 5Cs”. For their ability to live a middle to upper middle class lifestyle now is evidence 
of their successful middle class, pre-migration careers. Their financial capital allows 
them to "extend their dollar", so to speak, and reproduce the ideal lifestyle in Perth 
based on Singaporean standards, often at the expense of considering other culturally-
specific norms in West Australian society. As this informant said, 
Because Singaporeans are damn snobbish lah. They come in and complain about 
things, and they live in their own little world. They think they are so great, and that’s why 
there is a stigma…That’s why I told my husband maybe we should have bought a house 
in a worse suburb, a smaller house, drive a cheaper car. Then people may look upon 
you as humble, but now all the tall poppy syndrome sets in on me. A lot of Singaporeans 
I know have a few houses, and they are all in Dalkeith. The way they talk like "I'm in 
Dalkeith", like so big time like that you know? So they are damn atas (arrogant) lah, and 
I think that irritates some Aussies, because we have this money-can-buy-everything 
mentality, whereas the Aussies don’t like this kind of behaviour. Why do you think you 
hardly see them driving their Mercs and BM[w]s here, even though they can afford it? 
People will look down on them. (Female: 48, Chinese, university education, freelance 
lawyer) 
 
 The essentialist view of Singaporeans therefore extends to their generalised 
unsavoury reproduction of their middle class lifestyle in Perth based on a luxurious 
lifestyle that was elusive in Singapore. According to this informant, there is a strong 
symbiotic relationship between the extent that Singaporeans help one another and 
Singapore's meritocratic environment:  
The Italians are very very strong. But for us, we don’t want to know each other. We help 
ourselves only. It’s a typical thing in Singapore – if you are fighting for the same position 
in the company, do you think the person will say anything nice about you? No way OK? 
But for me, I try to help as much as I can, but my husband keeps on telling me to charge 
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for it. But why? Why is everything reducible to dollars and cents? Its just my way of 
passing my time and networking also. (Female: 48, Chinese, university education, 
freelance lawyer) 
 
In a somewhat similar vein, these people said 
If I can help, of course I will help lah. But it’s the same for other people, not just 
Singaporeans. Just because he is Singaporean so I should help him? I think that’s a bit 
naïve lah. (Male: 35, Chinese, university education, accountant) 
 
Another informant said that she feels ashamed being associated with other 
Singaporeans because of their extreme kiasu behaviour.  
Even in the supermarket you can see them producing their Singaporean behaviour. One 
day this inconsiderate Singaporean woman bought up all the chicken which was on sale, 
even though there was a queue behind her. Then this Australian lady saw what she was 
doing, and very politely told her "Excuse me, don’t you think it’s a little selfish of you?" 
And you know what she said? "But I'm paying for it!". You see? So it’s this kind of kiasu 
behaviour that is so damn embarrassing. I got money what. So what? And whenever you 
see this kind of thing, you know straight away – sure Singaporean one. (Female: 44, 
Chinese, university education, lawyer) 
 
 It was strange how this informant assumed that the lady was a Singaporean just 
because of her kiasu20 behaviour. This again reflects stereotypical, essentialised 
assumptions about unsavoury Singaporean traits, to the extent that Singaporeans 
readily attach the label "ugly Singaporean"21 to anyone who looks Asian, and who 
exudes anti-social behaviour. Indeed, it seemed like a taken-for-granted fact that kiasu-
ism belies Singaporean behaviour, due to the frequency with which my informants 
referred to the term during interviews, especially in relation to identity issues. If cultural 
intimacy may be defined as 'those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a 
source of external embarrassment[,] but that nevertheless provide insiders with their 
assurance of common sociality' (Herzfeld 2005:3), then kiasu-ism certainly represents an 
intimately "Singaporean" cultural trait. In a somewhat ironic fashion, these verbatims all 
                                            
20 Jones and Brown (1994:86) have discussed kiasu-ism in relation to the anxieties of the 
Singaporean middle class, which they argue is located in the state's own brand of 'managerial 
corporatism'.  
21 Kong (1999:581) and Chua (1995:118) have also made reference to this label in their analysis 
of Singaporean identity.  
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point to the dysfunctionality of social capital in a rather perverse way. The assumed 
culturally intimate (negative) forms of Singaporean social behaviour, which are in fact 
examples of cultural capital since they may be seen as embodied, 'long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body' (Bourdieu 1986:243-246), are so socially ingrained 
into the psyche of the migrant population that it elicits an immediate response – mutual 
avoidance22 by some, and mutual distrust of others. The fact that a migrant comes from 
Singapore provides him not with "credit" within the community of strangers, but with 
intensified scrutiny and negative labelling by fellow migrants – a kind of 'disciplined 
compliance to group expectations' (Portes and Sensenbrenner 2004: 279) and 
presumptions which are so important for the functioning of social capital, but which have 
been negatively reinforced. Similarly, 
You can smell a bloody Singaporean a mile away. The way he talks, the way he 
dresses, and of course his kiasu and arrogant behaviour. (Male: 46, Chinese, university 
education, banker) 
 
 Decisions to avoid one another result in weak intra-migrant ties, which is an 
ironic by-product of essentialised and stereotypical "self"-critique based on the intimately 
negative cultural capital that migrants presumably transplant. Consequently, there 
seems to be a lack of a strong migrant "spirit" that is characterised by mutual 
dependence, reciprocity and trust, partly because many do not need the inter-
dependence, and partly because many do not want to be associated with other 
Singaporeans.  
 
A bitter pill to swallow – Conditions of exit and the political/apolitical duality of the 
Singaporean migrant 
 
                                            
22 See Portes and Rumbaut (1990). The authors described a case whereby a successful 
Vietnamese businessman in California deliberately employed non-Vietnamese in his company, 
for fear that his own co-ethnics would make claims to their "rights" within his company.  
The Fragmentation of Community 
 86 
As I alluded to earlier, political distanciation from Singapore increases the social 
distance between migrants. It seems that their intention to sever political ties to 
Singapore informs their mutual suspicion of migrant acquaintances, as seen in their 
attempts to avoid me for example. Furthermore, the extremely heterogeneous conditions 
of exit are a detrimental force for any sense of unity that migrants could have potentially 
utilised for collective social capital and group cohesion. For example, 
You must understand that despite this ten thousand plus migrants living here, they all 
moved away for vastly disparate reasons. We are here as individuals, not as if ten 
thousand of us got up and left Singapore together…And while I may be interested to 
know other fellow Singaporeans, I am still separate from them. And what's more, there 
are different categories of migrants; I think you and I came for totally different reasons, 
and both of us are also viewed differently by the government…So I am not surprised that 
there is no sense of community spirit. (Male: 46, Eurasian, PhD, community volunteer) 
 
 Despite this heterogeneity, some informants are convinced that a common, 
underlying rationale prevails in all departures, which has to do with their disenchantment 
with the Singaporean system or way of life – a "political" aspect. Regardless whether 
one refers to their children's educational preferences, or the "push" of a meritocratic 
environment versus the "pull" of a more relaxed society, or the high cost of living in 
Singapore, their collective disenchantment in various forms informs their current 
attitudes towards Singapore, thus making their emigration a politicised issue. As this 
informant sums up nicely,  
When people talk about greener pastures, the assumption is that Singapore is green, but 
Perth is greener, right? But I find for many of them who left, they didn’t come here to look 
for something that was wonderful which they couldn’t get back there. They came 
because they couldn’t stand the way things were. So it is very negative. A lot of them I 
spoke to are very very bitter in their own different ways…They were disillusioned with 
the system…Many of them here came with a grievance, a chip on their shoulder…So 
when somebody says tomorrow is Singapore National Day, they say to hell with it. Who 
gives a damn kind of mentality…They are not anti-Singapore – they are passionate, and 
they are angry, and for me that’s normal human nature. The day they stop complaining 
about Singapore, that’s when I know they don’t care anymore. The worst thing is that 
they can't do anything about it in Singapore…So the bottom line is that the motivation to 
leave Singapore was more negative than positive. It was to get away from a system 
which had become untenable for them or their children. (Male: 58, Indian, university 
education, musician) 
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As if to offset the ill-feeling towards the Singaporean system and "objectify" his 
disenchantment, this informant says that: 
I didn’t migrate! The Singapore government kicked me out! It was a bitter pill to swallow 
for me...Don't get me wrong, I love Singapore to death Ok? It is my home; well, it was 
my home. I spent two years in national service charging up the hills, I volunteered for 
section commander course, I was a member of [association in Singapore], so what does 
that tell you? I am concerned about the country where I was born. And it made me the 
way I am today. And I would have died for it. But I have no choice. I had to leave for 
mine and my family's future, because I am not a graduate, and they only wanted 
graduates at that time…Now, my son will be liable for NS (national service), and I want 
him to go back and do it. I think NS is damn good man. If I hated Singapore so much, do 
you think I will ask him to go back? (Male: 49, Chinese, HSC, businessman) 
 
This informant's attitude towards national service was reiterated by another: 
…strangely, even though Singaporeans who come here complain about the system back 
home, they look at the way Australian society is, with all the drugs, crime, sexual 
permissiveness, so some of them actually think that sending their sons back for NS is 
not a bad idea if they are still holding the Singapore passport, to instil some sense of 
discipline into their kids…(Male: 58, Indian, university education, musician) 
 
 Yet, some migrants see the freedom in Australian society as a liberating space 
for them to express their repressed displeasures, and to unleash their "political" side by 
constructing anti-Singapore discourses with others. The apolitical Singaporean has, 
ironically, discovered his political inclinations. Perhaps the lack of political freedom in 
Singapore has intensified their need to find an outlet to vent their frustrations. 
Sometimes, some people find it amusing and stimulating. However, at other times, the 
wrong impression is created: 
I have mixed feelings about Singaporeans. If they come because they know why they 
are coming, with a positive feeling about Singapore, then OK I will talk to them. But I am 
not happy when I meet a Singaporean here who condemns the country, which I think is 
the wrong reason for leaving. I have seen quite a few of them, so I know…Compared to 
other countries in the world, from a Christian point of view, I believe we should give 
thanks to the Lord for what we have. Because what is there for Singaporeans to 
complain about? We are already living such a good life, so complain for what? (Female: 
44, Chinese, university education, religious volunteer) 
 
I know some Singaporeans here the last thing they want to do is get together with fellow 
Singaporeans, because what do fellow Singaporeans do? Its about food firstly, Katong 
laksa and chicken rice, and secondly, strangely, they talk politics, because they don’t 
have a chance to do it freely in Singapore, so when they get together they really 
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unleash. And its ironic, given their apolitical nature isn't it? So I think over time, it just 
gets very tiring, so they stay away from each other. (Male: 42, Chinese, PhD, lecturer) 
 
Conversely, there are also those who show unrestrained pride for their homeland, which 
may be disconcerting for others. As this informant says,  
I stay away from Singaporeans because they keep on sprouting pro-Singapore stuff, 
which I can't be bothered to listen. They try to get me to go for the National Day dinner 
and all that, and I tell them straight off "go to hell". I mean, I can't understand these 
people sometimes; they migrate because they don’t like the place, and then they come 
here and create their own mini-Singapore, and some even talk about going back for 
good because here very boring. Damn hypocritical man. (Male: 45, Chinese, HSC, real 
estate agent) 
 
Some avoid Singaporeans because they are “pro-Singapore”, while others do so 
because they are too left-leaning. Clearly, there exist multiple attitudinal disparities within 
this group, reflecting the diverse aspirations of a disenchanted migrant middle class.  
 
We are retirees, leave us alone – the sedentary group 
Perth has often been characterised as a "retirement home" on two fronts: literally, given 
the demographic makeup of the Singaporean migrant population, and metaphorically, 
given the tranquil social environment. It is no wonder that the retirees I spoke to often 
cited the quieter surroundings of Perth as a main attraction, compared to the hustle and 
bustle of Singaporean or Sydney city life. Even so, retirees do not escape the 
essentialist gaze of stereotypical Singaporean migrant discourses, with the tacit view 
being that retirees are people who simply want to be left to their own devices. If that is 
true, and if many migrants are indeed retirees, then it certainly provides added 
explanation for the fragmented community thesis. For how is the creation of a cohesive 
community possible if a large number of its potential members are not only ambivalent to 
the presence of others, but who also prefer to be undetectable? As these informants 
said, in response to my question regarding the presence or absence of a cohesive 
community, 
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…here is more like a retirement home, and although not everyone who comes here is a 
retiree, the point is that they chose this place because it is and they want to be left alone. 
So probably the last thing they want is for someone to come around knocking on their 
door and saying "Hey I'm from Singapore too! Wanna catch up sometime?". (Male: 37, 
Indian, PhD, consultant) 
 
I think…when Singaporeans come here, they take out their CPF and sell their house, 
they are self-sufficient. No need to worry about anything already; just enjoy life. Play 
golf, go fishing, drink wine, no hassles. You don’t even want to know about other 
Singaporeans here, other than your golf kar kees (partners) and makan kar kees. I think 
basically everybody, especially the older folks, want to be private and do their own 
things. They don’t want any troubles or messing around. That I think is the dominant 
attitude. Maybe the word is selfish, or self-centred. It’s the "you don’t come and find me" 
mentality, and I don’t find you. So its very difficult, given such a mentality, to form a 
strong community. (Female: 54, Chinese, university education, retired) 
 
Consequently, the strongest expression of their ambivalent attitude towards their fellow 
migrants comes from the retirees themselves, one of whom told me that  
Well, I am retired. Why would I need to network with others, and what use would I be to 
them? (Male: 61, Chinese, university education) 
 
 If the significance of social capital lies in potential reciprocal gains by those who 
are connected to it, then retirees are the most socially disembedded group, since they 
are deemed by others and by themselves to be ineffective network agents. These 
particularistic preferences associated with the usefulness of certain resources over 
others mean that while some people are included in a set of social relationships, others 
are excluded, precisely because they are viewed as non-assets (Portes and Mooney 
2003). Retirees' disembedding from the rest of the migrant community is therefore 
informed by their perception that no useful social capital will be produced from their 
participation, thereby lessening the overall sources of social capital within the 
community, which are potentially formable through network ties. Of course, not all 
retirees think along the same lines, but the empirical trend points towards dissociation 
from the group rather than cohesion. This is despite evidence of migrant clustering in 
certain Perth neighbourhoods.   
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Singaporean neighbourhoods without a Singaporean feel 
The Singaporean case also provides a rather paradoxical trend in immigrant 
incorporation compared to other empirical works that deal with related issues. Indeed, in 
most of the literature pertaining to immigrant adaptation and community-formation 
among migrants, the ethnic neighbourhood based on migrant clustering is viewed as an 
important informal social structure in terms of generating entrepreneurship and self-
employment (Light 1972; Ward and Jenkins 1984; Waldinger et al 1990), and providing 
mutual support and adaptation options for new migrants (Bonacich 1973; Zhou 1992; 
Logan et al 2002). On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that migrant clustering 
does take place in certain suburbs, such as Winthrop and Murdoch (commonly known as 
south of the Swan River), and parts of Nedlands (north of the river). As these informants 
say, 
This place is much better than the other one we were staying in East Perth. Here, it is 
generally quite clean, in the sense that there are not many junkies or trouble-makers 
around, because most of the people staying here are Singaporeans and Malaysians, all 
the newer batch of migrants who can afford to pay slightly higher prices. I feel much 
safer living here. (Male: 39, Chinese, university education, computer technician) 
 
This informant defined the potential for community in terms of migrants' spatial proximity. 
His answer, nevertheless, was still inconclusive, reflecting the diverse meanings 
associated with "community". 
You ask me if there is community. Well, if you go to Winthrop, when you walk around 
you literally think you are in Singapore. There are that many Singaporeans living there. 
So does that mean that we are a strong community, because they congregate together? 
I don’t know. (Male: 49, Chinese, HSC, businessman) 
 
 Spatial proximity alone is not indicative of a structural community, because 
migrant clustering may be a result of insecurities and a yearning for 'reactive solidarity' 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner 2004:281) born out of common experiences as "strangers", 
rather than an actual desire to be physically proximate with fellow migrants. On the 
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surface, it might therefore appear that migrant "enclaves"23 are intended consequences 
of individuals' perceived needs to strengthen their social ties through physical 
congregation. However, I discovered that pragmatic considerations usually outweighed 
the sentimental yearning for spatial proximity with other migrants. As this informant, who 
has been in the real estate business for more than ten years, said:  
One of the first things they consider is obviously the price of the house. But I find many 
Singaporean clients also think hard about the reputation of the suburb, because some 
places have a reputation of not being very safe because of all the break-ins and junkies 
who hang around there. Places like Vic[toria] Park, Bentley near Curtin [University], er… 
East Perth, maybe Belmont also. But at the end of the day, its all about money lah. If the 
price of the houses in the suburb goes up, then you will weed out all the bad apples 
because they can't afford to stay there, and more and more Singaporeans will want to 
invest in those places. (Male: 45, Chinese, 'O' Levels, real estate agent) 
 
 Coming from the relatively “safer” surroundings of Singapore, in which break-ins 
are not as common as in Perth24, security issues inevitably inform their residential 
patterns. Yet it is indeed remarkable that many of these ex-Singaporeans do not know 
one another beyond the level of informality, despite their physical proximity. As this 
informant says, 
Do you know how many Singaporean clients I have along [name of street] alone? Seven 
families. When I ask them "Do you know they are from Singapore?", they say "Yes". "Do 
you talk to them?", they say "No". So you see? Doesn’t that seem strange? Seven 
families along just one street alone in this suburb, but they hardly talk to one another.  
What does that tell you? (Female: 48, Chinese, university education, investment adviser) 
 
The irony is that their desired social ties – manifested in their desire for spatial proximity 
– are inconsistent with their attitudes towards one another. So while there is a "herd" 
mentality among some recent migrants, they do not transform these residential ties into 
actual attachments based on mutual solidarity, trust, and reciprocity – or social capital. 
Saying an occasional "hello" and "good bye" is indeed a strange way for migrants from 
                                            
23 Sometimes, it is difficult to detect these Singaporean "enclaves", since Singaporeans do not 
"stand out" as much as other migrants because they are devoid of their own unique culture, food, 
language and appearances.  
24 According to the RAC (Royal Automobile Club) website, nearly four burglaries are reported 
every hour in Western Australia (http://rac.com.au/).  
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the same country of origin to connect with one another at the daily level. If Singaporean 
migrant neighbourhoods are not reflective of solidarity and the generation of social 
capital based on mutually cooperative ties, then what about roles do immigrant 
associations play?  
 
Of associations25 and organisations – unreciprocal relations 
I managed to interview several ex-committee members26 from various Singaporean 
associations in Perth, which were formed with the intention of establishing Singapore-
Perth connections in various ways. To my knowledge, there are three existing 
associations – Contact Singapore27, WASBC (West Australian Singapore Business 
Council), and most recently, SWAN28 (Singapore West Australian Network).  
 Immigrant associations arguably represent the strongest focal point for the 
transmission of social capital, by providing 'bounded solidarity and enforceable trust' in 
which mutual support arising out of common experiences and utilitarian expectations 
through group norms are circulated (Portes and Sensenbrenner 2004:278-279). 
Bounded solidarity here refers to the norms of mutual and obligatory support arising out 
of commonly felt adversities, while enforceable trust is embedded in the instrumental-
utilitarian functions of community – to endorse rewards and to enforce norms for 
members. Yet, according to some ex-committee members, the difficulty in recruiting 
members – and hence the concomitant circulation of social capital – is again directly 
related to unsavoury or anti-social essentialised characteristics of the ex-Singaporean 
                                            
25 In the general literature, these associations are sometimes known as 'immigrant organisations' 
(Schrover and Vermeulen 2005), 'immigrant associations' (Moya 2005), 'community-based 
organisations' (Cordero-Guzman 2005), and hometown associations (Caglar 2006). While these 
varying terminologies may point to different frames of reference, the similarity lies in the fact that 
they are immigrant based. Similarly, these associations in Perth cater predominantly to the 
interests of the Singaporean migrant group.   
26 Since I was unable to interview active committee members, I will not document the 
organisation's activities or disclose other forms of information.  
27 This organisation is a Singapore government initiative, and is not exclusive to Australia only.  
28 See appendix 3A.   
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migrant population. In this instance, rather than simply following from generalised 
perceptions, these informants claimed first hand experiences of the uncooperative 
nature of their Singaporean counterparts. The most oft-cited problem was the tendency 
for many Singaporeans, apart from the committee members themselves, to be "quick to 
take, but slow to give", reflecting an obvious lack of reciprocal transactions and 
enforceable trust. For example, as this informant said, 
When I came here, I participated in [name of association] firstly as a member, and then 
subsequently as a committee member on a voluntary basis. But lately, I am about to give 
up, because of the perennial Singaporean problem. They don’t understand that giving is 
just as important as taking, and many Singaporeans I've met here only seem to want to 
take, and they take a lot, without returning the favour. I think this kind of attitude poses 
many problems in our efforts to construct a little Singapore here. Don’t get me wrong – I 
really want to see it succeed, but it is really very tiring when you encounter these 
Singaporeans who only attend events when there are freebies or goodies to be taken. 
(Male: 42, Chinese, university education, businessman) 
 
This other informant resigned as a committee member because she could not agree with 
the association's dictum of offering free membership to its members. According to her,  
I don’t understand why they keep on saying give free membership, just because we are 
new and we want to attract new members. How can? Then people will forget they are 
members, because there is nothing to attach them to the organisation in the first place. 
At least you charge a small sum like $10 per annum or something. Don’t tell me 
Singaporeans can't afford to pay $10? Even then some people say "Ha? Must pay one 
ah?". That’s why its just so difficult to get these things going. (Female: 48, Chinese, 
university education, self-employed) 
 
According to another informant, 
…whenever there are events, we committee members have to fork out all the time and 
money to organise. If you calculate, I mean it costs a lot of money for us. Even if we just 
charge a small sum like $5 per head, at least there is something to reimburse us for our 
effort. But then again, these Singaporeans I've seen over here, you charge money, they 
don’t want to come. And then when they come, they start complaining about things 
because they paid for it so they expect to be treated like kings. And then when it is free 
and you send out emails, some are left out and they complain "why I not invited?". So I 
had enough of it. (Female: 45, Chinese, university education, civil servant) 
 
In all these cases, negative social capital is caused by a free-rider problem, because 
only the recipients within the network are yielding profit, while the contributors (members 
of the organising committee) are short-changed due to a lack of reciprocal transactions 
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for their efforts in supplying the rest of the community (see Portes and Landolt 1996; 
Portes 1998).  
 Some ex-committee members and others who were privy to insider information 
also told me how they were "turned off" by certain management styles. There seems to 
be an essential "Singaporean way" of doing things, which does not go down well with 
those who left Singapore precisely because they wanted to get away from an 
authoritarian and "top-down" system. Consequently, where authoritarianism is evident, 
turf-guarding becomes endemic and avoidance the norm. This informant said 
Without naming names, some of the people who are running the show here are 
behaving in a very Singaporean way. They are authoritarian, throw their weight around, 
and would rather force through their ideas than to seek opinions from others. And just 
because they were somebody back in Singapore, and have lots of connections, they 
think they can come here and crack the whip. But the number of Singaporeans I've met 
here tells me that they would rather not participate in these things than to fall under the 
rule of a dictatorial system. And the sad thing is that when these powers-that-be are told 
nicely that perhaps they should change their style because this is not Singapore, they 
tell you if you don’t like it you can jolly well stay away. So a lot of them I know just stay 
away. (Male: 42, Chinese, university education, educationist) 
 
I personally noticed a trend whereby many of my informants – who come from a broad 
cross-section in society – had either not heard of those above-mentioned associations, 
or had not bothered to join them for some of the reasons already mentioned, or had 
signed up but received no news regarding the association's activities. The ambivalence 
towards these homeland associations can again be explained partly by the fact that 
many migrants already possess large stocks of "capital" to be willing to forego the 
potential social capital that may be yielded from networking in these organisations, and 
also partly because for various reasons, many Singaporeans do not want to engage in 
meaningful social relationships with one another. Consequently, weak structural ties are 
not even maintained, so that Granovetter's (1978:1373) 'sense of community' through 
the maintenance of weak ties does not even seem to hold. As this informant sums up 
nicely, 
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Ya, if eventually we become a little Singapore-town, then OK fine. But I don’t need, or 
more accurately, I don’t want to be part of it. I am quite sure many Singaporeans here 
think the same way. We don’t need this ghetto-ish kind of mentality, because we can 
speak English, we are educated, and we are generally self-sufficient. Furthermore, 
Singaporeans inherently think in terms of CMIO, we would rather mix with our own 
Chinese or Indian people, who may come from other places, not only from Singapore. 
So a combination of reasons why all this talk about building a (migrant) community here 
won't work. And of course you have an arrogant ass like me who can't be bothered in the 
first place. (Male: 53, Chinese, university education, former lawyer) 
 
Haller and Landolt (2005) have argued that institutions may either promote homeland 
ties among migrants or re-route them towards other segments of the host society. In this 
case, however, it seems that these institutions have, in some specific ways, redirected 
the Singaporean migrant away from both, back towards his own self or family rather than 
an overarching community. Without the ability to sanction norms and enforce trust within 
the community itself, the various networks within the community (social capital through 
mutual acquaintances and recommendations) are "closed". What Coleman (1988:105) 
refers to as the 'closure of social networks' rests on the positive assumption that 'closure' 
facilitates boundary maintenance, increasing the degree of group, or community, 
boundedness by excluding outsiders. However, the Singaporean migrant group does not 
experience closure; yet it is ironically closed off from within, resulting in a high degree of 
intra-organisational friction, and culminating in a fragmented migrant community that 
lacks the capacity to enact its own boundaries, since bounded solidarity does not even 
exist.     
 Yet it would be rather tentative to suggest that when people emigrate to a new 
country, they prefer to shut themselves out from others simply because they are self-
sufficient, and because they do not like to mix with their own "kind". Being social 
animals, migrants inevitably need to develop other social patterns and invest in ways to 
help them adjust in the new society; perhaps not physically, but certainly emotionally. 
What then, do they turn to, if post-national social ties are weak? It is interesting how 
some informants indirectly offered a precursor towards a plausible answer, in direct 
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response to my question regarding their non-participation in those homeland 
associations: 
I've lived here long enough lah, to know that those Singaporeans who talk about forming 
community are usually the more recent migrants who came here in the last, say, one to 
eight years. And most of them I find are hypocrites. They jump straight away into 
religion, and they want to shove Christianity down anybody's throats. I've had my fair 
share, and I find it very distasteful. So that’s why I rather stay away, because I am a 
rather obnoxious person who calls a spade a spade. You don’t like it, too bad. And I 
don’t want to rub people up the wrong way, so I avoid them totally. (Male: 45, Chinese, 
real estate agent) 
 
A lot of your so-called networks are spun around churches. Every now and then people 
will come and ask me "Are you a Christian?". So I say "Yes, but I am also a Hindu, a 
Muslim, and whatever". Then after awhile if they can't persuade you to go to their 
church, they leave you alone and go and bother someone else. (Male: 55, Chinese, 
university education, retired lawyer) 
 
If you ask me where do they hide, its in the churches. I think there are about two 
hundred Singaporeans in my church. Maybe some Malaysians, and a few Aussies. But 




Away from the Singaporean "community", and into the religious domain (but still 
amongst Singaporeans nevertheless) – the church as an ersatz Singaporean 
"association" 
 
Towards the end of my fieldwork, when I had begun to realise the "uniqueness" of the 
Singapore-Perth migration system – in which many Singaporeans were avoiding one 
another not because of class or ethnically-based differences – I decided that a deeper 
investigation into the religious domain may be a potentially fruitful avenue in furthering 
the fragmented post-national migrant community thesis. Indeed, I had overlooked the 
power of churches in attracting migrants and providing the reciprocal camaraderie that 
recent migrants yearned for, which was otherwise absent outside of the religious sphere. 
I am not attempting to account for the religiosity of migrants; that is, the extent of their 
religious affiliation and participation. The scope of such an exercise would be too broad 
for this thesis and would detract from the central argument. I am simply proposing here 
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that some Singaporean migrants turn to Christianity29 or the church group as an avenue 
to create their own friendship networks. It does not in any way mean that migration is a 
facilitating process for the miraculous discovery of their religious leanings. Nor does it 
imply that Singaporeans are generally a religious group of people, although much 
literature to date has provided evidence of increased religiosity among Singaporeans 
despite modernity (Tong 1992; Pereira 2005), and because of modernity (Goh 1999).  
 Since the church community constitutes an important focal point for many of its 
members, it explains why this migrant prefers not to utilise immigrant associations. 
Some people have approached me before to join these Singaporean associations. But I 
don’t have the time, and I don’t need to, because I already have my church, and there 
are so many Singaporeans there. I think we have more Singaporeans in my church than 
these associations! So my private time is prioritised between my family, and my church. 
Anything else after that is only if I have the time. (Male: 52, Chinese, HSC, 
businessman) 
 
Here, the need to engage in homeland associations is offset by the presence of large 
numbers of Singaporeans in the church, which constitutes an ersatz-Singaporean 
association of sorts. So perhaps a useful point to ponder is this: do many Singaporean 
migrants attend churches simply because they want to expand their friendship circles 
regardless of national background, or because they want to meet fellow Singaporean 
migrants only within the church context and not elsewhere? Based on my interviews with 
several active church-goers, the answer lies largely in the latter. As these informants 
say, 
There are about two hundred to two-fifty Singaporeans, and a lot of them are retirees 
who are relatively recent migrants, between the last one to five years. A lot of them you 
can see…they are quite lonely, don’t know anyone in Perth, not many friends, and 
nothing much to do on Sundays, so they find that coming to church helps them pass 
time…I think most of them come here for social reasons, knowing that the pastor is 
Singaporean, and there are lots of Singaporeans here, so they are quite 
comfortable…Of course, you can't ask me whether they are religious or not, because I 
just see them coming to church every Sunday, that’s all. And I seriously don’t think they 
talk about God twenty-four hours a day. But they do help out and contribute to functions, 
                                            
29 I am not referring to any specific Christian denomination. Some informants attended Anglican 
churches, some Charismatic, and others Methodist. 
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parties, barbeques, so its really quite fun do these things with your own kar kee nang 
(literally, your own “kind”). (Male: 29, Chinese, university education, banker) 
 
According to my informant, there are always new parishioners attending his church 
every month, whereby many are migrants who often rely on referrals and word-of-mouth.  
A lot of recent migrants come to this church because they were from certain churches in 
Singapore, and then before they migrated, they asked their pastor or friends which 
church to attend in Perth. So that’s how many of them end up here. Whenever I ask a 
new migrant how he found out about this church, they will say "My friend in Singapore 
ask me to come here", without knowing anyone in particular in the church. Sometimes 
they will come and check out first. Usually when they see so many Singaporeans, two 
things will happen: either they will be very comfortable and stay on, or they will leave and 
never come back again. (Male: 29, Chinese, university education, banker) 
 
 Recommendations and personal contacts are important resources for the 
transnationalisation of "religious" ties in this case. By "religious ties", I mean a church-
goer's almost seamless immersion into the host society's religious institutions, 
exemplified in his attendance in a church that was previously unknown to him, and which 
was recommended by a personal contact in the home country. Whether the migrant's 
persistent participation in religious activities (such as church attendance) necessarily 
signals religiosity is not the issue. The point is that continued church attendance is 
predicated upon the utilisation of already available social capital which is clearly 
transnational in nature, acting as a bridging tie during the initial phase of migration. Most 
of my informants – the parishioners themselves – also made it clear that their 
participation was facilitated by the actually existing strength of the ex-Singaporean 
congregation. As a result, network ties in the host society for these ex-Singaporean 
church-goers are largely spun around church groups. As this informant says,  
You find quite a few Singaporean cliques here. You have the housewives who don’t 
work, and they meet every week outside church and do their own things. Then there are 
the youths, high school kids, who are divided into various other sub-cliques; maybe 
about forty plus of them in total, and usually they form their own little internet café groups 
of five or so. Then you have the young working adults like myself who come from a wide 
variety of occupational backgrounds. This group is slightly smaller, and usually our 
activities revolve around social things like go cinema, play paintball, and also sports – 
basketball, rugby, sometimes soccer, and of course makan; things that people our age 
do. Most of the time we do things together, so we are very tight-knit. Then you have 
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those in their mid thirties and early forties with young families, and they also do their own 
things. So a very very diverse range of people, with different interests. If you look at 
them, I think you will find a nice cross-section of Singapore society in the church itself. 
But not everyone knows everyone, because its so big, and people come and go. (Male: 
29, Chinese, university education, banker) 
 
The church is therefore the central communal structure that determines and maintains 
the types of social patterns that evolve among those migrants who attend it. Clearly, 
migrants' social activities stem from, rather than being located within, the moral 
community of believers characterised by the church. The intensely personal space of 
religious beliefs, personified in religion through the church, is also expressively social. 
Lest it be misunderstood, these activities that take place outside of Sunday obligations 
are not religious in nature. In some ways, the prevalence of church groups provide 
evidence against the fragmented community thesis, because Singaporean migrants do 
congregate and form little communities and social networks based on post-national ties 
that are not religious in nature. Nevertheless, their religious participation simply means 
that religion is the central marker of their sense of community, not fellow Singaporeans. 
Still, not all Singaporeans attend churches, despite their overwhelming numbers in 
several churches in Perth.  
 If migrants do not coalesce into a cohesive community in the host society, how 
then does adaptation take place, and what role does the family play in the process? I will 
show in the next chapter that despite endemic negative self-essentialisation, migrants 
find other ways to reinvent their identities along post-national lines by utilising existing 
forms of cultural capital, such as symbolic ethnicity and food, as valuable cultural 
resources in the adaptation process.  
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 The Symbolically Constructed “Community”: 
In Place of the Social – Migrant Identities and 
Cultural Capital 
 
If the Singapore-Perth migration system is characterised by fragmentation along post-
national lines and endemic self-essentialisation, how then are migrant identities 
manifested? In recalling Faist’s (2000) migration framework, social and symbolic ties are 
crucial elements in the transmission of social capital and concomitant migrant 
adaptation. However, what if sociality is absent? This chapter argues that while social 
ties based on mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust among migrants remain 
weak, symbolic ties operate at discursive levels via cultural practices, and reinvent 
Singaporean identities at the individual and family levels. While there are multiple 
subjective Singaporean identities, I will focus only on the ethnic Chinese, since they form 
the largest ethnic group. I will show how symbolic ethnicity, as a form of cultural capital, 
is situationally utilised by many Singaporean-Chinese migrants to reinvent their identities 
along post-national lines, especially in relation to the Australian "other". 
 Given the complicated and often contradictory nature of Singapore’s C-M-I-O 
multiracial ideological discourse, in which identities tend to be conceptualised and 
reinforced in ethnic rather than national terms (Tan 2004a; Benjamin 1976), it is more 
likely that Singaporean migrants identify with traces of Singaporean culture than an 
overarching common identity, since “Singaporean identity” is a highly abstract and 
contentious social construct1 (Chua 1998; Kwok and Ali 1998). I will show that the single 
most useful cultural resource (or "good") that symbolically “binds” Singaporean migrants 
into any form of "community" is food. Thus, a sense of community is symbolically 
constructed through food and eating, which are culturally shared practices and highly 
                                            
1 Chua (2003b) argues that fifty years after independence, the question "What is Singaporean 
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symbolic acts for most Singaporeans. Nevertheless, while food is a highly valued and 
"objectified"2 cultural-symbolic resource, it is still not converted into social capital for the 
strengthening of community through social ties, because the social exchanges that 
reinforce its value remain elusive.  
 
4.1 Forms-of-Capital and the Reinvention of Identity 
 
In Chapter Two, I showed that despite heterogeneous factors for emigration, some 
Singaporean migrants utilised pre-existing network ties to "bridge" the initial migration 
process. As I have elaborated, Faist (2000) identifies the transmission of social capital 
within social and symbolic ties as essential elements in explaining mobility (acts of 
migration), because it connects migrants and potential migrants through transnational 
network ties. Social capital therefore constitutes the content inherent in these social and 
symbolic ties. While I have shown in the last chapter that Singaporean migrants do not 
establish strong social ties for community formation at the aggregate level, symbolic ties, 
which are the ‘perceived bonds…to which participants attach shared meanings, 
memories, future expectations, and representations’ (Faist 2000:102), are nevertheless 
utilised individually for adaptation purposes. Ethnicity may be viewed as a form of 
symbolic tie in which cultural capital inheres. I will utilise Cohen’s (1985) concept of the 
symbolic construction of community and Bourdieu’s cultural capital theory to explain the 
ways in which Singaporean migrants reinvent their identities away from the social to the 
symbolic realm. 
 
4.1.1 Cultural values as cultural capital 
                                            
2 I use this term in relation to Bourdieu's (1986) assertion that cultural goods are objectified forms 
of cultural-symbolic capital.  
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For many informants, their identities were often contrasted with what they were not – 
Anglo-Celtic or "White" Australians. These perceived differences were manifested in 
various ways, such as speech patterns, phenotypical differences, lifestyle, or "our way of 
doing things". However, the most common distinction was, vaguely put, values. In social 
scientific parlance, these arguably come closest to socially and culturally embodied 
norms, patterns of culturally-informed social behaviour, or value orientations3. The older 
generation are especially susceptible in employing the utilitarian functions of cultural 
values to differentiate themselves or, ourselves, from others. Nevertheless, cultural 
values constitute important sources of cultural capital for the continued perpetuation of 
identities on the one hand (for example, emphasis on family values, educational 
achievement), and adaptation on the other (such as language ability, familiarity with 
modern ways of living).  
 In applying the logic of cultural capital4, it is clear that cultural capital exists as 
cultural values, or what Bourdieu (1986:243) calls the embodied, 'long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body'. Its transmission and symbolic cultivation into the 
habitus requires time and effort, since culture refers to learned patterns of social 
behaviour that are usually acquired through familial socialisation. However, the 
interpretation and transmission of values vary considerably since, depending on the 
structure of the field in question, cultural capital is unequally distributed. Despite these 
variations, my interviews led me to believe that most Singaporean migrants reduced 
cultural values, and the differences that result from it, to ethnicity. Informants often relied 
upon the functional value of ethnicity as symbolic, boundary marking devices that 
distinguished insiders from outsiders to reinvent their identities. If ethnicity is defined as 
‘aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded 
                                            
3 It was clear that “values” referred to cultural values.  
4 Bourdieu (1986: 243-248) identified three possible forms of cultural capital: the embodied, the 
objectified, and the institutionalized.  
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by others, as being culturally distinctive’ (Eriksen 1993:4), then ethnicity may also be 
viewed as culturally constructed practices whose values are symbolically transmitted by 
members for boundary marking purposes. 
 
4.1.2 Cultural values as boundary markers and the perpetuation of identity based on 
ethnic differences (or distinctions) 
 
In my view, any attempt to explicate Singaporean identity inevitably needs to consider 
the politics of multiracialism5 in Singapore, in which ethnicities6 are both ascribed and 
essentialised as immutable cultural "givens" through the 'bureaucratization of ethnicity' 
(Siddique 1997:111), or the CMIO model of ethnic ascription. Following from the 
ideologically-laden multiracial discourse as a political governing tool, Singaporean 
identities are, above all, highly racialised discursive constructs (Chua 2003b). While 
some Singaporean migrants claim to have rejected state-ideological norms regarding 
meritocracy, elitism and pragmatism (see Chapter Two), they have nevertheless been 
socialized within a political system that stresses racial and hence, immutable cultural 
differentiation from birth. My fieldwork suggested that ethnic stereotypes persisted 
among many older generation, recently arrived ethnic Chinese migrants. These culturally 
specific stereotypes exist not only to function as transmissible symbolic ties among the 
uprooted by reminding them of their migrant roots, but also as situational mechanisms 
that situationally re-route migrant identities accordingly, wherein certain values are 
consciously adopted, while others are discarded.  
 Indeed, contrary to Chiew’s (1983) depluralization thesis regarding the increased 
overlapping and hence, gradual decimation of ethnic boundaries in post-independence 
                                            
5 I have elaborated upon this in Chapter Two. The point is not another exegesis of multiracialism, 
but an awareness that multiracialism shapes notions of Singaporean identities accordingly. 
6 I do not intend to provide a theoretical expose and conceptual critique of the various theoretical 
models of ethnicity, since the vastness of the field is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, I 
will make use of several existing theoretical models to explain the circumstances in which 
Singaporean migrants situationally negotiate their ethnic identities.  
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Singapore in lieu of a cohesive national identity, it was clear that ethnic sentiments for 
some Singaporean migrants had either persisted, or heightened after emigration. 
Similarly, in modern day Singapore, several academic writings have pointed to an 
increase in racial consciousness among the multiracial population (Tan 2004b), rather 
than collective national identification devoid of ethnic chauvinism that Chiew had 
proposed two decades earlier. And it is these ethnically-based forms of migrant identities 
that contribute towards the increased perception of cultural differences for some, and 
sameness for others in the transnational setting. Just like nationalism, ethnicity is a 
Janus-faced social construct that provides feelings of mutuality on the one hand, and 
exclusivity on the other. Despite looking in different directions, both "faces" work towards 
the common goal of constructing perceived racial boundaries, even though the structure 
and content of "Chinese-ness" (and hence the boundaries that they protect) are 
situationally determined and historically contingent. Ethnic identities may be viewed as 
both a threat to one's sense of group solidarity, as well as cultural ballast for the 
continued perpetuation of cultural values among migrants in the face of “White” 
adversity. Regardless, the key is that these obvious contrasts are highly oppositional, so 
that ethnic identities are often defined in relation to what one is not. Clearly, 
essentialisation often takes place, in line with Cohen's (1985:115) claim that the vitality 
of cultures lies both in their juxtaposition and exaggeration of self and other.  
 
Symbolic ethnicity and transmission of cultural values 
Here, I find Gans' (1979) rather dated but nevertheless influential theory on symbolic 
ethnicity particularly useful in accounting for the continued emphasis on cultural values 
among Singaporean migrants. According to Gans, symbolic ethnicity  
is characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant 
generation, or…the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be 
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felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour (p. 9, emphases 
added).  
 
Although Gans initially focused on the third generation7, he made it clear that symbolic 
ethnicity, as traditional cultural values, can exist among first generation immigrants as 
well. Symbolic ethnicity is based on 'a generalized tradition', such as the 'desire for the 
cohesive immigrant family, or for the obedience of children to parental authority' (p. 9). 
Significantly, the adherence to these values and its subsequent transmission do not 
require any 'functioning groups or networks' (p. 12); they can be transmitted, practiced, 
or simply imagined as part of one's individual identity. In other words, cultural values 
represent symbolic adaptive ties that can be reproduced within oneself (Cohen 1985) or 
within the structure of the nuclear family, without the need for hometown immigrant 
associations (such as Chinatowns) to act as middling devices. In the creation of these 
'symbolic tradition[s]' (p. 9), the social basis of ethnicity is therefore divorced from its 
symbolic “other”. Thus, according to these informants, 
I think since we are Chinese, we should try to instil some of those values into our 
children, like hard work, respect for elders, save money for a rainy day…Speaking 
Chinese I think is not so important as a value, but it may become useful in future for 
economic reasons because China is opening up…I am not saying that all Australians 
don’t respect their elders or all of them are lazy, but by and large, Asian people, I think 
because of our migrant background, place more emphasis on these values because we 
are in a foreign country, so we need to depend on each other more. And one way to do 
that is to keep the family unit together by teaching them to uphold these values. 
(Female: 48, Chinese, university education, church volunteer) 
 
…there will be some things, like respect for elders, which I think is more of a Chinese 
value than Singaporean. Of course, we in Singapore also practice that, regardless 
whether its Indian Chinese or Malay…Like over here, I will always introduce my Aussie 
friend to my daughter as uncle8 so-and-so; definitely not address him by his first name. 
And I expect her to greet him everytime they meet…Not say that I must definitely pass it 
                                            
7 In some of his later works, Gans (1999), together with some other North American theorists, 
sought to connect the micro theoretical understandings of ethnicity with other larger macro-
structural societal concerns, namely migrant assimilation. The concern was with the dialectical 
distinction between acculturation on the one hand, and ethnic retention on the other.  
8 This is a term that is used by younger people when addressing their elders who may or may not 
be known to them personally, similar to “sir” or “madam” in Western societies. It does not usually 
connote feelings of emotional attachment or kinship, and is invoked as a sign of respect for older 
people.  
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(Chinese values) on to her or insist upon it everytime, but I think if she knows and 
practices this, it is better, and I feel better about it. But then again, I hope her kids don’t 
call me [first name] next time! If that happens, then I know I have failed in my duty as a 
parent. (Male: 55, Chinese, self-employed) 
 
 Cultural values are often reduced to ethnically-based rhetoric, so that "Chinese" 
values become instrumental features in migrant identities. They are instrumental insofar 
as they perform culturally resourceful purposes, such as disciplining one's child into 
thinking habitually that the cultural ways of his elders such as respect, filial piety and 
hard work are uniquely Chinese traits which should be upheld9. There are no concrete 
interests to be gained by preaching or adhering to these values (such as economic 
incentives, acquisition of business contacts, or strengthening of social relations), other 
than the maintenance of family ties. Without the instrumental force of ethnic structures to 
maintain these values, the migrant family becomes the sole avenue for its direct 
transmission. However, despite my claim that the social basis of ethnicity is only 
confined within the family, it is clear that increasing cross-cultural social contact, or 
acculturation, between migrant children and Australians perceivably reduce the cultural 
distances between both, hence increasing the perceived need to socially transmit these 
cultural values to the young. And as these informants have mentioned, they enact and 
reinvent these cultural traditions because of their assumption that the countervailing 
values in Australian society leave much to be desired.  
Personally, I don’t give a damn what my son does for a living, as long as its an honest 
day’s work. Having lived in Australia for what, nine years, I understand that he will be 
influenced by the ways of this society. Some are good, some not so good. But I insist 
that he respects me by keeping some of the values that we Chinese always follow, like 
respect for elders, showing his face and greeting people whenever they come to the 
house, and of course, staying at home for Chinese New Year for family reunion if he is in 
the country. (Male: 58, Chinese, university education, retired) 
 
Although there may be slight variations in emphasis and methodology, it is also 
clear that strong family ties are defined as Chinese traits, not Australian ones. The 
                                            
9 Chua (1995) has argued that these Confucian traits are promoted in Singapore as ideal values 
specifically for the proper functioning of society. 
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migrant family is therefore the site of 'household communism', in which 'solidarity in 
dealing with the outside and communism in property and consumption of everyday 
goods [from] within' (Weber 1978:359) are reproduced by strong social ties within the 
family domain. I am not claiming that strong ties characterise most Singaporean migrant 
families. I am arguing that being strangers in a strange land, parents tend to place 
extraordinary emphasis on the utility of family ties – and the concomitant transmission of 
cultural values from within – as an adaptation strategy. Strong family ties are therefore 
culturally specific values that are constructed relationally against its immediate opposite 
– Australians, who apparently do not invest intensely in its transmission. Although 
Bourdieu (1986:244) made it clear that cultural capital can be acquired without 
‘deliberate inculcation’ or ‘unconsciously’, the persistence with which some Singaporean 
migrants instil these values into their children are arguably reflective of the perceived 
differences that they, as bearers of different and unique cultural traits, need to protect 
and enforce. Seen in this way, strong family ties become salient symbols of primordiality, 
which are often claimed as the "truths" of being Chinese. Family ties based on culturally 
constructed differences are also conveyed in these comments: 
For the Aussies, you notice when they reach a certain age, like eighteen years old or 
university-going age, they will move out and stay alone, or with their friends, then they 
only come back home once or twice a year to see their family. They don’t seem to place 
as much importance on their family as we Chinese, or should I say Asians, because I 
think the Vietnamese and Hong Kongers also practice the same thing. I definitely don’t 
want my kids to grow up thinking that way… (Male: 51, Chinese, self-employed)  
…as far as possible, I will make sure that during the weekend, we all have a family meal 
together at home or outside. During the week, we can do whatever we want, but come 
Saturday or Sunday, we must all sit down together at the table as a small family. This is 
something I have always insisted upon, especially after we migrated here, and I am glad 
my son realises it…I think these values are important to cultivate from young, otherwise 
he will just follow his Aussie friends' style of doing things. (Male: 50, Chinese, university 
education, teacher) 
 
 The migrant family thus becomes the main focus and repository for the 
generational transmission of cultural "norms"; norms that are defined in ethnically value-
laden terms. These cultural values represent not only cultural capital for instrumentally-
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strategic adaptation purposes for the migrant family (Nee and Sanders 2001), but also 
act as symbolic ties that connect migrants to a larger imagined diasporic community of 
Chinese, without the need for direct social relations or immigrant associations for its 
continued perpetuation. Among Singaporean-Chinese migrants, ethnic identities are 
often directed at a generalized tradition which is grounded in family-centric values and 
kinship, a view that ethnic theorists such as Horowitz (1985) and van den Berghe (1981; 
1995) have championed. However, these generalisations cover a range of other 
practices, so that the content, if not the structure, of cultural values vary accordingly.  
 
4.1.3 The cultural value of education  
Education is another essentialised, culturally embedded value that is often juxtaposed 
against Australia's egalitarian opportunity structure. While the Singapore state 
capitalises on educational investment to minimise human wastage in society (Tan 2002), 
Singaporean migrants emphasise the culturally-laden importance of education as a 
pragmatic resource for the attainment of human capital via the "normal" academic route, 
which ideally culminates in a university degree. The difference, of course, is that 
Australian society accords more opportunities should they fail to achieve their desired 
academic credentials. The point here is that most Singaporean-Chinese migrants tend to 
essentialise the quest for education as an ethnic Chinese value that is antithetical to 
Australian culture. Indeed, the cultural value of education, and the cultural background 
(such as the family) that conditions educational performance, are intricately linked to 
cultural capital, which Bourdieu (1986:244) has identified as the 'socially most 
determinant educational investment'. Thus, the quest for higher education should be 
seen within the context of culturally embedded familial regularities or norms, whereby its 
acquisition is part of a larger cultural "code of conduct" for many Singaporean-Chinese 
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migrants. Similarly, Waters10 (2005) has argued that overseas education among some 
East Asian students may be seen as a familial strategy in acquiring much-needed 
cultural and human capital (overseas education) for in toto family migration.  
 For my study, the "astronaut families" and "satellite children"11 phenomenon, in 
which family members are separated transnationally for prolonged periods of time to fulfil 
their various roles (for example, education in host society institutions for the children, 
and work in the home country for parents), was not particularly evident. In some remote 
cases, one parent remained in Singapore to fulfil the role of breadwinner (not necessarily 
the male), while the other half served as guardian to their children in Perth. 
Nevertheless, the "normal" academic route, in which the migrant child should strive for a 
university education, was visibly evident. Remarks such as "being serious in studies" 
were often invoked as essential features of Singaporean culture, which inevitably takes 
its cue from the Confucianist (read Chinese), patriarchal mentality that is so evident in 
Singapore society.  
You notice its generally quite easy for Singaporean kids when they come here to do well 
in school. Why? Because the expectations over here are much lower than Singapore, 
partly because success is not defined according to how many As you get, but partly also 
because the average Australian kid and his parents don’t place as much emphasis on 
studies as Asians – in some ways, they are less kiasu I suppose. Now, no matter what 
anyone tells you, I still think most Singaporean parents over here want their kids to excel 
in academics first and foremost – everything else is secondary. Its in our Chinese culture 
– how we are all brought up to think that education is a must, otherwise you will become 
a rubbish collector or a road sweeper, that kind of mentality. You must get the paper cert 
first before you become a professional sportsman or what have you, because then you 
have some sort of insurance in case you fail in other areas of life. But the Aussies don’t 
see it that way, because their society is like that, maybe because of all this welfarism 
mentality I don’t know, where if you don’t work, the government will give you money. 
(Male: 58, Chinese, HSC, former businessman) 
 
                                            
10 Here, education is seen as a valuable source of capital for two reasons: firstly, because some 
students found the educational system in their home country (Hong Kong) too tough, so that 
emigration became the "cheaper" option; and secondly, because an overseas education was still 
viewed favourably in their native Hong Kong. 
11 See Chan (1997); Pe-Pua et al (1998); Waters (2003) for more thorough analysis of the 
phenomenon.  
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Here, educational qualifications are reduced to culturally specific "values", which 
are again symbolically tied to the Singaporean elitist mentality of attaching paramount 
importance to paper qualifications. Thirst for knowledge through formal education is, in 
their views, antithetical to the Australian notion of egalitarianism and informality in life 
choices, whereby higher education is only sought after if one is truly interested in 
pursuing it. Yet for some Singaporean migrants, notably the ethnic Chinese, the lack of 
paper qualifications disadvantages a person considerably. Indeed, as Ong (1999: 95) 
has observed, many ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, regardless of their socio-
economic status, view Western education as a 'strategy of accumulation', because it 
provides valuable forms of social and cultural capital that are converted to other 
resources, such as accumulating much-needed points12 for emigration to Western 
countries. Unlike the Hong Kongers in Waters' (2005) study, the children in my study 
were not cast into orbit (to the host society as satellite kids) specifically to obtain their 
university degrees (human capital), so that their parents could qualify to enter Australia 
on the family migration (or reunion) visa. Neither did Singaporean parents send their 
children to Perth because an overseas education (in Australia) was a marketable 
resource for enhancing one's job opportunities in Singapore, since the Singaporean 
system places local universities on a higher pedestal than West Australian ones. 
However, the emphasis on education is seen as an avenue of cultural-symbolic 
transmission, itself a manifestation of Chinese-centric cultural values. There are 
obviously pragmatic (securing the best available jobs on the basis of high qualifications) 
as well as symbolic (perpetuation and reinvention of identities based on Chinese cultural 
values) reasons involved.  
                                            
12 As I have noted in a previous chapter, the Australian immigration authorities practice the 
“points system”. Education weighs highly for the “Skilled migration” visa – almost half the required 
overall points for successful applications. Tertiary qualifications from an Australian university is 
extremely important for a potential migrant in this visa subclass.  
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 Interestingly, as I have documented in the previous chapter, it is often the 
pressure-cooker, meritocratic and paper-oriented environment in Singapore that 
"pushes" entire migrant families to Perth, especially the bilingual education policy13 in 
Singapore. Yet, some parents now yearn for their children to acquire some basic 
conversational knowledge of the Chinese language.  
I always tell my children that if they have the time, they should try and master their 
mother tongue, because it will become useful for them in the future. Nowadays, it’s a  
disadvantage not to be able to speak Chinese, especially for us Chinese. But I won’t 
force them. If they are not interested, then it’s a waste of time. Now I even know of some 
older people who are taking Chinese classes with the Chung Hwa Association. (Female: 
47, Chinese, university education, lawyer) 
 
Among some migrants, the learning of the “mother tongue” is done more for 
instrumentally-pragmatic rather than symbolic reasons, given its current potential value 
due to increasing global emphasis on the China market. Investment in "foreign" 
(Chinese) language abilities are therefore long-term goals that aim to produce useful 
social relationships in more utilitarian ways or, to generate social capital. Yet, speaking 
the Chinese language does not seem to be an important cultural marker of Chinese-
ness among present-day Singaporeans, particularly amongst the English-educated 
Chinese (Tong and Chan 2001a; see also Ang 2001). Sometimes, practicality takes over 
the emotional in identity discourses. As this informant claims,  
I wanted them (his children) to learn Chinese. But they are not interested lah. So I might 
as well let them go and do something else, like play rugby or some other sports that they 
enjoy, rather than force them to do something they don’t want. (Male: 51, Chinese, HSC, 
managing director) 
 
Nevertheless, ethnic identities continue to operate on highly essentialistic terms, which 
are defined in relation not only to what one is not, but when one should be. To 
strategically essentialise (Spivak 1987) as such is ultimately to employ illogical, 
reductionist modes of thinking, for while egalitarianism is a central hallmark of Australian 
                                            
13 See Hill and Lian (1995), and Mauzy and Milne (2002) for detailed analyses of these policies 
and their social implications. 
The Symbolically Constructed Community 
 112 
society, it does not mean that all Australians do not take education seriously. Neither 
does it mean that all of them do not maintain strong family ties. However, as van den 
Berghe (1981) reminds us, the strength of ethnicity lies in its irrationality, which makes it 
so appealing for those who espouse it.  
 
4.1.4 “Birds of the same feather”  
As they say, birds of the same feather flock together. I don’t mean Singaporeans, but 
Chinese people. They can be Malaysians or Singaporeans doesn’t matter…We tend to 
think the same way, whereas the Aussies are somewhat different in their approach 
towards life, towards work, and sometimes I don’t really agree with their mentality or 
their way of doing things. (Male: 55, Chinese, university education, real estate agent) 
 
Ethnic identities14 are powerful instruments of self-containment, in the sense that they 
provide feelings of in-group solidarity and cohesiveness through perceptions of similarity 
based on common historical experiences. Some scholars have argued that ethnicity – at 
the theoretical level – requires both the subjective as well as objective components for it 
to be operationalised as an effective instrument of group identity. However, following 
Weber (1978), I contend that subjectivity far outweighs objectivity in people’s self-
identification processes, because these feelings of commonality are based on 
perceptions of similarities and differences. Whether a so-called objective blood, 
linguistic, or historical tie to a homeland exists is largely irrelevant, because as long as 
they feel that they belong to a certain group that espouses common origins (not 
necessarily common goals) – what some authors have called the affective tie (see 
Anderson 2001) – then identity construction is possible, which is ultimately the intended 
consequence of all ethnically-induced projects.  
I won't say that I mix around more with Singaporeans lah; more of Chinese people lah. 
So Malaysians, Taiwanese, they all count. I don’t want to sound too chauvinistic, or 
some people call "racist", but it is inevitable that you feel more comfortable with your 
                                            
14 So pervasive are ethnic ties in contemporary society, that several scholars have drawn strong 
links between ethnicity and the modern nation (see Smith 2000; Hutchinson 2000; 2004; Connor 
1978; 2004). 
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own kind (ethnic Chinese), especially in a foreign country. Yes, as Singaporeans, we 
can all speak English, so by right we can survive here. But still as Chinese, we can be 
proud to say that we have our own language, be it Mandarin or Hokkien, Cantonese, 
whatever. (Male: 55, Chinese, self-employed) 
 
 While I have previously argued that the acquisition of language – if it was invoked 
at all – is mostly operationalised along pragmatic lines, the symbolic aspects of the 
Chinese language also represent affective, fictive ties of perceived common descent, 
since "we have our own language", despite being under-utilised in Australian society. 
Similarly, the ability to comfortably oscillate between the English and Chinese languages 
in daily parlance highlights the symbolic utility of a familiar (Chinese) language, 
generating comfort rather than concrete utilitarian gains. Devoid of the utilities in 
reciprocal exchanges through social ties, linguistic cultural capital is not enforced to 
effect strong social ties between Singaporean migrants and other ethnic Chinese in 
Perth. As one informant told me, 
I sent him to Chinese classes here, so that he can maintain his roots. For me, how can 
you be a Chinese without speaking some Chinese? Not to say that you must speak very 
well, because I don’t. But at least some knowledge of it to emphasise your roots. But 
now he has given up already, because he said to me "Dad, why am I learning Chinese 
when nobody here speaks it?". See, the young people here very practical. They think 
very logically. If no use, then what's the point of doing it, that type of mentality. (Male: 54, 
Chinese, university education, self-employed) 
 
Apart from language, being with and around their “own kind” – kar kee nang (Teochew) 
– also generates feelings of closeness and mutual comfort based on alleged similarities 
that might otherwise be absent in their relationships with Australians. These perceived 
similarities provide the sense of security that as Chinese, they have more in common 
with one another than with Australians, even though some of these "similarities" may be 
fallacious by-products of the imagination. Again, there is an implicit, essentialised 
assumption that all ethnic Chinese necessarily share the same values; the same 
understanding about what constitutes Chinese values, and attaching equal importance in 
its transmission.  
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 Of course, the objective tie is important insofar as the people concerned have 
aspirations towards a common group identity. However, my argument is that ethnicity in 
this case only provides one with a singular conception of Chinese-ness that is not based 
on aspirations towards group solidarity. As Jenkins (1997) has argued, ethnic identities 
can function in the social organisation of everyday life without the need for the Barthian 
concept of groups and boundaries. Neither is ethnicity mobilised for any instrumental 
political gain, such as the transformation of homeland through various transnational 
projects (see Adamson 2002). The sense of identity based on Chinese cultural values, 
the patriarchal nuclear family, and educational attainment are features that can exist 
independently of other members' diverse practices or beliefs surrounding Chinese-ness. 
Thus, for ethnic Chinese Singaporean migrants in Perth, ethnic identities are not based 
on any futuristic goals, such as aspirations towards an independent nation-state or the 
search for a common sense of peoplehood based on ethnic essentialist assumptions. 
They choose to highlight or glorify their sense of Chinese-ness as a form of individual 
identity based on alleged culturally-unique values for the symbolic imagination of self, 
not community. It follows that when ethnicity is invoked as an instrument of collective 
identity, or when it is politicised for instrumental purposes that transcend the immediacy 
of the individual, that Barth's boundary maintenance becomes important. In this study, 
ethnic identification and its generational transmission is simply a process whereby 
agents willingly select (and perhaps distort at times) certain useful values from the 'group 
stock[,] and organise them into a system which suits [their] own particular purposes' 
(Smolicz 1981:86). Ethnic identities from this perspective are therefore symbolic 
constructions for the self, without necessarily producing a 'deep commitment to ethnic or 
social ties' (Alba 1990:306).  
 
Oppositional ethnicity  – the strengthening of ethnic (not national) identities 
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In a previous section, I explained how boundary maintenance transcends physical traits 
through alleged cultural distinctions. However, in some cases, ethnic identities are 
strengthened when migrants are away from home15, and there is a sense of inevitability 
that these "birds" look for those with the same "feathers" – commonalities based on 
phenotypical characteristics differentiating between "us" and "them", rather than other 
subjective cultural markers such as language, religion, or place of origin. However, are 
physical characteristics not objective markers of ethnic identity? It may very well be 
construed as such, but the crucial distinction between subjective and objective markers 
lies in the perception (rightly or wrongly) of commonality among members based on 
physical characteristics. However, just because I look Chinese does not mean I think 
that way. Nevertheless, there seems to be an inherent mentality among some older, 
Chinese educated migrants to view ethnicity in terms of racially ascribed features; 
resonating with the Furnivallian concept of racial stratification, which was so evident in 
the colonial divide and rule era (see Hirschman 1987; Hefner 2001). Conversely, as this 
younger, Western-educated migrant says, 
If I help someone, its because I want to help him, not because he is Chinese or 
Singaporean…I know there are some here who think that because we are migrants, we 
should stick together, that kind of tribal mentality. But I think that stems more from 
insecurities than a real need to stick together. Because you notice these people usually 
don’t try and integrate into Australian society and mix with the Aussies. They don’t even 
want to try, because they think that Australians are racist. But have they even tried to 
mix with the Aussies? I have many Aussie friends, and some of them have actually told 
me that they find Asians racist, because they look down on Australians. (Male: 36, 
Chinese, university education, private tutor) 
 
However, during the course of my fieldwork, it was not uncommon to find statements of 
the sort: 
                                            
15 This finding is juxtaposed neatly with Kong's (1999) empirical findings that Singaporean 
(national) identity is strengthened when migrants confront their various transnational situations in 
China. My findings in the previous chapter therefore contradict Kong's thesis regarding overseas 
Singaporean social ties.  
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No lah we are Chinese first and foremost. One look at us and you know already. No 
need to open mouth and talk. But if you look at me, you can't tell I am Singaporean, can 
you? (Male: 62, Chinese, retired) 
 
When I first came here in 1973, I mixed more with Australians. But recently, I find myself 
associating more with Chinese people. Not really Singaporeans per se, but of course if 
you mix with Chinese, inevitably you will get some Singaporeans in the picture. Maybe 
its my biological clock I don’t know, or maybe its generation gap. But I find as the years 
go by, we older folks want to identify more with our roots. So I won't call myself an 
Australian, although I am a citizen and I've given up my Singaporean passport. I call 
myself an Asian of Chinese descent living in Australia. (Male: 64, Chinese, university 
education, self-employed) 
 
 It is clear that for some migrants, especially the older generation, their identities 
take on an ethnic slant when they are positioned as minorities within a White-dominated 
society. Upholding "Singaporean-ness" serves no useful purpose, since Singaporean 
identities are vague, discursive constructs that are essentially constructed along ethnic 
lines. Ethnic attachments for many of these older people tend to increase when their 
minority statuses are amplified through contrastive – or oppositional – effects. Barth 
(1969:15) argued that it is the 'ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural 
stuff that it encloses'. By extension, cultural differences therefore 'can persist despite 
inter-ethnic contact and interdependence' (p. 10). However, following Scott (1990), I 
contend that cultural differences – and hence ethnic identities – persist precisely 
because of inter-ethnic contact, especially if the contact is oppositional. This might 
explain why for some Singaporean migrants, their identities have been reinvented along 
ethnic lines, because of a two-way process of heightened racial awareness based on 
immediately observable phenomenon. The Singapore state's insistence on discrete, 
bounded ethnic categories has obviously contributed towards heightened racial 
awareness among migrants, despite living in Australia for many years. In addressing my 
question about intermarriage, this informant said that  
We unfortunately have double standards. Just now I told you I consider myself to be an 
international person, who has friends from all cultural backgrounds. But let's say if one 
day my son comes home and tells me that he is going to marry an African or Indian 
woman, I will be very very disappointed. Ideally, I would prefer him to marry a Chinese or 
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Asian, although I won't go all out and encourage him to do so. It's his choice…Would I 
disown him? No lah, not so drastic. This is not the way we do things over here. I would 
be disowned by society if I did! (Male: 49, Chinese, university education, physical 
education teacher) 
 
Individual, ethnically-based identifications may also be transformed into boundary 
marking devices if one feels that he cannot "become" Australian16, highlighting the 
'relational rather than absolute' nature of boundaries (Cohen 1985:58). Cornell and 
Hartmann (1998: 33) have argued forcefully that 'ethnicity is a matter of contrast…it is to 
draw a boundary between "us" and "them"'. As this informant says, 
I was born a Chinese, so I will die a Chinese. So what if I live in Australia for the rest of 
my life? I have only recently migrated with my family, and sometimes I wonder whether it 
was the right option, because I see how my kids now think they are ang moh, speaking 
with an Aussie accent, and they forget their roots. I hope its not the same for you. We 
are born Chinese, and woe to anyone who thinks that he can become an Australian 
overnight. They don’t see us as Australians; they treat us differently, and we are 
inevitably second-class citizens here. (Male: 59, Chinese, university education, retired) 
 
 However, it is also the sense of primordiality (De Vos 1975; Epstein 1978; 
Grosby 1994), of what Isaacs (1975:29-30) calls 'basic group identity', or the assumed 
cultural 'givens' (Geertz 1963:109-110) that some informants view as unchanging, a 
priori facts of human existence when living in a supposedly multicultural, yet White-
dominated society, which reinvent their identities along ethnic-cultural lines. For this 
informant,  
If you ask me about my identity,…Now at first thought, I should say Singaporean, 
because I have no attachments anywhere else, not even Australia because this is a 
country adopted for convenience. But having lived here for some time now, slowly I am 
reminded of my ethnic roots as a Chinese, not Singaporean, because do you realise that 
we are actually a bastard case? Now, I am taking Chinese classes, and I am learning to 
read and write Chinese. Because no matter what you want to say, you and I are 
ultimately yellow-skin. We may be yellow on the outside but white on the inside, it 
doesn’t matter. The White man still sees us as yellow regardless of inside or outside. 
And we can never be like them, no matter how good English you speak, or whether you 
play Aussie Rules or drink beer. We are Chinese, and I always remind my daughter, who 
has an ang moh boyfriend, about her Chinese roots. I think one day, she will also be 
rudely awakened to the fact that she is yellow skin… (Male: 50, Chinese, university 
education, retired lawyer).  
 
                                            
16 I will elaborate this in the next chapter when I discuss ways of belonging. 
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This informant's comments arguably represents a rather extreme view pertaining to self-
identification. Various themes may be gleaned from this single excerpt – ethnic 
identification, the conflation between ethnic and national or, it may also be construed – 
transnational identities, where the interplay between being Chinese and being a 
Singaporean are negotiated at different levels of discursive analogies. It also speaks of a 
sense of racism17 at two levels – the feeling that as a Singaporean-Chinese living in the 
transnational social space, one has to be aware of the (presumed) racist sentiments of 
the dominant White Australian majority towards "yellow others". On another level, it 
showcases the informant's own self-constructed way of differentiating himself or, for that 
matter, ourselves from the dominant "others". The only way to protect oneself in a White 
majority society is by "re-learning" and enhancing his own ethnic roots as an ethnic 
Chinese, not as a Singaporean because to him, the concept of the "Singaporean" is 
nothing but a vague discursive political construct that has been born out of accidental 
historical occurrences, or 'born into modernity' (Kwok 2002:249) – into 'this man-made 
artifice' (Rasheed and Mahizhnan 1990:80), which Lee Kuan Yew once described 
Singapore. As Ang (2001:30) has so eloquently put it, this process of 'self-ethnicization' 
tends to occur amidst White-majority settings, in which members of the minority group 
self-construct these essentialistic notions of a great cultural tradition to hopefully reach 
levels of authenticity that mark the distinction between "us" and "them". Being Chinese 
here is therefore defined according to what one is not, and what we are (or not) are 
reduced to ascriptive, physical characteristics that are arranged hierarchically by 
ourselves as opposed to laterally – the unchangeable, primordial givens based on 
perceived ethnobiological traits, which are automatically attributable to all those who are 
seen to possess it, including myself (given my obviously "yellow" skin). Why then, has 
this informant only started learning Chinese and paid more attention to his own ethnic 
                                            
17 Racism and ways of belonging will be discussed in much greater detail in the next chapter.  
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identity in Australia, and not while he was in Singapore? Given the Singapore state's 
reified conceptions of (ethnic) identities, it may be deduced that being the majority in 
Singapore, the ethnic Chinese do not feel their "difference" as much as the other 
minority ethnic groups, but do so when they are contrasted with others in a White-
dominated society.  
 Crucially again, it is the perception that counts in constructions of identity and 
differentiation. Even the classical primordialist Shils (1957) once argued that it is the 
perception, not the reality of the situation, that defines ethnic identities and shapes group 
boundaries, resulting in varying conceptions of Chinese-ness among Singaporeans, so 
that what constitutes “Chinese” is vague at worst, and indeterminate at best. Therein lies 
the crux; although some informants have reduced Chinese-ness to primordial 
characteristics, it is also clear, from the previous verbatims, that there are shifting 
degrees of ethnic sentiments which are contextually dependent. Even primordial 
components vary according to the strength of the opposition (Scott 1990). Still, the 
vagueness of out-of-bounds markers surrounding ethnicity allows people to alter, shape, 
and justify their identities accordingly, even though there may be differing views 
pertaining to its form, depth, and content. In this way, the plasticity of ethnicity decenters 
one from the primordial "core" surrounding the naturalness of ethnic identities if they 
choose to, so that ethnicity becomes instrumentally useful in socially constructing 
people's identities based on their own self-interests, and their own understandings about 
"Chinese-ness". These self-interests, as I alluded to earlier, are not economic or political 
in nature, but are nevertheless tied to the strategic manipulation of ethnic-cultural traits 
for the perpetuation of cultural capital in the form of Chinese-centric values – not 
Singaporean ones – providing migrants with an identity that they believe emanates from 
the (generalised) traditions of their elders, their families, and their own immediately 
observable "kind" for the symbolic transmission of values. As Cornell (1996) has 
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suggested, rather than assume the bounded and persistent nature of ethnic boundaries, 
it might be apt to reconsider the cultural stuff that goes on within those boundaries – the 
content of ethnicity based on what people presume to share – so as to understand how 
and why some members attribute flexibility to some traits, and immutability to others.  
 I have therefore shown that through the renegotiation of identity, whereby the 
ethnic-cultural takes precedence over the post-national, Singaporean identities are 
renegotiated in various ways, resulting in its continued reinvention at the everyday level, 
albeit focusing solely on the ethnic. It is arguably difficult for Singaporean migrants to 
reconstruct their identities along post-national lines since, as Brown (1995) has 
observed, Singapore does not possess any distinctively pre-colonial, culturally 
homogeneous attributes. Devoid of the national, migrants therefore (re)turn to their 
ethnic roots, which may be a direct manifestation of the CMIO multiracial ideology. 
Among the ethnic Chinese, ethnicity has therefore been invoked instrumentally by some 
migrants as cultural resources (capital) in their construction of difference based on 
primordial characteristics for the transmission of values (symbolic ties), in which these 
values are utilised to reinvent Singaporean identities transnationally, so that culture 
becomes a 'strategy of survival' (Bhabha 1994:172). Indeed, as Wang Gungwu 
(1991:199-217) once argued, 'modern Southeast Asian Chinese…do not have a single 
identity[,] but tend to assume multiple identities'. The allure of ethnicity thus lies in its 
ability to convey culturally specific, essentialised meanings that function as a moral 
ethos for migrants and their children, in which deviance from the norm runs the risk of 
cultural ostracism. Yet the plasticity or situational nature of ethnicity allows one the 
option to adopt or discard various traits accordingly, hence justifying the construction of 
difference based on alleged cultural ties, which are more often than not explained as 
"good", communitarian values versus the "bad", individualistic ways of Australian 
society. The question "what", or "how is a Singaporean?" is arguably elusive and a 
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pointless exercise, especially at this period of Singapore's short history. However, the 
question "when is a Chinese?" is more achievable, yet elusive, for it depends on the 
situational context in which one is embedded. As Ang (2001:36, emphasis in original) 
says, 'if I am inescapably Chinese by descent, I am only sometimes Chinese by consent. 
When and how is a matter of politics'.  
  
4.2 Food and Eating – Symbolic Forms of Transnational Practices 
This brief but arguably necessary foray into the discussion of food is predicated upon the 
pervasive consumption culture amongst Singaporeans. Indeed, if there is one aspect 
with which Singaporean migrants readily proclaim any attachment to, it is in the realm of 
food and its consumption, to the extent that it can be seen as a symbolic representation 
of Singaporean culture. It can thus also be argued that eating and the appreciation of all 
kinds of food – be it local or otherwise – is part and parcel of the Singaporean’s lifestyle. 
This is despite the fact that Singaporeans do not have a unique "national dish" to call 
their own. 
 In their empirical study on the relationship between food and ethnic ascription in 
Singapore, Chua and Rajah (2001) noted that the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board 
cites food as a significant reason for tourists to visit Singapore, reflecting the strong 
culture of food consumption among Singaporeans18. Sociologically, the authors argued 
that the rigid, multiracial categorisation of Singapore society is also reproduced in the 
essentialisation of local food by both state and citizens alike. In reality, however, they 
argue that "Singaporean" food – just like Singaporeans themselves, is as hybrid as can 
                                            
18 Even Singapore's President Nathan remarked during an official visit to Western Australia that 
attachment to Singapore should involve 'more than just missing our mee rebus, char kway teow, 
fish head curry or chicken rice' (Nathan 2005, cited in Straits Times, 18 March), suggesting that 
symbolic representations of Singaporean identity should transcend the food issue. Nevertheless, 
the fact that food was mentioned as a possible dysfunctional element of Singaporean identity 
reflects its symbolic power in relation to (a) Singaporean migrants, and (b) migrants and their 
homeland. For the full article, see appendix 4A. 
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be19. I am not claiming here that Singaporean migrants in Perth ingest food with 
multiracial awareness in mind; neither do I claim that communal food consumption is the 
elusive, secret recipe that provides the social glue for increased social exchange. 
However, I will show that food and its consumption is a valuable cultural resource that 
symbolically binds Singaporeans to a larger imagined community of Singaporeans, 
despite the lack of strong social ties among members. As Fischler (1988) has argued, 
the repeated consumption of food not only serves to symbolically (re)construct individual 
identities, but also transmits cultural values across generations. 
 
4.2.1 The proliferation and globalisation of Asian food in Australian society 
Over the last few decades, Western Australia has witnessed the increasing implosion of 
Asian food and other foodstuffs into its local market, penetrating not only the city area 
but also the outlying suburbs with its restaurants, takeaways, and grocery stores. 
According to one informant, who was a student in Perth in the 1970s, there was only one 
Chinese restaurant then, and choices were obviously limited. However, Australia’s 
political re-positioning towards Asia in the late 1980s and beyond witnessed the gradual 
proliferation of Asian cultural products (especially food) amidst an increasingly 
affirmative state-led discourse on “multicultural Australia”20, when former Prime Minister 
Paul Keating described Australia as 'a multicultural nation in Asia' (Ang and Stratton 
2001:95). Without over-stating the point, this period of Labour rule was arguably the 
impetus that sparked off a greater appreciation of Asian culture today. At the everyday 
level, the implications for this increased inter-connectedness with Asia increases 
acculturation through the mutual appreciation of Asian food. As this informant says, 
                                            
19 In Australia, Singaporean and Chinese food typically gets subsumed under the label "Asian 
food". When my informants refer to Singaporean or Chinese food, they are thus referring to all 
kinds of Asian cuisine.  
20 See Tam for an analysis of the transplanted yumcha (or dim sum) tradition among Sydney’s 
Hong Kong immigrants.  
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Asian food is now so globalised that I think it helps to make us more accepted as well. 
Previously, when I was a student in the ‘70s, there wasn’t much Asian food here…And 
you also didn’t see many Aussies eating it [Asian food] because I think they were a bit 
apprehensive, maybe afraid also, to eat it. But now you walk into most Asian restaurants 
and you see Aussies eating laksa or ordering sweet and sour pork and using chopsticks. 
I think its taken awhile, but its really wonderful to see this. I think its a reflection of how 
far we've come in terms of being accepted. (Male: 48, Chinese, university education, 
physical education teacher) 
 
 Empirically, it is noteworthy that while Asian restaurants continue to be 
dominated by Asian clientele, it is now not unusual to see Australians savouring a bowl 
of laksa21, either with other Asians, or fellow Australians. In line with Mintz’s (1985: 4) 
assertion that  
[w]hat we like, what we eat, how we eat it, and how we feel about it are 
phenomenologically interrelated matters: together they speak eloquently to the 
question of how we perceive ourselves in relation to others, 
 
these informants say that 
Everywhere you go nowadays, you see ang mohs eating Asian. And they can eat hot 
food. Some now even cook their own Asian food at home, so its nothing new to them 
anymore. (Male: 35, Chinese, PhD, private tutor) 
 
Food is a popular culturally-specific marker by which Singaporeans establish social 
relations with others, an ice-breaker of sorts22. Within the diaspora, Singaporean food is 
a prized commodity given its relative "rarity". While most types can be found in various 
parts of Perth, Singaporeans' love for food often finds them sourcing for the most 
"authentic" cuisines, and making biased comparisons with the higher standards set in 
Singapore. These critiques nevertheless reflect Singaporean migrants' yearning for 
quality, authentic homeland food. The transnationalisation of foodways has arguably 
facilitated adaptation, since Singaporean migrants can now comfortably reproduce and 
consume their homeland culture within the private realms of the household and in public. 
It also shows that if there is anything "collective" about them, it is in their love for food. 
                                            
21 Rice vermicelli in a thick and spicy coconut based gravy. 
22 Whenever I conducted interviews, it was not unusual for informants to suggest that we adjourn 
to a food court that served Singaporean delicacies.  
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4.2.2 Food as transnational symbolic tie 
If we agree with Douglas (1984) that eating is a socially meaningful act that is 
functionally related to cultural conceptions of the self (that is, identity), then we need to 
explore how these meaning-filled acts are reproduced in symbolically meaningful – 
hence culturally specific – ways. However, if eating is such a pervasive and ritualistic act 
amongst Singaporean migrants, then surely we would find them congregating together 
at functions or parties, if not for social purposes, then at least for consumption? How 
does this practice constitute a symbolic tie that links members of the diaspora with their 
homeland, and a social tie that links migrants together in the host society? As Cook and 
Crang (1996: 140) have argued, contemporary understandings of food are premised on 
the reality that foods ‘do not simply come from places,…but also make places as 
symbolic constructs, being deployed in the discursive construction of various imaginative 
geographies’. So how does the consumption of familiar foods help to construct a cultural 
life-world that revolves around notions of familiarity, and a sense of homeliness?  
 
The familiarity of Asian/Chinese food 
While many Australians have taken positively to Asian cuisine (as we have seen in the 
previous section), the same co-relation cannot necessarily be said about Singaporean 
migrants, because many of them still prefer to eat Asian, home-cooked food. Based on 
my interviews, the most essential reason is the sense of familiarity that is produced while 
eating these foods. As these informants say, 
Yes, I can eat anything, because I consider myself to be a cosmopolitan person. But 
despite having lived here for what, twenty odd years, I still find that one thing that we do 
regularly – and actually this exemplifies the only Singaporean-ness in me – is that I 
cannot eat Western food everyday, or even three times a week. So ninety percent of the 
time we eat Asian food, whether its home cooked or takeaway, or in my favourite 
Chinese restaurant. Once in awhile steak and chips are fine, but most of the time its 
Asian food. (Male: Chinese, 52, university education, real estate agent) 
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Consumption of these “local” – read Asian – cuisines are part of Singaporean 
migrant culture, although not all migrants consume it regularly. If food is seen as a 
valuable cultural-symbolic resource of "Singaporean-ness", then its consumption within 
familiar sites serves to transmit culturally embedded norms for the maintenance of 
identity. Transnationally speaking, the proliferation of Asian grocery stores greatly 
enables Singaporean migrants in Perth to construct a cultural world that revolves around 
familiar consumption patterns at different levels, and re-construct their migrant identities 
around the reproduction of these cultural sites. As these informants say, 
Ya you can get all these things to cook for yourself like back home. Even the markets 
like Canning Vale have. Then also got all the different sauces for cooking. Food is no 




Food and the reinvention of identity – the “Australianized” Singaporean migrant 
However, while Singaporean migrants acknowledge the cultural value of food as a 
reflexive agent for the reproduction of familiar cultural sites, some migrants ironically 
downplay its value for health reasons. Not all migrants consumed Asian food regularly, 
although most recognised the symbolic link between eating and Singaporean identity, 
and the overall significance of food in Singaporeans’ everyday lives. As this informant 
says, 
I only eat Western food. No that’s not completely true. I love Chinese food. That’s one 
part of my body that has migrated over with me as well…But having said that, having 
lived here for ten years, I cannot eat Asian food like how I used to eat in the past. I 
cannot – the taste is just too strong for me. It has to be a bit blander now because… 
(I’m) getting used to the fact that over here they don’t use MSG (flavour enhancer) as 
much as in Singapore, except of course in Asian cooking. I mean in the past I could eat 
Chinese food three times a day, but now I actually feel revolted at the idea of eating it, 
and I think part of it has to do with health reasons as well. I do get revolted when I even 
smell the amount of oil in a dish. (Male: 37, Chinese, PhD, private tutor) 
 
The increased consumption of Western food by no means signifies an 
acrimonious rejection of one’s "Singaporean-ness", since the informant has already 
professed his love for Chinese food. However, in line with my argument in Chapter Two 
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that an increasing number of Singaporeans are emigrating to Perth for lifestyle reasons, 
food choices gradually become significant factors in some people's diets due to health 
considerations. These informants claim that 
Well of course I love my laksa and char kway teow. In fact, I'd rather have that any day 
than a barbeque or steak. But I have a heart condition, and the good thing about here is 
that Asian food is less accessible than in Singapore. You don’t have the luxury of driving 
to a coffeeshop at 11pm at night to eat. So I have no choice but to make my own little 
sandwiches. And when you make your own, you tend to control what you put inside. 
(Male: 55, Indian, university education, musician) 
 
Cultural norms, personified in the love for food, are therefore reinvented rather than 
discarded. Rather than disavowing the symbolic conditions of these resources, they are 
simply modified according to one's lifestyle choices. In other words, as I suggested 
earlier, food and its consumption represents a collectively owned cultural norm that 
essentially defines a Singaporean, if one can be "defined" at all.  
 
The community-enhancing functions of food (or its lack thereof) 
Falk (1994) has also pointed out the cultural symbolic dimensions of food consumption 
and its relationship with notions of the self. Food is not only a commodity that nourishes 
and satisfies the individual's physiological needs, it is also reflective of both the 
subjective and objective images that one wishes to draw upon himself through the 
choice of foods. For Falk, these choices carry cultural connotations that act as boundary 
marking devices, demarcating "us" from "them". However, if we were to limit our analysis 
to constructions of "us", then we can assess the value of food in symbolically 
constructing a sense of community for those who are bounded within it. As these 
informants say, 
Anytime there is a gathering that involves food, I never miss out, even though I'd rather 
stay away from Singaporeans. (Male: 54, Chinese, university education, retired lawyer) 
 
I attend these functions so that I can eat. Networking is a secondary issue. (Male: 38, 
Chinese, university education, banker) 
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Food! It is the only thing that most of us ever talk about. You can even see sometimes 
people arguing about where is the best char kway teow or chicken rice in Perth. 
(Female: 47, university education, financial consultant) 
 
The prominence attached to food as a form of cultural capital is obvious, if cultural 
capital are cultural goods whose transmission yields "profits" – economic or otherwise – 
for those who possess it. However, the social exchanges that underlie its consumption 
are nevertheless absent.  
Food is the main menu during these gatherings. I tell you, if we don’t serve any 
Singaporean food here, nobody will come. They all just come and eat only. And we have 
to supply everything ourselves. (Female: 52, Chinese, university education, civil servant) 
 
Aiyah a lot of them just come here to take the free food lah. (Female: 45, Chinese, 
university education, homemaker) 
 
 If the creation of a community requires strong social ties, then it is clear that 
Singaporean migrants are found wanting in this regard, which I have documented in the 
previous chapter. However, if a community 'exists in the minds of its members' and the 
'meanings which [they] attach to them' rather than in their 'structural forms' (Cohen 
1985:98), then the notion of a community through the symbolic practice of food 
consumption makes it a 'resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their 
identity' (Cohen 1985:118). Somehow, despite endemic negative self-essentialisation 
about the Self by the Self, food seems to occupy more neutral grounds, as part of the 
positively reinforcing 'cultural stuff' that defines Singaporeans and differentiates them 
from others (see Barth 1969:15). Lack of sociality notwithstanding, the symbolically 
constructed notion of a Singaporean community is evident through discourses of food, 
discourses that even the President of Singapore identifies with. On one level, the 
appreciation of all kinds of food arguably represents the only collective link that binds ex-
Singaporeans to Singapore. Yet the lack of a so-called national dish does not hinder the 
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continued identification with this rojak23 culture and the expression of identities – 
individually or collectively – in their love for food and eating. As this informant stressed, 
when I remarked that most of my interviews were conducted over makan24 sessions, 
Of course lah! What else do Singaporeans do in their spare time, other than play golf or 
mahjong? At least I can also get something out of this interview right? Anyway this is 
important for your research, because it shows you what your kar kee nang (literally, your 
own kind) do over here. No different to what they do back home right? (Male: 52, 
Chinese, university education, retired) 
 
 In these instances, food is embodied in a whole repertoire of cultural norms that 
Singaporean migrants view as part of their culture, ranging from its consumption, to the 
discursive realms, and to personal identity. Its appreciation therefore does not represent 
a social tie from which other ties emanate. It (food and eating) is simply a common 
cultural resource that many migrants draw upon in their quest to maintain some 
semblance of “Singaporean-ness”, symbolically expressed in their collective desire for 
food. This resource, unlike others such as religion or ethnicity, simply provide the 
personal – not interpersonal – symbolic bond to the vague, discursive concept of the 
"Singaporean" among those who undergo similar experiences as Singaporean migrants. 
So while most emigrants view the love for food and its consumption as a culturally 
“normal” act that seems to have “migrated” along with them, the collective experience 
still does not translate into strong social ties for bonding purposes for reasons I have 
already explained.  
 While I have reinforced my argument that Singaporean migrants do not maintain 
strong social ties for the creation of a cohesive migrant community, I have also shown 
here that a sense of community can be constructed symbolically, without the need for 
face-to-face social relations, through the acknowledgement of common cultural norms. 
However, it still does not explain the ways of belonging that migrants need to negotiate 
                                            
23 A salad dish comprising various disparate ingredients that is mixed and tossed in a peanut and 
prawn paste sauce.  
24 Malay word for food and/or eating. 
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when living in a foreign country. In other words, if a cohesive community at the 
aggregate level based on social ties is elusive, what about a symbolic, transnational 
community that is manifested in a strong diaspora consciousness? These discourses 
reflect the salience of transnationality in the modern age, whereby feelings of liminality 
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Discursive Analogies of Home  
and Ways of Belonging 
 
 
For me, this is home because my family, my friends, my people are here. My 
memories are here…You will not feel this same sense of belonging anywhere 
else. You may enjoy a physically comfortable life. But only at home here in 
Singapore, can you control your destiny… (former Singapore Prime Minister Goh 
Chok Tong, Today, August 19, 2002) 
 
In referring to the salience of home in migrant discourses, a significant contrast is drawn 
between the Singaporean government's ideal version, revolving around notions of 
familiarity, kinship, and togetherness, versus equally ideologically constructed 
antithetical forms elsewhere, in which migrants are repeatedly cautioned that they will be 
viewed as nothing more than "guests" or second-class citizens who have no political 
control over their own lives. The Prime Minister's "advice" obviously did not strike a 
chord with want-away Singaporeans, because more Singaporeans emigrated to 
Australia – especially Perth – in 2004-2005 than at any other period in Singapore's short 
history. The significance of this quote lies in its timing – a period in Singapore's history 
where emigration to the "greener pastures" of Australia is predicated not only upon a 
physically more comfortable life, but lifestyle. An irony of sorts may be located in Goh's 
speech; should comfort not be a defining feature of all "homes"? Subsequently, the 
intense hype and media frenzy surrounding Goh's infamous "quitters-stayers" speech 
cast a moralising gaze back onto emigrants and potential emigrants themselves, 
questioning their loyalty to their country of birth1.  
 This penultimate chapter analyses the ways in which migrants construct their 
homes in relation to their ways of belonging, or modes of incorporation. By modes of 
incorporation, I am referring to the ways in which migrants’ constructions of “home” are 
reflective of their adaptation strategies. I will show how, despite not forming a cohesive 
                                            
1 See Straits Times, August 31st 2002 "Stayer, quitter, dreamer, planner – which will it be?"; 
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migrant community in Perth, Singaporean migrants nevertheless continue to identify with 
the homeland in multifarious symbolic ways. Transnational approaches – with their 
emphasis on duality and placelessness – advance the idea that there can be various 
modalities of feeling at home without physically being at home. This results in the 
"paradox of home" – an unstable, neither-here-nor-there 'liminal' (Turner 1969:95) 
condition, which is couched more in symbolic spaces rather than physical places. 
Operating within varying levels of subjective migrant discourses, "home" becomes a 
deterritorialised and dynamic space with multiple manifestations in transnational 
conditions, acquiring different meanings under different circumstances (Rapport and 
Dawson 1998; Al-Ali and Koser 2002). Thus, while most Singaporean migrants in Perth 
are not transnational migrants, transnational conditions – the sense of being neither here 
nor there, or displacement – is nevertheless a socially constructed reality for many 
migrants.  
 Theoretically, the flexibility of transnational approaches challenges current 
notions of migrant adaptation and modes of incorporation – especially the traditional 
cultural pluralist and assimilationist paradigms – whereby conventional assumptions 
hinged on an either/or dialectical distinction between ethnic or cultural retention on the 
one hand, and assimilation into the mainstream on the other (Kivisto 2001). Rather, we 
should view transnationality as a possible variant of assimilation, in which modern day 
migrants are simultaneously engaged in maintaining transnational homeland links, as 
well as acculturation into the host society. In relating their discourses on home to general 
theories on assimilation, I analyse the ways in which various forms of stereotypes 
operate as essentialising forces that demarcate insiders from outsiders at the everyday 
level, so that transnationality becomes an actual experience for many migrants in Perth. 
When we speak of home, we are accounting for the multiple ways in which processes of 
inclusion and exclusion delimit the boundaries surrounding those discourses, reflecting 
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power relations at the aggregate level of everyday life. It is therefore possible to feel at 
home in a particular place but be socially excluded from it by others (Brah 1996). To 
what extent is their conceptualisation of home really about 'roots' (in reference to sense 
of attachment and belonging) and 'routes' (in reference to opportunities and 
aspirations)? Thus, the political culture in both societies – the societal context2 – 
determine the form and extent of transnational practices, in particular immigrant 
adaptation. I find that where the concept of transnationality applies, and hence the 
instability and multiplicity which results from it – rests more on the multiple routes in 
which they are imagined, in relation to their modes of incorporation in the host society. 
 
5.1 Symbolic Constructions of Home and Diaspora Consciousness 
Accordingly, I will analyse the ways in which 'diaspora consciousness' among 
Singaporean migrants are manifested in their individual discourses on home. Following 
Robin Cohen (1997:184-187), diaspora consciousness is defined as 'a strong and 
enduring [migrant] group consciousness about the homeland, and feelings of solidarity 
more or less shared by members of a diasporic [or migrant] collectivity in the host 
country'. If these shared 'feelings of solidarity' identified by Cohen refer to social ties 
between migrants, then I have already established that such ties are weak, apart from 
those in the religious domain. However, if migrants express a 'strong group 
consciousness about the homeland', then it is possible that migrants identify with the 
homeland in multifarious symbolic ways, yet do not coalesce into a cohesive imagined 
community based on strong social ties in the host society. So 'diaspora consciousness' 
may be absent at the aggregate level, but becomes evident at the personalised level of 
the habitus relative to the individual's position within the field of power relations. Migrant 
                                            
2 Portes and Borocz (1989: 614-620) have argued that settlement patterns, in particular the 
degree of assimilation or what they call 'the velocity of absorption', are analytically linked to 
migrants' conditions of exit, their class origins, and the context of reception in the host society.  
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discourses regarding home are subsequently informed by factors such as their reception 
in the host society, their life chances and most importantly, the extent to which their 
cultural capital are potentially convertible resources for successful adaptation.  
 Here, I find Hage's (1998:48-55) adaption of the Bourdieurian concept of cultural 
capital particularly useful in explaining the various strategies behind migrants' 
accumulation of 'national capital' or nationality. For Hage, cultural capital is synonymous 
with national capital, because national capital may be understood as the  
sum of accumulated nationally sanctified and valued social and physical cultural 
styles and dispositions (national culture) adopted by individuals and groups, as 
well as valued characteristics within a national field: looks, accent, 
demeanour…nationally valued social and cultural preferences and behaviour (p. 
53). 
 
Thus, national capital is accumulated as an adaptive investment strategy to cultivate a 
sense of national belonging to Australia. This is done through the acquisition of 
language, accent, and the 'mastering' of various "Australian"3 practices – or 'assimilating' 
(p. 54) in various ways. However, as Hage also argues, there are 'unequal' and 'different 
modalities of national belonging' (p. 51) in Australia, which are informed by subjective 
social markers or forms of national capital. Thus, the extent to which migrants identify 
Australia as their home are reflective of the ways in which they have, or have not, 
successfully "assimilated". Most importantly, while scholars debate about the 
significance of home in transnational studies as an analytical tool to understand 
immigrant incorporation and adaptation, they often fail to clarify what they mean by 
"home", or what it is to be "at home". In offering a broad definition for our purposes here, 
home refers to the generalised condition of comfort that a migrant perceives in relation to 
                                            
3 Since I did not conduct any interviews with Australians, I rely on Hage's (1998; 2003) analysis 
for information regarding Australian perceptions and stereotypes. Furthermore, defining an 
Australian is just as impossible a task as defining a Singaporean. As Stratton and Ang (1998:153) 
say, the Australian way of life is a 'vague discursive construct…often boiling down to not much 
more than the suburban myth of the car, the family, the garden and a uniformly middle-class 
lifestyle'. See also Castles (1997) regarding the ambiguity of Australian identity. The point, 
therefore, is to utilise Herzfeld's (2005) notion of stereotypes in understanding these discourses.   
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his social environment. In documenting these discourses, I will use one primary 
informant – Jim – as a point of reference.  
 
5.1.1 Multiple "routes" in migrants' homes – physical or emotional? 
Jim, a retiree of Eurasian descent, has been living in Perth for thirty-six years. Born and 
bred in Singapore, he left in January 1969, because he was increasingly feeling the 
strains of the Singapore rat race during a period of intensifying industrialization4. Without 
knowing much about Perth nor having relatives there, Jim and his wife resigned from 
their well-paying job at Shell and, together with their three sons, emigrated to Western 
Australia to start a new life. Admittedly, Jim said that he made a big sacrifice by giving 
up a comfortable life and a well-paying job so that his three children could avoid the 
rigorous social environment that was beginning to sweep over Singapore society. Perth 
was the ideal choice because of its proximity and more pro-family environment.  
 After his wife had succumbed to cancer six years after emigrating, Jim reached a 
crossroads: return to Singapore, or remain in Perth? According to him, his choice was 
facilitated by the fact that they had never returned to Singapore during their six-year 
sojourn in Perth. For him, this was reflective of his successful assimilation into Australian 
society, despite always harbouring fond memories of his home country. A regular 
church-goer at the local parish where he does volunteer work, Jim alluded to the fact 
that he was still very much a “Singaporean at heart”, even though he has never set foot 
on "home soil" since. However, he was quick to point out that he is now a loyal citizen of 
Australia, due to his length of stay and his Australian passport. So where is his home, 
given his obvious fondness for Singapore on the one hand, and his loyalty to Australia 
on the other? And what does being Singaporean at heart entail? 
                                            
4 See Pang 1993, Deyo 1981, and Tan 1993 for theoretical and empirical examples details about 
Singapore’s industrialization drive from the late 1960s onwards.  
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I am an Australian citizen first and foremost, but that is my legal identity…Culturally, I 
think I am a mix between both Australian and Singaporean. It helps that I am Eurasian, 
because Eurasian means I am a mixture of both the Western as well as Asian ways. The 
food I eat, my lifestyle, the way I speak, I think it facilitates a kind of cross-cultural 
understanding in my dealings with the local Aussies and with Asians. When I talk to 
Singaporeans here, I can switch my accent to suit them, and sometimes it feels 
uncomfortable if I don’t talk like them, because they know I am Singaporean…But 
speaking Singlish reminds me a lot about my past, and when I talk to them over here, 
usually I ask them “where did you stay in Singapore?”. Many are from the Upper 
Serangoon-Hougang area, so they are mostly Teochew nang. I am Teochew also, 
because of my mother…So there is this kind of bonding you know, when you meet like 
that casually, and you discover the same connections, the same roots. And then you talk 
about the good old days living and growing up in that area with all the kampungs, and its 
beautiful. Perth is great, but it doesn’t have that feeling of nostalgia because my 
formative years were not here…  
 
Sifting through this verbatim, it is clear that Jim experiences strong feelings of nostalgia 
towards Singapore which are rooted in presumed cultural similarities with a symbolic 
place, such as language (English and dialect) and other social experiences that are 
associated with a particular space. When I asked him to identify his “home”, Jim said  
…I am no longer a Singaporean, but I am still Singaporean at heart…because of all the 
memories I have about the place…But here is also home, because my late wife was 
buried here,…and I also will be buried here…So yes, in a way I have two homes: One is 
my physical home, and the other is more emotional, I suppose intangible. Because I was 
married there, my children were all born there, and I suppose my job in Shell as well. 
Without my job there, maybe I will still be slogging it out in Singapore like some of my 
other friends back there…its an irony – Singapore has been good to me, but it has not 
been for some others. So I guess I am fortunate and in a way, grateful.  
 
At the same time, physical aspects also inform his conceptualisation of home, grounded 
within a specific place. This pluri-locational tension between two homes can be captured 
in the practice of separating the practical (or physical) from the emotional. On the one 
hand, Singapore is home because of a strong diasporic consciousness of a symbolic 
past, or roots, which are manifested in subjective markers such as his marriage, his 
children's birthplace, and his memories of the Singaporean neighbourhood of Hougang. 
On the other hand, Perth constitutes the practical home, since he has severed all 
political ties to Singapore and has lived in Australia for almost forty years. Similarly for 
this informant, 
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Perth is definitely my home, because it’s a very animal thing. When you live here, you 
become very familiar with the surroundings. When you're in Singapore, you don’t have a 
house, so you don’t really feel you've come home, because you're always in someone 
else's home. So it’s a physical thing first and foremost. But on the other hand, in a very 
strange way, I follow the elections here and see how Howard and Latham are doing, but 
till today, when I read about things in Singapore on the internet, I still empathize more 
with the politicians there, because I can identify more with Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok 
Tong, and even Jeyaratnam than I can with Howard. And anyway I think the politicians 
here are third rate lah. So I am more concerned with what's going on in Singapore than 
in my immediate home here. (Male: 55, Indian, university education, musician) 
 
 This dialectical separation between physicality and emotionality is therefore not 
always evident in other migrants' discourses. Sometimes, it seems that the notion of 
home depends on one’s empathy with selective features that a migrant can positively 
identify with. Still, migrants may identify two separate places as home, depending on 
their life priorities. For this informant, 
Home is both in Singapore and here (Perth), although I must admit that over the years, it 
has gradually become more here, due to the length of time I've spent, and the friends 
I’ve made, and the fact that my family is here. However, home is also in Singapore, 
simply because I travel there for business, and my mother is still there, and I always go 
back to stay in the house that I grew up. But if you ask me whether I have any 
attachment to Singapore, then the answer is no, because of the reasons that I left in the 
first place…My business travels are simply economic, and I have no inclinations to stay 
on there for any other reasons…Tomorrow if I set up a company in Africa, then that 
becomes my home also. So Perth is my home, and Singapore is my second home. 
(Male: 45, Chinese, university education, businessman) 
 
The duality of homes can also be expressed simply in pragmatic or physical terms. 
Rather than engage in the spatial arguments that characterise some transnational 
approaches, it would suffice to note in this case that homes, while being "multi-placed", 
are ultimately anchored in physical locations where 'personal and social meanings are 
grounded' (Papastergiadis 1998:2). Obviously, home for an economic 
transmigrant/migrant such as this informant above takes on different, pragmatic 
meanings rather than emotional ones. So depending on the conditions of exit, different 
migrants express different feelings towards the homeland. As added evidence of the 
fragmented community thesis, it may thus be expected that rather than possessing a 
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shared group consciousness, some Singaporean migrants in Perth do identify with the 
homeland, but in their own individual, symbolically diverse ways.  
 
The primacy of race as a form of national capital? 
While the pluri-locational meaning of home is evident in Jim's discourse, how can we 
make sense of it sociologically, especially in relation to migrant adaptation and forms of 
capital? It was significant that Jim explained his successful assimilation, or adaptation, in 
terms of the extent to which he was accepted by Australians.  
No problems whatsoever. It was like moving from Upper Serangoon to Ang Mo Kio. I 
suppose because I look like them (Australians), so they treated me as one of them.  
 
Appearance, defined in terms of physical features or race, seems to be an important 
source of “capital” for successful assimilation. Here, I employ Alba and Nee's (2003:11, 
emphasis added) recent conceptualisation of assimilation5, which refers to the 'decline of 
an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences'. Alba and Nee do 
not view assimilation as a complete loss of one's ethnicity and the concomitant 
absorption into the mainstream culture. Assimilation is hereby viewed more in terms of 
acculturation, in which increased cultural contact may result in changes on both sides of 
the boundary, despite being in a majority-minority situation. Thus, assimilation works 
best if ethnic distinctions decrease in salience; if diacritical ethnic markers such as race, 
language or culture attenuate in creating perceived differences to block potential 
assimilation. Most importantly, Alba and Nee (2003) recognise that despite these 
theoretical considerations, ethnicity is nevertheless invoked by most people as the most 
                                            
5 I am aware that Alba and Nee are grounding their theory within the context of American society. 
Furthermore, I am aware that the concept "assimilation" is riddled with contentious debates and 
varying conceptualisations, starting from Park's (1950) race relations cycle, to Gordon's (1964) 
multidimensional laundry list of assimilation dimensions, to Gans's (1999) bumpy-line assimilation 
theory, and most recently to Portes (1995a; 1996b; Portes and Rumbaut 2005) and his 
collaborators' (Min Zhou and Yang 2005; Portes et al 2005) segmented assimilation theory. 
However, a critique of these theoretical accounts is beyond the scope of this thesis. For an Asian 
perspective on assimilation as acculturation in Thailand, see Tong and Chan (2001b).  
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prominent marker of social differentiation. Whether ethnicity is viewed in terms of race or 
other social markers is therefore dependent on the societal context, which I will now 
explicate. More specifically, are there declining ethnic distinctions in Australian society, 
making the migrant feel more "at home"? 
 As I have documented in Chapter Four, many ethnic Chinese informants 
capitalised on their pseudo-Chinese identity for boundary maintenance and the 
accumulation of ethnic-cultural capital, amidst what they perceived to be a threatening 
"White Man's" presence. This arguably reflects the salience of race as a perceived 
marker of social differentiation in Australian society. These racial anxieties, personified 
as "threats", are also evident within the Australian psyche, resulting in an irreconcilable 
two-way essentialisation of each "Other"6. As Markus (1979:256) has argued, 
Australians' 
perception of this threat was heightened by a consciousness of race, a 
consciousness that innate and immutable characteristics of certain human 
groups were associated with non-physical attributes which precluded their 
assimilation into the Australian nation. 
 
 Ien Ang locates this racial consciousness in Australia's independence, because 
'Australia was defined, foundationally [in 1901], against Asia' (2003: 58; emphasis 
original). In other words, one of the founding myths of Australia was "Whiteness", or 
Anglo-Celtic superiority. Just like Singapore, racial awareness was "institutionalised" at 
the country's inception. Australian national identity has been, as Vasta (1996:48) argued, 
'structured in racist dominance' by Whites over non-Whites. Consequently, 
multiculturalism is simply a reformulated ideology of pacification and emancipation, 
                                            
6 Much has been written about the “Other”, or more specifically, anti-Asian discourses in 
Australian society. For detailed examples of such works, see Walker (1999 and 2003). 
Significantly, anti-Asian (or Chinese) discourses have pervaded Australian society as far back as 
the late 1800s. For a more critical sociological analysis of the issue in modern day Australian 
society, see Ang (2001) who, as an Asian-Australian academic, feels that the recent surge in 
Hansonite politics is a reflection of a deep-seated racial and spatial anxiety that underlies 
contemporary Australian society. 
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justifying and legitimising the dominant White social order by blocking immigrant 
assimilation into the mainstream under the guise of cultural pluralism, while also actively 
highlighting people's differences rather than their commonalities7. It may be that 
multiculturalism as rhetoric is divorced from the everyday realities of Australian social 
life, in which the practice of being Australian is rooted in White, Anglo-Celtic supremacy. 
This could be the central reason why, despite living comfortably in Australia for many 
years, many Singaporean migrants still do not think they are "Australian". For saying that 
"I am an Australian citizen" is not the same as saying "I am Australian". This informant 
says that 
I have been living in this country for twenty-six years, and I still don’t know what's the 
meaning of Australian. But I definitely feel more comfortable here than in Singapore, 
because I feel my difference is highlighted less. It’s a more level playing field. (Male: 64, 
Eurasian, retired) 
 
However, as Hage (1998) argues, Whiteness is the fundamental basis for Australian-
ness, because it is essentialised as such by most Australians. While poorer White 
Australians may not fall within the middle to upper middle class social structure that was 
characteristic of their Anglo-Celtic forebears, the very fact of their Whiteness is itself a 
source of national capital, because being White allows one the potential to accumulate 
more national capital and identify with the existing governmental, capital-endowed White 
class. In other words, being White necessarily bestows one with some 'natural 
governmental right over the nation' (p. 211). But at the same time, Hage (2003) argues 
elsewhere that this obsession over the monopoly of certain resources as nationally-
specific Australian traits also culminates in the 'white worrier' (p. 2) syndrome at the 
everyday level, whereby increasing numbers of immigrants are presumed to have 
marginalising effects on working class Australians themselves. This sentiment, 
according to Gibson et al (2002:832), is manifested in 'identity' as well as 'interest-based' 
                                            
7 See the edited volume by Vasta and Castles (1996) on the persistence of racism in 
contemporary multicultural Australian society.  
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resistance, whereby immigrants are firstly presumed to possess different cultural habits 
and values that are incompatible with Australian ones, and secondly, that they deprive 
working class Australians of potential jobs. The 'paranoid nationalism' (p. 3) that follows 
this insecure ideological discourse of presumed 'Anglo-decline' (Hage 1998: 180) is 
epitomised in Pauline Hanson's infamous remarks about Asians in the 1990s: 
I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. Between 1984 and 
1995, 40% of all migrants coming into this country were of Asian origin…if I can 
invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in 
who [sic] comes into my country' (Hanson 1997, quoted in Ang 2001:126). 
 
 Given this racial backdrop, it should not be surprising that some Singaporean 
migrants – particularly the Eurasians – are deemed to possess the necessary cultural 
capital that is easily convertible into national capital. For this informant, 
…I’ve always had a European in my life, plus the fact that I am a Eurasian as well. My 
husband was a Scotsman, and now James is an Australian, so that helped me to adapt 
better…I think it is definitely easier for someone who has such a European background 
because people think that he or she eats the same food, speaks the same language, 
and has the same customs as them, so the barriers are easier to cross than if someone 
were to be say, Indian or Muslim. So I have no problems. They (Australians) think I'm 
Australian or British, and treat me as such. (Female: 59, Eurasian, HSC, unemployed) 
 
Race, as embodied cultural capital, can function either as a facilitating or constraining 
mechanism for adaptation, making the migrant feel more, or less, at home in Australia. 
Due to their hybridity, being a Eurasian facilitates acculturation, because they satisfy the 
"objective" criteria for assimilation. Conversely, for this informant, 
Oh ya, my wife has her fair share of racist comments thrown at her. Sometimes, we just 
felt like packing up and going back home (Singapore), because these things don’t 
happen at such an explicit level over there. (Male: 48, Chinese, university education, 
retired) 
 
On the other hand, 
Well, here is better for me, since I look like them. The Chinese have it harder because in 
Singapore they are the majority, and then when they come here they become minorities. 
(Male: 65, Eurasian, HSC, retired) 
 
However, depending on one’s essentialising tendencies, appearances sometimes lack 
the fungibility for conversion into national capital, so that its accumulation is predicated 
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on other secondary markers, such as one's country of origin. As this informant, who 
emigrated to Perth in the 1970s said, 
I applied for a job at the local newspaper company, and when the manager interviewed 
me, he said “Wow! You can speak English!”. The funny thing is that I don’t look one bit 
“Asian”, as in I don’t look Chinese, or Indian or whatever. Appearance-wise, I look as 
White as him, but because my documents showed that I had come from a place called 
Singapore, he straight away assumed that I couldn’t speak English, even though if you 
look at me, you wouldn’t think so. Anyway, I got the job, and a week later, when the 
manager saw me writing English, he nearly fainted. So I jokingly said to him “What do 
you think? We live on trees or what?”. So it goes to show how narrow-minded, how 
parochial these people were back then. But it has changed a lot since. Someone like 
Pauline Hanson would probably have become PM if she had stated her case back then 
about Asians and all that, but not so now. (Male: 60, Eurasian, HSC, property agent) 
 
Here, this informant was stigmatized not because of his appearance, but because he 
was associated with a presumed non-English speaking place – Asia – despite 
possessing cultural-symbolic capital; Whiteness and the ability to speak English. 
Obviously, appearance does not constitute the only important signifier of national capital 
accumulation.  
 Where this discussion on race is significant lies in the ways in which Singaporean 
migrants associate their sense of belonging in relation to a place in which they not only 
accept as their home, but also where they are accepted by others as part of the 
symbolically imagined Australian community. Racial significance for the Singaporean 
migrant is generally informed by two separate factors: the racialised environment in 
Singapore which has socially constructed Singaporeans along racial lines (see Chapter 
Two), and the perceived over-racialised Australian setting, especially in recent years due 
to extensive media coverage on specifically "racist" issues such as Pauline Hanson's 
outburst against Asians (1990s), the firebombing of Chinese restaurants in Perth8 
(2004), and the recent race riots in Sydney (2005). Indeed, the significance of Hanson's 
speech lies not so much in her rhetoric, but in the large support that her right-wing, 
White populism garnered amongst working class Australians (Gibson et al 2002). 
                                            
8 See The New Paper, July 25th 2004 "Perth unites against racist attacks". 
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However, it often takes both hands to clap when it comes to racial tolerance and mutual 
understanding. Interestingly, as this informant says, 
When I was a residential assistant at [X] College, many Singaporean students claimed 
racial discrimination by Australians. In fact, it was the highest recorded number in terms 
of complaints by nationality. But I always asked myself whether they were just being too 
sensitive in terms of their difference, and whether it was because they refused to mix 
and integrate with others, so their difference becomes heightened. And guess what? 
Most of those who reported these racist cases were ethnically Chinese. In Singapore 
they are the majority, but when they come here they become the minority. They are 
automatically removed from their ethnic comfort zone. Then suddenly everyone around 
them is a racist, except themselves. (Male: 38, Indian, PhD, civil servant) 
 
 Thus, for some migrants, their physical home in Perth is sometimes directly 
threatened by the perceived racialised realities of everyday life. For this informant, 
You have to be living here to understand the anxieties that some Asians face. You know 
about the firebombing of the Chinese restaurant in Willeton. I live just around the corner 
from there. It affects me in some ways as well. I sometimes think what if my own home is 
targeted by these white extremists? I worry about my kids' safety. That’s why sometimes 
I think I was better off in Singapore. Its a hard life there, but its safe, and being Chinese, 
I don’t have to worry. Here, I am a minority and a second class citizen, and sometimes 
these incidents make me feel unwanted, that I don’t belong here…So where is my 
home? I don’t know. (Male: 43, Chinese, university education, sales representative) 
 
This migrant's sense of home is informed by everyday lived realities, particularly 
personal experiences which are constructed around racialised issues. The firebombing 
of the Chinese restaurant attracted headline news, receiving adequate coverage in 
Singapore's media. When racism rears its ugly head, it destabilises a migrant's sense of 
belonging to a place by directly threatening his sense of safety. Rather than being 
grounded in rootedness, the notion of home is suspended – neither here nor there, 
always on a psychologically provisional basis; not exactly a very comfortable experience 
for a migrant who has cut off political ties to Singapore. 
 
Language as a racial-cultural marker of Australian-ness  
Has it (Australian society) really "changed a lot since [then]", as my above-mentioned 
Eurasian informant stressed? In other words, has the value of national capital fluctuated 
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over time, especially in light of the shift from assimilationist to multicultural governance, 
and the pro-Asia stance adopted by former Prime Minister Paul Keating in the 1990s? 
Mellor’s (2004) recent study on Vietnamese' racial experiences in Australia seems to 
strengthen the perception that racism is indeed an institutionalised feature of Australian 
society, especially in relation to Hage’s modalities of Australian-ness. While the 
Vietnamese may be accepted by mainstream society, they are still resented as ‘being 
either “not Australian” enough[,] or “too Australian”’ (Mellor 2004:652-53). Castles and 
Vasta (1996:1-16) are also unsure, pondering over whether Australia is a 'multicultural, 
or multi-racist' society. Perhaps it is a matter of degree, as this next informant thinks. 
Speaking in fluent Australianized English but occasionally lapsing slightly into Singlish 
when the need arose, he was adamant that 
…people will still judge you by the way you look, because its immediately observable. In 
order to integrate well into Australian society – and I emphasise the word “well” – if you 
don’t look like an Aussie, the more you want to sound like one…If you have a recent 
migrant coming into Australia and say, speak Singlish, I think its extremely difficult for 
him to be accepted into the general culture. And also I think its very hard for him to get 
positions at the very top…The simple fact is that looks are deceiving – Singaporean-
Chinese look the same as Vietnamese, so we are classed as Asians, who eat rice, 
maybe cannot speak English, and so on. But maybe if Singaporeans are White, like the 
Eurasians, then it’s a different story, because of the stereotype that White people speak 
the White man’s language…For me, people actually think I was born here, and they call 
me ABC (Australian-born Chinese), just because I sound like one. Not that I speak 
perfect English, but I share their jokes, I have their accent, and I understand their 
phrases which a new migrant certainly will not. So I feel accepted on the one hand, and I 
know that the Aussies have accepted me as well. So the point is that if you don’t look 
like one, you certainly want to sound like one if you want to fit into the general culture. 
(Male: 38, Chinese, PhD, lecturer) 
 
This informant's emphasis on speech patterns illustrates the utility of locally-specific 
language as national capital. Notice, however, that the primacy of "looks" preclude the 
importance of speech patterns. In simple metaphorical terms, race becomes the primary 
signifier or "face", while speech patterns are one of many other essentialised "masks" 
that are situationally determined and contextually dependent. The issue then is not how 
or why someone is seen to be "Australian", but when. Consequently, the crux lies not so 
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much in a migrant's ability or inability to speak the English language, but in the manner 
in which it is spoken, which constitutes culturally specific behaviour. In other words, the 
stress is on a cumulatively more-or-less trajectory rather than an absolute either/or logic 
(Hage 1998). The ability to speak English does constitute an important form of "capital". 
Yet, for a migrant to be fully accepted into the mainstream by the dominant majority, 
cultural capital (English language) needs to be converted into forms of national capital 
(way of speaking English). Thus, to sound like an Australian involves different modalities 
of speech making, including the appreciation of culturally-specific jokes and phrases. As 
this recent migrant said, 
Even though we all speak English, its still quite hard for me to understand them 
sometimes. I think its quite embarrassing also, because they use weird phrases, and 
because they think I can't understand English, they speak very very slowly like a kid, so 
that I can grasp what they say. So pai sei! (embarrassing) So I just avoid them, because 
I don’t want to feel stupid. (Female: 38, Chinese, university education, unemployed) 
 
 Others take offence at the way some Australians seem to claim a monopoly over 
the English language as bounded capital. This is expressed in statements of the form 
"You speak very good English", implying shock and surprise at an Asian's linguistic 
capacities. For the English-educated Singaporean migrant, this is insulting as much as it 
is arrogant.  
They think they are the only ones in this part of the world who can speak English. (Male: 
57, Chinese, university education, retired architect) 
 
So while appearances (physical features) seem to be the primary tools with which 
Australians judge a migrant's cultural capital, other secondary aspects are racialised 
through essentialisation, such as language abilities. As this informant stressed, 
One day when I was at the gym, this consultant gave me a form to fill up, and she said to 
me “This is in English, so I hope you won't have any problems”. So I said to her “I’ll try 
very very hard”. Because in their eyes, you are Chinese or Asian, so you cannot speak 
English, or your English is not up to their standard. But you notice that we Singaporeans 
actually write better English than them, and often, I use that to my advantage to put them 
(Australians) in their proper place, sometimes with some legal jargon to confuse them a 
bit…assimilating into the mainstream is impossible, because the White man will not see 
you as one of them. (Male: 55, Chinese, university education, former lawyer) 
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The racialised discourse is ironically inverted, because here, this informant capitalises 
upon his written command of the language to reverse racially-induced linguistic 
inadequacies onto the Australian instead. Thus, the White man speaks good English, but 
he cannot write well, which makes him no more or no less Australian than the 
Singaporean migrant. Yet, while written English is a useful component, it arguably does 
not constitute a potent enough resource for acceptance at the daily level, since people 
seldom engage in written parlance.  
 
5.1.2 Not a true blue "Australian", but still at home in Australia 
Interestingly, Jim does not consider himself to be a "true blue" Australian, because  
I don’t fit the stereotype of a typical Australian, even though nobody has ever told me 
that before, because I don’t go to the pub, I don’t drink, I don’t play cricket, and I don’t 
watch any sports. 
 
Working on these socially intimate archetypes of a typical Australian, Jim has excluded 
himself from the group because he feels culturally inadequate to be considered part of 
the dominant group. In theoretical terms, while he possesses significant cultural capital 
(appearance and language), he assumed that he does not possess enough capital for 
national belonging, based on self-informed stereotypes about Australian-ness. In 
recalling his previous verbatim, it is interesting to note that he referred to his being 
Australian primarily as his legal, rather than cultural, identity. Returning to Hage 
(1998:52), such 'practical nationality' seems to be a hallmark of national identification, 
because people 'recognise themselves as more national than some people, and less 
national than others', reflecting a more-or-less qualification. As this informant testified, 
Being or not being Australian boils down to basic honesty. I am not a great fan of 
Australian football (Aussie rules). I am a soccer fan, and I support Perth Glory…So I am 
not going to bluff and say since I am in Australia, I should do as the Australians do. I will 
not enjoy it. So to do it just so I can integrate is not my cup of tea…And I don’t think you 
can come in here and claim to be Australian overnight, because culturally I am not 
Australian; I am Singaporean. I enjoy a good laksa more than a barbeque. (Male: 55, 
Indian, university education, musician) 
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 Despite his "inadequacies", Jim felt more than comfortable living in Australia, 
because he felt accepted as an Australian, which was racially premised upon his 
Whiteness. Yet, to say that he is not a true blue Australian is to acknowledge that there 
are varying degrees of Australian-ness, which are variably informed by the extent to 
which a person satisfies Hage's capital-accumulating component for national belonging. 
If these stereotypes exist at the everyday level, it means that migrants are able to 
discern the extent to which they have accumulated symbolic capital to qualify as 
"Australian" or not. Of course, going to the pub and playing sports are not the only forms 
of capital, although at the everyday level, much is often made by way of these 
stereotypes that to assimilate into Australian society means to "practice" these culturally-
specific traits.  
 
Varying conceptions of "opportunities" and homeliness 
However, while these "practices" are empirically founded upon essentialised images, we 
need to make a more theoretically informed explanation about why some consider 
Australia as home (other than going to the pub), while others do not. And as I argued at 
the beginning of this section, an important aspect lies in the ways in which migrants 
assess their life chances in relation to what is or is not home, which determine their 
comfort levels. By life chances, I am referring to the ways in which Australian society 
provides an outlet for upward mobility based on their own expectations and beliefs – or 
opportunities, which may be epitomised in this informant's statement that 
Here, I can do what I want, when I want to. In Singapore, I did it because I had to. 
Completely different. (Male: 36, Chinese, PhD, private tutor) 
 
Or, as this informant said,  
As my husband will tell you, we came over here because he wanted to pursue his life-
long ambition to attend Bible college and study theology. In Singapore, the working 
hours were so long, he just didn’t have the time and energy to do it. So the only solution 
was to sell everything we had, and with the spare cash we can come over here and buy 
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a small house and car, and still have enough savings to tide us over while he does his 
studies. I really really respect him a lot because of what he has given up, because over 
here, he can really do what he wants without any pressure from society to perform. 
(Female: 46, Chinese, university education, housewife) 
 
Pursuing one's opportunities does not necessarily entail becoming an Australian or being 
accepted as one – that is, not "true blue" or "dinky dye" Australian. Neither is it always 
reducible to the acquisition of financial capital. For while some might see a need to 
assimilate or to be accepted as being part of the Australian community based on 
essentialised stereotypes of the "Australian", others may not deem it to be as important. 
As this informant stressed, 
…that is the beauty of real multiculturalism – the ability to embrace and be tolerant of 
many different cultures, and different ways of doing things. So I can be a Singaporean 
living in Australia without feeling that I must assimilate and become one of them, even 
though I may be a citizen here. (Male: 55, Indian, university education, musician) 
 
 The "real multiculturalism" that this informant speaks of is juxtaposed against 
Singapore's version of multiracialism, which Chua (2003b:58) has claimed to be an 
'instrument of social control' aimed at controlling racial harmony. "Real multiculturalism" 
as defined here accords this migrant a flexible range of identity options without 
assimilating.  Despite his minority status and due to official multiculturalism, he finds that 
Australian society offers him more opportunities for upward social mobility than in 
Singapore, because his difference is tolerated or even celebrated. Yet for others, this still 
entails leading a "nomadic" life, in which home is neither here nor there; always 
traversing provisionally and never settled, because both societies do not offer concrete 
grounds to function as "homes".  
Perth is my adopted home, and Singapore is my second home, if you go by the concept 
of domicile in law…But in terms of friends and family, then its Singapore, but I won't ever 
go back there to live. I will go for my laksa and char kway teow and catch up with friends, 
but to live there its a flat “no”…This (Australia) is only a place which is adopted for 
convenience…I have no inclinations to integrate or assimilate into the society 
whatsoever, because at my age, you just don’t bother anymore. Also as I said, you can 
never become an Australian, because the White man will not see you as Australian. But 
over here I can do all the things I’ve always wanted to do all my life but couldn’t due to 
the Singapore environment, like playing golf, tending to my garden, breathing in fresh air 
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in the morning, and not paying six figures for my car. So I consider myself to be a 
political nomad – I have no attachment to Singapore, neither am I attached to this place. 
I am more like a citizen of the world. As they say, “the world is my oyster”. I have 
travelled far and wide, and I can safely say that I am adaptable to all the different 
situations. (Male: 55, Chinese, university education, former lawyer) 
 
Here, any attempts to convert cultural capital into national capital is profoundly absent, 
because this migrant has personally revoked any options for integration. Nevertheless, 
Perth is still his first home because the options at his disposal satisfy his conditions of a 
"home", which were unattainable in Singapore. He is not rooted to either Singapore or 
Australia, but is always re-routed whenever necessary. He is, according to Vertovec and 
Cohen's (2002:2) definition, a 'cosmopolitan' – one who possess a 'pluralisation of 
political orientations', yet none in particular. Here, any attempt to assimilate is predicated 
upon his subjective belief that assimilation is an illusory and unachievable vision, 
because acculturation – uni-directional cultural acceptance – is blocked by the "White 
man". Being a cosmopolitan, he does not need to assimilate.  
 Similarly for this other informant, opportunities are defined in terms of the 
transferability of his financial capital, or the stretching of his dollar, as well as the better 
lifestyle in Perth.  
I miss the familiarity of kar kee nang, the fact that we are all same colour, we think the 
same, and culturally we are the same. And of course the abundance of cheap, good 
food. But I don’t miss the lifestyle at all…If you talk about now, my home is here. 
Singapore is my chalet if you want, but here is my home. Why? Because I am happier 
and more comfortable here. I will die here as far as I am concerned…People say come 
here become second class citizen, but I live a better life than a first class citizen in 
Singapore.  So what? I have a bigger house and I drive a nicer car than I ever drove in 
Singapore. And most importantly, I am connecting with my children, something that the 
Singapore government can't solve; and in your lifetime, you only have one chance at 
that. So here is my home, simply because I am living a better life based on my own 
standards, not the government's. (Male: 52, Chinese, HSC, businessman) 
 
This migrant's comments again reflect the salience of race ("same colour") as a marker 
of perceived social differentiation in multicultural Australian society, as well as the 
prominence attached to race as a form of capital that breeds familiarity for an ethnic 
Chinese based on putative common descent. However, the significance here lies in the 
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levels of comfort that a "second class" citizen in Australia experiences compared to a 
"first class" citizen in Singapore, defined in terms of a better quality of life. Being around 
fellow Chinese (kar kee nang) in Singapore connotes a familiar, racialised space, but not 
necessarily a more comfortable place. The physically comfortable life that PM Goh 
talked about is clearly important in migrants' conceptualisations of home; more so than 
emotional attachment or the ability to control one's destiny. Being a second-class citizen, 
presumably referring to perceptions of blocked cultural assimilation (see Gordon 1964), 
is of no consequence as long as physical comfort is achieved, making him feel at home 
in Australia without necessarily assimilating into the mainstream. He has therefore 
converted his financial capital into more substantive personal rewards without any need 
of accumulating national capital for national belonging or "becoming Australian". Neither 
does he need to rely on fellow migrants to achieve these individual goals in the host 
society.  
 
5.1.3 "Take me out of Singapore, but you can't take the Singaporean out of me" 
Finally, how is consciousness for the homeland expressed transnationally? For while 
many migrants claimed to have adjusted well into Australian society, some still yearn for 
the nostalgic past that characterises the "good old days" living in Singapore. As I have 
argued, the extent to which diaspora consciousness is expressed depends on the ways 
in which migrants have successfully adapted into the host society. What are some of the 
ties – social or symbolic – that bind them to Singapore, and how are they expressed or 
realised? Do return visits strengthen these ties? These migrant discourses again reflect 
the contrasts between what is and what is not home.  
 
Return visits as social ties and re-rooting the re-routed 
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As Baldassar (2001) argued in her study on Italian-Australians in Perth, return visits 
constitute an important stage in the migratory process. For it is the ability or disability to 
make the return visit or "pilgrimage" that distinguishes between a voluntary migrant and 
a refugee. Clearly, Singaporean migrants in Perth are not refugees, although some 
informants claimed to be, due to the sense of negativity that surrounded their conditions 
of exit. To what extent then, do they view return visits as an integral part of their lives? 
The answer, tentatively, is significantly so. Clearly, while some of my informants 
expressed bitterness towards Singapore, returning to visit friends and family members 
was generally a consistent feature not only for recent migrants, but established ones as 
well. For as Papastergiadis (2000:4) says, 'departures and returns are rarely, if ever, 
final', making migration a constant journey rather than a permanent settlement. The 
difference, however, lies in the frequency, which vary considerably between migrant to 
migrant.  
 Theoretically, it may thus be argued from a forms-of-capital approach that return 
visits are enacted to ensure the maintenance of reciprocal relationships or ties between 
the "uprooted" and the "rooted". The return visit thus constitutes an important dimension 
in the strengthening of social capital within what Faist (2000) calls the 'transnational 
kinship group', especially for labour migrants and potential repatriates. But it is important 
to reiterate here that these return visits do not, in any way, imply that these migrants 
have become "transnational", because the volume and regularity of these movements 
are arguably insignificant and extremely diverse. Furthermore, most Singaporean 
migrants are not labour migrants. The return visit itself may be a feature of 
transnationality, due to the border-crossing expansion of social space. But 
transnationality requires more than occasional visits home, such as regular remittances, 
and a conscious interest in homeland activities. It should be clear by now that most 
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Singaporean migrants in Perth do not uphold these "obligations" or duties. Yet, certain 
emotional ties are still enforced. For this informant,  
Before I migrated, my mother just told me one thing. "Don’t lose touch with your roots". 
So that’s why I come back as much as I can, not because I like the damn place, but to 
fulfil my promise to mum, because I know it makes her very happy when we go back. 
(Male: 43, Eurasian, university education, self-employed) 
 
Returning home in this case is done not so much out of loyalty, allegiance or nostalgia, 
but to maintain social ties with family members. As I discussed in Chapter Three, many 
Singaporean migrants construct their life-worlds around their nuclear family, an issue 
that I will further explicate below. This informant says that  
Well, I don’t send any money back, but I try to go back once a year for mum's birthday. 
Then everyone will come together, no matter where we are, to celebrate and get 
together. But its not definite. Like I haven't been back in the last three years already, 
although I'm going back this year. Over time, I think the frequency of returns lessens, 
partly because we have our own lives to live and I think we are comfortable here, and 
also partly because things in Singapore are just getting more and more expensive. 
(Male: 49, Chinese, university education, teacher) 
 
Over time, these ties do tend to wane, reflecting the difficulty in sustaining transnational 
social relations. It seems then that the lack of regularity also necessarily weakens the 
social capital inherent in these transnational homeland ties, because if return visits 
diminish over time, so too will the social relations inherent in those ties.  
 
The dismemberment of the homeland through the reduction of space – strangers in a 
strange place 
 
While return visits mostly fulfil a family-oriented function, do they reflect a strong 
diaspora consciousness that is manifested symbolically, so that the homeland ties are 
strengthened with each return visit? Ironically, the answer is no, reflecting once again 
the problems associated with concomitant globalisation and the gradual 
"dismemberment" of the homeland through state monopolisation of space, or the 
'systemic colonisation of living places' (Goh 2001:24). As this informant remarked, 
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Every time I go back, something has changed. Nothing stays the same in Singapore. I 
don’t blame the government, because you have no space. But its so hard to connect 
with the place because of all these changes. New buildings sprout up everywhere, and I 
really feel like a foreigner. Even my old school is also gone. Another simple example is 
signing credit cards. Here, you sign on a piece of paper. In Singapore, you sign on an 
electronic pad. Its just strange to me. So that’s why each time I go back, the more I feel 
that Perth is really my home, and everytime I come back, I feel that this is home because 
I know this place better. (Male: 48, Chinese, university education, self-employed) 
 
These radical changes to Singapore's social landscape destabilises return migrants' 
sense of self in relation to their natural surroundings. What was once a relatively 
spacious island-state has become a modern cosmopolitan city, replete with skyscrapers 
and crowded places. And it is to this "strange" social environment that migrants are 
returning to, making then feel even more displaced and disoriented in their homeland. 
Consequently, their homes are defined in relation to the always-familiar, vast open 
landscapes characterised by Perth city. As this informant said, 
For me, here is home, because I am someone who likes open spaces. I grew up in an 
area where everything was woods, and plenty of space to run around – Pasir Panjang. 
Then when Singapore moved to the HDB concept, I felt more hemmed in, and I knew I 
had to get out quickly. Sometimes, I just take my car and drive around Western Australia 
to nowhere, to experience the clear blue sky, mountains, hills, rivers, everything. That is 
something innate in me that I must have. (Male: 55, Indian, university education, 
musician) 
 
 Given the rapid changes brought about by modernity, the once-familiar 
surroundings of Singapore-the-home are transplanted to the vast physical landscape of 
Western Australia. Consequently, if migrants place any remote importance on the past in 
their identifications of home, then the "home" in which they grew up has become more 
"foreign" than their adopted home in Perth.  
What I like about Singapore is the old Singapore, which is gone. The days when people 
of all races mixed together in the kampung; that was what I remember about Singapore. 
Now, I think it is so soul-less. I still call myself Singaporean, but I can't identify with the 
place that I grew up, so how to call it home? Home must be familiar to me, and I really 
don’t know the Singapore of today anymore. (Male: 56, Chinese, university education, 
real estate agent) 
 
Significantly, the nostalgic image of the past ("the old Singapore") is a comforting and 
reassuring space, while the present has become unsettling and alienating (Chua 1997). 
Discursive Analogies of Home and Ways of Belonging 
 153 
Diaspora consciousness may in fact be reduced with each return visit, because the only 
aspect that has not changed is the rat-race lifestyle that many in fact sought to escape 
from. Not only is the place – the physical landscape – unfamiliar to them now, but the 
stigma of the Singaporean rat race remains an all too familiar scene, serving as a stark 
reminder that while the physical Singapore they knew is now gone, the socially 
"negative" aspect which prompted their exit has been intensified. For most migrants, 
they are unable to develop any diaspora consciousness – strong imagined symbolic ties 
to Singapore – because they are disconnected in various ways. Consequently, 
Singapore is simply a hotel for a particular class of people. It is a great place to visit, but 
never to live; a fact that is all too well-known among Singaporean politicians themselves. 
As testimony to this assertion, consider this informant's comments: 
Oh Singapore is definitely home in my heart, although not on paper because I have no 
property there. I love Singapore. I am always saying Singapore Singapore Singapore to 
all my friends here, and I think it gets up their noses a little…I mean, how can you fault 
it? Where in the world can you walk safely on the streets at 3am in the morning? Where 
can you buy a HUDC flat at such a low price? Where else can the government always 
record profits? That’s why I always go back as much as I can, and I shop till I drop, 
because the sales there are much better. And I can go to all my country clubs, eat at my 
favourite hotel restaurants with my friends. And here the weather is so dry, my skin 
always dries up. Singapore is more humid, which is better for me. Also here, I don’t like 
how they don’t have maids (domestic help). I have so much stuff to do in this house its 
not funny. I don’t understand why if I can pay for my own maid, I am still now allowed 
one. Its really stupid sometimes. In Singapore, everything can. (Female: 52, Eurasian, 
HSC, unemployed) 
 
Yes, in Singapore "everything can", provided you can afford to pay for it.  
 
Signs of nostalgia and the gradual reduction of diaspora consciousness 
Despite these changes, some migrants, especially the older ones, still tend to locate 
their sense of home in certain essentialising "monumental"9 features in Singapore. If a 
characteristic feature of modern Singapore society is constant change and "corruption" 
                                            
9 Monuments here do not refer specifically to physical, iconic features of society, such as the 
Merlion or the Singapore flag. It can also refer to symbolic features that are unique to a given 
population. See also Straits Times, January 18th 2005 "Call to promote S'pore icons that bind".  
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of the physical landscape, then what remains unchanged? Indeed, it was clear from 
interviews that nostalgia, characterised by a yearning and glorification of a past period 
and place (Yeoh and Kong 1999), was reflective of migrants' individual biographies. 
Many of them again referred to stereotypical, culturally intimate representations, such as 
Singlish and the kopitiam (coffeeshop), as symbolic markers of "home". They are the 
'embedded regularities' (Herzfeld 2005:196) of social life – at-once familiar, 
essentialised, 'socially poetic' images that migrants presume to share with others within 
and without the diaspora; images which produce a homogenising (and hence familiar) 
effect based on feelings of mutual comfort and orthodoxy when they are internalised 
through practice. As this informant says, 
Home for me is a place where you can identify with others around you. When I come 
back, I think what strikes me most is the fact that everyone is speaking the same 
Singlish, whether its Indian, Chinese, or Malay. From the taxi driver at the airport, to the 
man in the kopitiam, I think that’s the only thing that makes me feel I'm home, because 
everyone is similar in that sense. The way we speak I think is the only defining feature of 
our identity as Singaporeans. (Male: 46, Chinese, university education, accountant) 
 
The familiarity lies in the way we speak as Singaporeans. You can take me out of 
Singapore, but you can't take the Singaporean out of me. I've been here for what, twenty 
years now. But I still speak like a Singaporean, and I can easily pick out a Singaporean 
from a group of Asians just from the way he speaks. Its unique to our culture. (Male: 57, 
Indian, university education, retired) 
 
 It is clear that Singlish constitutes a socially embedded regularity that is rooted in 
the historical-structural conditions of Singapore society. Its level of intimacy with 
Singaporean identity is evident in the different ways in which it is monopolised in 
everyday life, ranging from joke books, to t-shirts, to satirical websites. Yet, it is indeed 
ironic that Singaporean politicians have recently tried to play down its usage in public 
discourse, justifying it on the grounds that it is a handicap which impedes foreign 
relations and subsequent economic growth. It is another inevitable occurrence in the 
industrialisation of everyday life. Once again, an important symbolic feature of diaspora 
consciousness has intentionally been cast aside as a liability, rather than celebrated and 
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utilised as a potential source of "capital" that undoubtedly connects Singaporeans 
everywhere, regardless of race or religion. For these essentialised features (speaking 
Singlish) do constitute social strategies that separate the familiar from the strange, and 
for developing a diaspora consciousness through the use of language-based rhetoric.  
 However, while some locate homeliness in a familiar language, others 
emphasise the more immediately physical, unchanging setting of the coffeeshop or 
kopitiam, which arguably has 'persistent symbolic significance in the cultural register of 
Singaporean everyday life' (Chua 1997:154). For this informant,  
I would say the focus of my nostalgia revolves around the coffee shop. One of the first 
things I do when I go back is to wake up in the morning and go to the kopitiam and order 
the lo-ti (bread) with two hard-boiled eggs and have my kopi-o (black coffee). Only when 
I've done that, then I feel I've arrived in Singapore. I just sit there for an hour or so and 
take in all the noise and the smell of the place. That’s my initiation. So it’s a kind of 
cultural warp that I go through; like a time machine, and I just look at the way people go 
about their business. It could be some old fart going to the market, or someone carrying 
her baby and eating mee pok ta (dry noodles), or an old man drinking Baron's beer and 
smoking his cigarette at 9am in the morning. In the coffee shop, I can see Singapore 
revolving. Every morning I am there. (Male: 55, Indian, university education, musician) 
 
It is clear that nostalgia lies in the coffee shop – an age old feature of pre-colonial 
Singapore society, in which 'collective idling' (Chua 1997:158) and relaxation was, and 
still is, a recurrent but diminishing theme. It is at once symbolically reflective of the "old" 
and the "new" Singapore, straddling different durées and converging people of all races 
and social backgrounds. While certain forms in the kopitiam have changed due to the 
state's increasing emphasis on culinary hygiene, a consistent feature is the accessibility 
evident in the roadside culture of the kopitiam, since most coffee shops are located on 
the intersections of major roads. Indeed, when many informants indicated "eating" as 
their main priority during their return visit, they invariably referred to their "favourite 
kopitiam". But again, as this informant highlighted, the nostalgic landscape of the coffee 
shop is increasingly being threatened by bureaucratic state policies. 
Everytime I go back I sure go to my kopitiam one. I know all the stall holders there. We 
are like kar kee nang. But very soon, business is going to suffer, because of the no-
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smoking law the government is going to implement in 2006. (Male: 48, Chinese, 
university education, self-employed) 
 
Again, a significant portion of the symbolic space of home will be redefined; and perhaps 
reduced. Along with the increasing encroachment of the state into the public and private 
arena of the kopitiam, diaspora consciousness will slowly but surely lose its powers to 
symbolically attach migrants to the homeland in more ways than one.  
 
5.1.4 Back to the family and re-focusing migrant priorities – pragmatic and emotional 
considerations of home 
 
Ultimately, despite the multiple ways in which home is symbolically imagined, most 
Singaporean migrants located their home within the secure and bounded space of the 
nuclear family unit. Many authors have argued that the most basic repository of social 
capital and collective action among migrants lie within the confines of the family (Nee 
and Sanders 2001; Boyd 1989). Among labour migrants, migration and the dispersal of 
the family unit is often seen as a rationally-induced strategy or 'family affair' (Chan 
1997:195) that reduces relative deprivation and increases social capital through 
transnational network ties. Social capital is then utilised when family members in the 
home country latch on to their familial connections in the host society for chain migration. 
Social capital within the family is also evident in the realm of immigrant entrepreneurship 
and self-employment.  
 The focus here, however, is not on the instrumental ways in which the immigrant 
family provides the basis for trust and solidarity or 'household communism' (Weber 
1978:359), but on the importance attached to the nuclear family unit in discourses of 
home and ways of belonging. Regardless of the extent to which informants claimed 
diaspora consciousness on the one hand or successful adaptation in Australia on the 
other, the family was the primary foundation upon which migrants' comfort and 
happiness was built, constituting the "home" in both emotional as well as pragmatic 
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ways. Emotional because the family is the site of unreserved love and attention, and 
pragmatic because of the former reason. Add to this the Singapore state's persistent 
indoctrination that the patriarchal nuclear family is the basic social structure of society, 
and one can see why socially engineered Singaporeans place so much importance on 
the ideal-typical functions of the family, which are to provide care and emotional support 
for fellow members. For these informants, 
Home is where my responsibilities lie. My house is here, and my family is here. So this is 
my home. Simple. (Male: 45, Eurasian, PhD, community volunteer) 
 
When I go back to Singapore and stay with my parents, that’s my second home. But 
ultimately Perth is my home, because my wife and kids are here. (Male: 39, Chinese, 
university education, self-employed) 
 
 There is a positive correlation between the family unit and one's sense of home. 
Indeed, many migrants claimed that emigrating was done with their families' interests in 
mind, such as their children's education and an overall better quality of life, resulting in 
more leisure and family time. For most Singaporeans, parental obligations do not only 
involve the nurturance of children till their university-going age, which tends to be the 
case amongst Australian parents, but at least until their children are married. Somewhat 
ironically, the Singapore state's corporatist communitarian ideological views regarding 
the normative nuclear family form, which operates as an anti-Western moralising 
discourse against alternative lifestyles, has been reproduced among migrants. 
Over here as far as possible, I tell my kids to stay at home with us until they are married, 
or if they work elsewhere like Sydney or Melbourne, then of course no choice they must 
go. The Aussies are not like that; once their kids go to university, they will go and stay on 
their own or rent a place with their friends. Then they only come back once or twice a 
year for Christmas or New Year. They don’t place so much importance on the family, 
unlike us. (Male: 55, Chinese, HSC, unemployed) 
 
I don’t want them to follow their Aussie friends' style of having multiple partners and 
cohabiting with their girlfriends before marriage. (Female: 45, Chinese, university 
education, former lawyer) 
 
Discursive Analogies of Home and Ways of Belonging 
 158 
Although most informants declared irrevocably that their home was encapsulated within 
their family, other informants' comments also reflect the dialectical contrast between 
family life in Singapore and Australia, reflecting the home versus not-home imagery.  
Well, remember I said we chose to emigrate for our kids, because we don’t want them 
growing up in that kind of stifling environment. And over there, I felt that I was slowly 
losing touch with my kids, because they were growing so quickly beyond my ability to 
connect with them, because as you know lah, Singapore is like that. Work work work, 
family life is only on the weekends, assuming you don’t need to do more work. But over 
here, everyday you finish work you go home to your family with no hassles over work. 
You don’t get people calling you after office hours to talk about work. You have dinner 
with your family, and you just, how to say it…you just connect better with them. I don’t 
know if it’s the less stressful working environment. But I do know I am much happier 
now, because for awhile in Singapore, I thought I was losing my family. (Male: 44, 
Eurasian, university education, lawyer) 
 
For this informant, emigration was a family issue not because of his children's future, but 
his.  
Coming over here was to save my marriage and my family. I am comfortable in 
Singapore. I have friends everywhere, and I had a good job. Here I think is too quiet for 
me. But I had no choice. My wife is European, and having lived in Singapore for what, 
fifteen years, she told me enough is enough. If I didn’t come over, she would have come 
without me and taken the kids over anyway. If it was any other reason other than my 
family, I would definitely not have come. (Male: 52, Indian, university education, dentist) 
 
These verbatims reflect the pragmatically-laden discourses surrounding their views on 
the importance of the family unit in their daily lives. When family issues are involved, 
emotionality often gets infused with logically pragmatic considerations. If I don’t migrate, 
I will lose my family. So I will give up my comfort zone in Singapore, and migrate to keep 
my family.  
 The individual, yet multiple ways with which Singaporean migrants imagine their 
homes show the diversity of this migrant group. Indeed, if migrants are self sufficient, 
have vastly different reasons for emigrating, and generally reproduce their essentialised, 
negative traits, then it makes the collective formation of a community in the host society 
that more difficult. Nevertheless, as I have shown throughout the thesis, they are still 
able to connect with the homeland in various symbolic ways. This, unfortunately, is also 
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dependent on the extent to which the homeland is gradually transformed and 
dismembered through state monopolisation of space and globalisation.  
 By way of conclusion, I will juxtapose the Singaporean case against two other 
established migrant diasporas in Australia – the Italians and Vietnamese. These two 
groups have been the subject of much scholarly attention in recent years within 
Australian discourse, and the general consensus is that they are a tight-knit community 
of migrants with strong networks and social solidarity. A simple comparison with these 
two groups will show, from a comparative perspective, why the fragmented community 
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In this thesis, I claimed that Singaporean migrants in Perth do not form a cohesive 
migrant community characterised by mutual solidarity, reciprocal obligations and trust. 
This is partly due to their extremely diverse and bitter conditions of exit, but more 
significantly, due to the generalised mistrust and endemic self-essentialisation that 
pervades this migrant "community". Furthermore, rather than assume that social capital 
is functionally useful for collective goals, their large "stocks" of capital in various forms 
negate the need for interdependence. As a result, collective social ties remain weak, 
although symbolic ties are utilised to reinvent their identities along post-national lines 
within the realms of the family. Diaspora consciousness is also manifested in 
transnationally symbolic ways, so that migrants continue to maintain some semblance of 
"Singaporean-ness" through the imagination of certain iconic homeland features. 
Nevertheless, the gradual dismemberment of the homeland will arguably reduce any 
remote sense of attachment that migrants experience in the diaspora.  
 
6.1 Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this study was its scope. Since this was an under-
researched area, there were many things to ponder and many different angles to take. 
As a result, I tried to cover several issues as adequately as possible, but at the expense 
of others, such as Singaporean-Australian social ties, the assimilation trajectories of 
immigrant children, repatriation, and perhaps most significantly, why some Singaporeans 
emigrate, while others who are part of the same circumstances stay.  
Based on current trends, I strongly believe that the general underlying feature of 
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suggest that all Singaporeans avoid one another, which was clearly not the case. 
However, there was enough evidence to document the dysfunctional aspects of 
community life in Perth, especially given the relatively large size of the cohort within an 
arguably small social space (Perth). Nevertheless, herein lies a paradox; many of them 
are “culturally” Singaporean in terms of their identification, if there is any way to quantify 
such a vague discursive construct. Yet, they prefer not to associate themselves with 
other Singaporeans or, depending on the context, the Singaporean “label”. Whether this 
will remain a prominent feature in years to come largely depends on identity issues; not 
so much the cultivation of a Singaporean national identity, but specifically, a strong 
sense of a "we"-feeling that transcends the symbolic and incorporates the social. For it 
was clear that Singaporean migrants were not fragmented along either ethnic, religious, 
class, or other social lines. Something deeper, something perceivably and indescribably 
"inherent" in most Singaporeans have turned them away from one another. The general 
bitterness and disenchantment surrounding their exits does constitute a bane towards 
any sense of collectiveness, since some Singaporeans do not only leave Singapore 
because they feel marginalised, but also because they want to detach themselves from 
other Singaporeans whom they have essentialised into some of the nastiest people 
alive. In this final chapter, I will juxtapose the Singaporean migrant community against 
two other established diasporas – the Italians and Vietnamese – to highlight the ways in 




One of the most striking features in Singaporean migrants' discourses regarding the 
sense of community, or its lack thereof, was their juxtaposition with the other dominant 
migrant groups in Perth – the Vietnamese and Italians (and sometimes the South 
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Africans as well). "Community-ness" was often defined in relation to the strength of ties 
that characterised those communities, which were either informed by their own personal 
connections to members of these groups, or general societal stereotypes that describe 
these groups as being "strongly-knit". Loretta Baldassar's (2001) ethnographic study on 
Italian-Australians and Mandy Thomas' (1997) work on the Vietnamese in Australia 
provide several recent useful comparisons here. I confine my analysis here to those 
aspects of their study that seek to explain the formation (or otherwise) of a migrant 
community. 
 
Vietnamese migrants in Australia 
Thomas' study was grounded on the daily lived experiences of the Vietnamese 
community in Cabramatta in western Sydney, focusing on their identities in relation to 
broader societal realities such as their reception in the host society, their portrayal in the 
Australian media, the renegotiation of family life, and their homeland ties. While Viviani 
(1984, cited in Thomas 1997:21) argued that their conditions of exit (as refugees) and a 
powerful anti-communist nationalist ideology facilitated the formation of a cohesive 
migrant community, Thomas argues that the extremely large and diverse Vietnamese 
group (comprising Chinese, Hmong, Tay and Dao people) has further problematised the 
notion of community into an ambiguous category. There are 'networks,…a notion of 
connectedness, and a degree of spatial concentration' (p. 14) in some areas. 
Nevertheless, community-ness is highly ethnicised and politicised due to their marginal 
post-migration status. The politicisation of ethnicity is therefore invoked as a resource for 
empowerment amidst oppositional contact which are, in many ways, similar to the 
Singaporean-Chinese' experience. The difference is that the latter lack the broad base 
for collective ethnic mobilisation, preferring to utilise ethnicity as a non-political cultural 
resource for the generational transmission of values instead.  
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 The increasing numbers of Vietnamese ethnic associations have gradually 
become an intrinsic part of Vietnamese migrants' lives. According to Thomas, these 
associations have become pivotal structures for the maintenance and generational 
transmission of family values, reinforcing the boundaries around which an "authentic" 
Vietnamese identity may be formed (p. 22). It is clear that these associations function to 
enforce trust and to bound solidarity within a shared identity amidst feelings of 
displacement and marginality, through Vietnamese language and "cultural" classes. 
Significantly, Thomas argues that the political ethnicisation of identity through community 
organisations is enforced by first generation Vietnamese migrants as a reaction against 
the perceived loss of homeland culture – a loss that stems from the 'damaging effects of 
the communist regime' (p. 24). It is therefore the community's hope that, through "exile", 
they are able to effect the transformation of home by participating in a collective "code" 
of social solidarity, despite the diverse factions within the community itself. It is this 
strong sense of nationalism – if nationalism refers to intense pride for one's home 
country – that evades many Singaporean migrants in Perth; partly because many of 
them feel that nothing can be done to effect any change in the "strong state" because 
the nation is "owned" by the state (and not its citizens), and partly because many are 
sufficiently endowed with the material gifts of social life, resulting in general ambivalence 
towards political issues. They are, after all, voluntary "quitters".  
 
San Fiorese Italian migrants in Perth 
Situating herself as an insider, Baldassar’s “thick description” of the Italian community in 
Australia was a comprehensive study on their conditions of exit, adaptation patterns, 
identity formation processes, network ties and generational differences, in relation to 
societal contexts. The general theme, however, centred on the dynamics of return 
homeland visits as part of a “natural progression” of being a San Fiorese migrant in 
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Australia, as well as the multifarious connections that pervaded the transnational social 
field between San Fior in north-eastern Italy, and Australia. While return visits are part 
and parcel of the migration process, linking both migrants and non-migrants alike, 
conflicting views regarding italianità (in general, being Italian or Italian-ness) 
problematises their identities according to generational differences, social class, gender, 
and migration type. Nevertheless, Italian identities intensified amidst prejudicial (hence 
ethnically oppositional) forces in the host society. Amidst similar social conditions, 
Singaporean-Chinese migrants' identities were largely reinvented along ethnic rather 
than national lines.  
Arguably one of the strongest expressions of a sense of community among the 
Italian-Australians is captured in the interplay between sistemazione (setting oneself up) 
and campanilismo (attachment to place, or parochialism) which, it seems to me, are 
forms of social capital inherent in social and symbolic network ties that underpin the 
entire migratory system between San Fior and Australia. Accordingly, Baldassar 
identified these inter-related concepts as ‘cultural values’ (p. 13). Subsequently, they 
may also be viewed as cultural capital – dispositions of the mind and body – which make 
return visits an institutionalised and obligatory pattern of social-cultural exchange that 
almost pre-determines italianità, while at the same time reinforcing these values as 
forms of social capital with every return visit and each new exit.  
Because most San Fiorese migrants share these values and internalise them as 
cultural practices, albeit with differing intensities, they are converted into social capital 
that facilitate Faist’s bridging, selective, diffusion and adaptive functions in the 
transnational social space, so that communities without propinquity are functionally 
linked through mutual obligations, reciprocity and intense social solidarity. As Baldassar 
observed, the San Fiorese migrants in Perth had strong family or comparatico 
(godparentage) ties, and everyone was socially and symbolically connected though 
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‘kinship, marriage, attachment to homeland, the migration process, cluster settlement, 
common work experiences, a shared history, and the Laguna Veneto Social Club’ (p. 
198). These migrants therefore transcend transnational kinship groups and transnational 
circuits to form a transnational community or Gemeinschaft, in which movers and stayers 
are connected through dense social and symbolic ties that generate a high degree of 
social cohesion (Faist 2000:207-08) in a transnational social space. Despite inevitable 
transformation of the community’s form and intensity over time (p. 196), the central 
underlying mechanisms of “community-ness” were nevertheless embodied within 
sistemazione (common experiences based on cultural values) and campanilismo 
(community identity through solidarity and social control), which are reflective of Portes 
and Sensenbrenner’s (2004:278-79) notion of social capital as bounded solidarity and 
enforceable trust – two important prerequisites for collective immigrant social action.  
 
Realising a community based on social ties 
The multiple meanings attached to campanilismo and italianità are nevertheless 
anchored within common historical experiences, so that while the content may change, 
its form persists across generations. This sense and actuality of community can only be 
achieved through collective solidarity characterised by dense social and symbolic ties, 
whereby reciprocity as a cultural norm and obligations as a pattern of social exchange 
are deeply embedded within the transnational social space. The experiences – in 
various senses of the word – of this diaspora group therefore represents a stark contrast 
to the Singaporean one. One aspect that works strongly against the Singaporean 
community is, of course, the lack of common, unifying symbols of nationhood (other than 
food) that transcends the symbolic and inheres in the social. This is to be expected, 
given the short history of the country. Perhaps in time to come, we may witness a global 
diaspora of ex-Singaporeans (rather than simply economic transmigrants) who are not 
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only pragmatic seekers of the gifts of material social life, but also "dinky-dye" 
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1. When did you migrate to Perth? 
 
2. Are you a citizen or PR? 
 
3. Why did you migrate to Australia and not somewhere else? 
 
4. Why did you choose Perth? 
 
5. Why did you emigrate? Are reasons different from (3)? 
 
6. Have you been to Sydney or Melbourne and other eastern states? What are 
some similarities and/or differences between Perth and these places? 
 
7. How many times did you come to Perth before emigrating? 
 
8. Who influenced your decision to migrate? If it was someone else, what were the 
reasons? 
 




10. Now that you have been here for ____ years, how would you describe your 
identity? 
 
11. What were some of your initial impressions about Australian people in Perth, and 
has that impression changed over the years?  
 
12. What aspects of Australian lifestyle do you like the most, and what aspects do 




13. What aspects of Singaporean lifestyle do you like the most, and what aspects do 
you not fancy? 
 
14. What are some similarities and differences between life in Singapore and 
Australia? 
 
15. What type of food do you normally eat and cook when you are in Perth?  
 
16. What are some reasons for choosing this suburb? 
 
17. Do you participate in or celebrate any Australian festivals and/or holidays? Which 
ones are most meaningful to you? 
 
18. Do you celebrate Singaporean or your own ethnic festivals and/or holidays?  
 
(Occupation) 
19. What profession were you in before you “migrated”? Are you in the same 
profession now? If different, why did you switch jobs? 
 
20. What are some of the similarities and differences between the working and/or 
business environment in Singapore and Australia?  
 
21. Did you have any problems adapting to the working environment? Examples? 
 
22. Have you ever encountered an instance of discrimination and/or racism, either 
implicitly or explicitly?  
 
 (Modes of incorporation) 
23. What are some of the problems that you faced when you first migrated here? 
 




25. Did you make use of any support networks when you first came here to aid in 
your adaptation process, eg Contact Singapore, WASBC, Temasek Club, 
Australia-Asia Association? 
 
26. What are some “Asian” or Singaporean values that you want to pass on to your 
children and hope that they will consciously adopt in their everyday lives? Why 
do you identify these values as important? 
 
27. What are some of the cultural “dos” and “don’ts” about Australian society that 
you’ve learnt while you’ve been here for ____ years? 
 
(Community and social life) 
28. Tell me a bit about your social life here and what you do to pass your time. How 
is it similar or different compared to your leisure time in Singapore?  
 
29. Can you name some of the Singaporean associations in Perth and their activities 
or goals? 
 
30. Have you ever been approached to join these organisations? 
 
31. Would you like to join any of these organisations if you were asked to now? Why 
yes/no? 
 
32. Where/in what context do you think you have met the most number of 
Singaporeans in Perth? 
 
33. Do you make special efforts to help new Singaporean migrants settle in here?  
 
34. Do you think that there is a strong sense of a Singaporean migrant community in 
Perth, excluding the student community? 
 




36. Assuming the Singapore government allows dual citizenship. Would you have 
taken it up? 
 
On transnational connections with the “homeland”/place of origin: 
37. How often do you maintain contacts with family and friends in Singapore? 
 
38. How often do you go back to Singapore? How long do you normally spend? 
 
39. What is one of the first things that you do when you make your “return visit” to 
Singapore? 
 
40. Do you keep in touch with events that happen in Singapore? 
a) How? 
b) How often? 
c) Can you name one specific event that you identify emotionally with 
Singapore? 
 
41. Do you maintain contacts with any specific organization in Singapore (i.e. alma 
mater, former company etc)? 
 
42. Now that you have been here for ___ years, where is your "home"? 
a) What do you understand by the term “home”/”homeland”?  
b) Why do you say that _____ is your home, and not the other? 
 
43. Would you want to return to Singapore in the future to live? 
 
44. Have you ever felt that you should do something (anything) to help Singapore, eg 
donations, advertising Singapore to locals from here etc? 
 
45. What were your first impressions/thoughts when I called you regarding this 
interview, bearing in mind that you don’t know me and have never met me 
before, and the fact that I am Singaporean? Why did you feel that way?  
 
 
